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CHAPTER V
NATURAL HISTORY AND THE STATE OF NATURE
In the second section of chapter III above,

we re-

ferred to Locke's apparent relegation of morality to the
periphery of his concern in writing the Essay.

Locke seems

in effect to promise that however novel in other respects
may

be

his

empiricist

account of

natural

science,

that

account leaves relatively inviolate the province of morality;

he declares in closing that the study of nature is

"wholly separate and distinct" (4.21.5) from the science of
ethics or morality.
tions

We have noted too that Locke's asser-

of the possibility of a

science

of

precisely

morality
such

a

appear

strict

to

demonstrative,
entail

separation

sciences of morality and nature.1

an
of

mixed-mode

insistence
the

on

respective

In fact, however, there

are significant ambiguities in Locke's presentation of this
proposal.

To say the least, it is by no means clear that

he does insist upon the total or even decisive abstraction
of morality from nature; indeed we may wonder whether his
occasional qualifications of this proposal, taken together,
serve ultimately to undermine in principle any attempt at
such an abstraction.

In the midst of his chapter "Of the

lsee chapter III above, especially pp. 99-106.
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Improvement of

Our Knowledge, "

fesses to "doubt not,

for

instance,

Locke pro-

but if a right method were taken,"

that not all, but only "a great part of Morality" might be
demonstrated "to a considering Man" with a clarity equal to
that of a mathematical demonstration (4.12.8).

Similarly,

in his discussion "Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge, " he
claims that the central ideas of the proposition that human
beings as "understanding, rational Beings" are God's Workmanship would,

"if duly

considered,

and pursued,

afford

such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might
place" morality among the demonstrative sciences,

"to any

one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and
Attention"

to

morality

that

( 4. 3. 18) .

Shortly thereafter,

he

devotes

to

mathematics

in explaining why attempts

at demonstrations in ethics have hitherto caused greater
difficulties than those in

m~thematics,

he makes the same

point still more cautiously, maintaining that a search with
"indifferency" would bring us only "nearer perfect Demonstration, than is commonly imagined" (4.3.20).2
Leaving aside for the moment the implications of the
questionable likelihood of widespread "indifferency" on the
part of individuals in their moral inquiries, we first

2 Gibson is rare among Locke's commentators in noting
the caution apparent in Locke's formulations concerning the
possibility of a demonstrative science of morality, but he
seems nonetheless to hold that Locke is at best dimly aware
of the difficulties that such a pure science would entail
(1896, 50,58).
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wonder in the wake of these qualifications precisely how
according to Locke an indifferent inquiry would fall short
of strict demonstration, or what part of morality necessarily

resists

though

he

attempts

at

acknowledges

We

demonstration.
that

moral

recall

discourses

that

inevitably

contain substance ideas as well as ideas of mixed modes and
relations,
ideas

need

he

maintains

not

that

disturb

such

the

presence

discourses,

of

substance

because

the

adequacy of their definitions need not--indeed cannot--be
self-evident or demonstrated, and so instead can and must
be merely supposed

( 3. 11. 16) .

As Grant explains,

"With

respect to subjection to the law, the question to be asked
is not,

Is this a Man? but Is this a corporeal rational

Being?" (1987, 30).

Locke suggests here that our inability

to achieve any precise,

finally adequate definition of a

human being is inconsequential for morality, insofar as we
can

nonetheless

frame

an

abstract

idea

comprising

the

qualities essential to moral beings. 3 The undemonstrative
portion of

ethical

science would then

appear to be the

supposed or posited character of the subject of morality,
of the "moral man" or person.

3This reasoning appears to underlie Locke's occasional
references to the subject of law or morality as a "rational
Creature" or a "free and intelligent Agent" (TT II .12, 57;
also STCE 31).
We hope to show in what follows, however,
that for Locke such references to agency or personhood may
provide greater analytical precision, but they do not imply
the invalidity of ordinary references to human beings as
the subjects of morality.
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It

is

important

to

recognize,

however,

that

supposition lying at the basis of Lockean moral

this

science

does not represent a pure act of mental construction or
creativity.
spirit

of

Locke does not suggest that we ponder,
indifference

to

whether

such

beings

in a

actually

exist, what faculties one would have to possess in order to
qualify as a moral being.

Morality is our great concern,

"the proper Science and Business of Mankind

in general"

(4.12.11); insofar as we do so with even minimal rationality, therefore, we frame moral ideas, be they substances or
mixed modes,

with a view to their usefulness

2.28.2; 3.5.7).

(2.22.6,10;

In the context of his own account of the

origin of our moral ideas, Locke's framing of the concept
of a moral man or person makes sense only on the premise
that such beings actually exist in the world.

He proceeds

not by simply positing an idea, but instead by collecting
the morally basic or necessary qualities of the class of
moral beings actually existing,
experience.

of which we have actual

Once again, Locke appeals to what "Every one,

I think, finds in himself" (2.21.7) in order to corroborate
his account of our moral faculties.4

The complex idea of a

corporeal rational creature is not then a pure creature of
the mind,
proper.

but is instead formed in an act of abstraction
It is abstracted from real experience.

The premise of the present chapter is that throughout
4see chapter IV above, pp. 191-193.
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the

Essay

Locke

tends

to

exaggerate

the

methodological

separation of moral from natural science, just as elsewhere
he exaggerates the distinction between the abstract, normative-theoretical principles of political science and the
empirically,
governing.5

historically

grounded

prudential

art

of

In maintaining that "at best an Argument from

what has been,

to what should of right be, has no great

force" (TT II.103), Locke implies no more than that what is
moral or just cannot be simply reduced to actual historical
practice; he does not deny that historical inquiry is useful and indeed necessary for the development of a proper
understanding of the nature and limits of our capacities as

5see again "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and study
for a Gentleman," in Axtell 1968, 400.
I do not mean to
argue that the distinctions in question are without any
validity for Locke. I am suggesting only that the rules of
morality, and by implication the principles of political
justice, rest ultimately upon an empirically grounded
conception of the nature of those to whom such rules and
principles properly apply.
Locke's exaggerations of these
distinctions tend to obscure the extent to which his
account of a constructivist moral science rests upon a
natural ground.
Focusing on other textual ambiguities,
Strauss persuasively explains much of the reason for
Locke's exaggeration by reference to the different form of
caution proper to practical as opposed to theoretical
writers (1953, 206-209; cf. Cox 1960, 11).
I believe that
in the Essay Locke indeed intends to attack scholastic
morality, but to do so for the most part indirectly,
through his critique of scholastic natural science; he
seeks to clear a space of relative freedom to deliver his
critique of scholastic natural science, by suggesting
misleadingly that
that
critique will
not
implicate
scholastic morality as well.
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moral

In

beings. 6

keeping with

the

"Historical,

plain

Method" of the Essay as a whole (1.1.2), Locke employs the
idea of "moral man" as an empirically grounded,

testable

hypothesis, even as a kind of thought-experiment.
suppose,

Locke reasons in effect,

Let us

that the beings in the

world who possess the capacity or equipment for morality
constitute

a

natural

species;

the

following

empirical

questions then arise, as most immediately relevant to our
purposes.

In what relation does the class of moral beings

stand to the class or classes of beings ordinarily denominated "human"?
nature

of

this

What if anything can we infer from the
moral

equipment

concerning

the

specific

content of the political morality most appropriate to the
class of tho.se so equipped?

What further common qualities

can we discover that may be relevant to our construction of
moral ideas?

What natural needs, desires,

interests,

and

passions do the members of this class share, in addition to
the qualities constitutive of moral personhood, which may

6cf. ECHU 4. 4 .1 with 1.1. 5:
Perhaps with a view to
the fact that a purely constructive or definitional moral
science could produce only "Castles in the Air," Locke
remarks somewhat offhandedly but suggestively that "Probability," the proper yield of empirical inquiry, "is sufficient to govern all our Concernments."
(Emphasis supplied.)
It appears that this fact compels Grant as well,
notwithstanding her opinion that the distinction between
normative and empirical political science derives from a
distinction fundamental to the Essay, ultimately to attribute to Locke the opinion that "Nature is the appropriate
standard" for the formation of our moral ideas (1987, 37;
cf. 21-22,37-41,48). Cf. Ashcraft 1969, 209; Shapiro 1986,
81,105,109,123-124.
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engender a natural affinity for or resistance to a given
moral-political doctrine--in particular the doctrine of the
natural rights of humankind?
In this chapter and the one following

it,

we will

describe more specifically Locke's view of the nature of
our moral equipment, and then examine the reasoning whereby
Locke defends the doctrine of equal unalienable rights as
the teaching of justice most appropriate to our nature.

We

will argue that there is no ultimate conflict between the
Essay's proposed demonstrative moral science and the Two
Treatises'

doctrine of natural rights,

provided that the

former

understood

empirically well-

be

as

resting

upon

founded but nonetheless necessarily experimental propositions.

More importantly,

we will argue that in the end

Locke's account of the nature of our moral equipment does
contain

the

materials

required

to

defense of the principles of natural

erect

a

reasonable

rights,

though the

peculiar rhetorical imperatives by which Locke finds his
presentation constrained tend to obscure these materials.
Let us begin by elaborating Locke's account of agency as a
requisite for subjection to moral rules or laws.

THE MORAL AGENT
Fundamental
"moral

man"

concept

of

as
a

to
a

Locke's

elaboration of the

"corporeal

person

or

rational

self.

All

idea of

Creature"

rational

is

the

creatures,

according to Locke, have an experience of inwardness or of
reflectiveness,

in

which

they

recognize

a

distinction

between self and world, between the subject and objects of
their thinking.
son ..• a

To have this experience is to be a "Per-

thinking

intelligent

Being,

that has

reason and

reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same
thinking thing

in different

times

and places"

(2. 27. 9).

Moreover, to be a person is to be conscious of oneself as
the author or proprietor not merely of thoughts, but also,
and more generally,

of actions.

By ordinary reflection,

according to Locke, we find in ourselves "a Power to begin
or forbear,

continue or end several actions of our minds,

and motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering,

or as it were commanding the

doing or not doing ... a particular action"
passim).

and

In exercising this power of willing we experience

ourselves as agents,
beings.

( 2. 21. 5, 7,

as free,

self-disposing,

responsible

For it is our sense of the mind's "Dominion ... over

any part of the Man"

(2.21.15),

of our self-ordering or

commanding power, that allows us to appropriate our inter225
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nal

and external motions,

which would otherwise be mere

unconscious or unfree behavior, as our own productions and
thus our own actions.
moral

beings,

"Person"

for

the

Without this power we could not be

bearers

Locke

is

"a

of

rights

forensick

and
Term

obligations.
appropriating

Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent
Agents

capable

of

a

In

Law ••• "

"personal

Identity

is

founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment"
(2.27.26,18; cf. 1.3.14).
Essential to our moral equipment is then, as Shapiro
describes
action"

it,

our

capacity

for

(1986, 96,105,124,144).7

"autonomous

intentional

Whether this capacity in

itself represents a proper or sufficient basis for Locke's
doctrine of rights, however, remains to be seen.
or not Freedom," Locke maintains,

"Freedom,

"can belong to nothing,

but what has, or has not a power to act" (2.21.19).

Let us

consider more carefully what it means, according to Locke,
for us to be free, to be agents.
mind that

freedom

We need first to bear in

and volition are

nonidentical,

though

closely related; volition in itself is a necessary but not
sufficient condition of the freedom of agents.

We are free

as agents, in Locke's more provisional definition, insofar
as the alternatives of performance and forbearance of a
7More or less elaborate descriptions and analyses of
Locke's account of agency appear in Lamprecht 1918, 96-102,
110-115; Parry 1978, esp. 23-37; Tully 1980, 105-111; Wood
1983, 143-161; Colman 1983, 188ff, 206-234; Yol ton 1970,
138-159, and 1985, 17-33; Rapaczynski 1987, 116-176.
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given action lie equally in our power, so that our volition
to perform or forbear occurs in the context of a genuine
choice

In Locke's examples,

(2.21.8,27).

through the air who wills not to fall
free,

a

man

falling

is obviously not

in that his volition is irrelevant to his performing

or forbearing, that is, his continuing or ceasing to fall;
whereas, less obviously though on the same principle, a man
who wills to remain with desirable company in a locked room
is

also

unfree,

in

that

his

decisively upon his own will,

remaining

does

not

depend

but is necessitated by an

external impediment to his leaving (2.21.9,10). 8
The

freedom

of

agency

thus

requires

a

certain

contingency or indeterminacy in the actual possibility of
either doing or forbearing, in order to ensure the primacy
of volition.

Still,

as

Locke somewhat testily imagines

"the inquisitive Mind of Man" might object, how does this
notion of freedom apply to the action of volition itself?
Can we say properly that someone is free "if he be not as
free to will,

as he is to act, what he wills"

(2. 21. 22)?

Bet. Hobbes, Leviathan XXI: "A FREE-MAN, is he, that
in those things, which .Qy his strength and wit he is able
to do, is not hindered to doe what he has g_ will to"
(ed.
MacPherson 1968, 262).
Thus Hobbes would hold that only
the man in the first of Locke's examples is unfree. In its
greater emphasis on the availability of a genuine choice,
Locke's stricter definition of freedom seems to reflect his
desire to promote among his readers a sharper consciousness
of the conditions of human freedom and unfreedom.
It thus
corresponds with his insistence on freedom, contrary to the
doctrine of Hobbes, as an unalienable right and a condition
of governmental legitimacy.
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In what sense can we be agents, possessing active power, if
the will itself is a passive power?9

We recall Locke's

acknowledgement that "Morality and Mechanism .•. are not very
easy to be reconciled,
the other hand,

or made consistent"

( 1. 3. 14) .

On

it is equally questionable whether we can

be truly agents if the will is a

strictly active power.

For if we conceive of the freedom of the will or more generally of the mind as radical autonomy, as pure contingency
or

indeterminacy,

then

we

would

reduce

human

action

to

sheer arbitrariness--"as great an imperfection," according
to Locke,

"as the want of Indifferency to act,

or not to

act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection
on the other side"

(2. 21. 48).

The difficulty concerning

the status of the will is thus twofold, with extreme implications of arbitrariness and fatalism seeming to correspond
respectively to the alternative conceptions of the will as
an active or a passive power.10

The task Locke faces in

explicating our experience of agency is to find a moderate
solution whereby willing can be in some sense both active
and passive, both free and nonarbitrary.
9 11 Power thus considered is twofold, viz. as able to
make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called
Active, and the other Passive Power" (2.21.2).
lOcf. Rapaczynski's formulation:
"If the agent's
choice of reasons is ultimately determined, then he cannot
be responsible for his actions. If, on the other hand, his
choice is not determined, then it is unmotivated and arbitrary.
If this is the case, however, responsibility will
not make much sense either, for the agent is not 'rationa 1 I l l ( 19 8 7 I 12 6 ) •
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After disposing of both the semantic confusions and
the more trivial questions that arise from an excessively
literal construction of the term "free will"
25),

Locke turns

(2.21.6,14-

finally to the serious question of the

determination of the will.

He holds that

" ... that which

immediately

Will ..• is

uneasiness

desire,

determines

the

fixed on some absent good ... "

ideas here require explication.
good,
terms:

which
11

•••

Locke

tends

the

(2.21.33).

of

Several

Most basic is the idea of

to define

in purely hedonistic

what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us,

is that we call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in
us, we call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness
to

produce

2.20.2).11

Pleasure

and

Pain

in

us"

(2.21.42;

also

Uneasiness for Locke refers simply to pain; it

subsumes "All pain of the body of what sort soever,
disquiet of the mind. 11 12

and

Moreover, it is inseparable from

desire, in that desire is "nothing but an uneasiness in the
llcf. again Hobbes, Leviathan ch. VI:
"Pleasure
therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of
Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or
sense of Evill" (ed. MacPherson 1968, 122).
12colman complains with some justification that in its
abstraction or generality Locke's concept of uneasiness is
"to say the least of it, shadowy ... a blanket term covering
a variety of mental states of the agent ... too broad and
vague to be of much service in a causal explanation of human action" (1983, 216-217,223).
But this for Locke seems
to be precisely the point; his vague, general account of
the concept of uneasiness constitutes merely a statement or
restatement of the massive fact of relativism or dissensus
with respect to the objects of our actions or our conceptions of happiness.
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want of an absent good."

No one feels pain without feeling

in that very pain a desire for relief equal in magnitude to
Uneasiness for Locke seems to

the pain itself (2.21.31).
represent
desire

the

force

represents

that movement. 13

capable

of

moving

the determination

the

of the

will,

while

direction of

Further, Locke distinguishes between an

essentially negative

or

indefinite

desire

for

ease

from

pain and an essentially positive desire for a particular
absent good (ibid.).

It is the latter form, the desire for

an absent positive good,

in which our cognizance of the

absent good precedes the sense of uneasiness, that leads to
the heart of his account of voluntary action.
According to his

own

testimony,

Locke

changed his

mind concerning the determination of the will between the
publication of the first and second editions of the Essay.
In the first edition, he confesses, he "took .•. for granted"
the soundness of the opinion that "seems so establish'd and
settled a maxim by the general consent of all Mankind, That
good,

the greater good, determines the will"

(2.21.35) .14

In its most basic significance, Locke's insistence in the
second and subsequent editions on the primacy of uneasiness
13cf. Rapaczynski 1987, 145-148.
14Thus 2.21.29 of the first edition:
"For the cause
of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater
degree of Pleasure, has the nature of Good, and vice versa,
and is that which determines our Choice, and challenges our
Preference.
Good then, the greater Good is that alone
which determines the Will" (ed. Nidditch 1975, 250-251).
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represents

an

application

of

against the nature of things,

the

principle

"'tis

that what is absent should

operate, where it is not" (2.21.37).
sense a matter of semantics:

that

This is in a trivial

an absent good can be present

to the mind only as desire, as privation or uneasiness, and
therefore can move the will only in this mode.

As for its

more substantive significance, it is fundamentally true, as
Yolton

argues,

that

Locke's

reconsideration

involves

a

rejection of the first edition's "intellectualist position
on motives"

(1970,

144).

But this does not mean that in

the second and subsequent editions Locke totally or drastically depreciates the role of the understanding in volition; Colman observes aptly that Locke's revision constitutes rather a clarification than a rejection of the view
"that properly free actions are those which are grounded in
rational decisions" (1983, 215).15
The depreciation of reason

in the

revised account

consists in Locke's denial of the causal or motivational
efficacy of "bare contemplation" or "unactive speculation"
(2.21.34,37); he no longer holds that the mere apprehension
or acknowledgment of an absent good as such, that is, of
its pleasurable potential, is in itself sufficient to raise
15contrast the account of Lamprecht, who finds in the
first edition a statement of "the extreme hedonistic position, which discomfited Locke by its implication "that men
were mere creatures swayed by the strongest pleasure .•. thus
leaving no room for the guiding activity of reason."
Locke's revision thus represents for Lamprecht a retreat
from mechanism, not from intellectualism (1918, 112-115).
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in us a

desire proportionate to

its goodness.

What

is

instead sufficient to raise our desires is "happiness and
that alone"

(2.21.41).

In accordance with his definition

of the good, Locke tends also to define happiness hedonistically; in its full extent it is "the utmost Pleasure we
are capable of," while in its lowest degree it is "so much
ease

from

all

Pain,

and

so

much

present

without which one cannot be content" (42).
the

idea

of happiness

principle,

operates

determining which

as

as

Thus conceived,

kind of regulatory

prospective

which will not raise desires in us.
ledged good stirs us,

a

Pleasure,

goods

will

and

Not all absent acknow-

"but only that part, or so much of

it, as is consider'd, and taken to make a necessary part of
(our) happiness" (2.21.43; also 59).
Locke's diminished estimate of the power of a rational apprehension of the greater good to determine the will
arises in part from the necessity of explaining the common
fact

of

volitional

error.

On

the

principle

that

the

greater apparent good determines the will, we are unable to
explain the fact that we often stray voluntarily from our
own understanding of what is good for us--that we commonly
acknowledge the real possibility of a joyful afterlife or a
prosperous earthly future, for instance, and yet choose not
to order our lives in the pursuit of such goods.
... let a Drunkard see,
Estate wastes; Discredit
all things, even of his
the course he follows:

that his Heal th decays, his
and Diseases, and the want of
beloved Drink, attends him in
yet the returns of uneasiness
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to miss his Companions; the habitual thirst after his
cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern,
though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least
of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses, is far greater, than the tickling of his palate
with a glass of Wine, or the idle chat of a soaking
Club.
(2.21.35; also 38,45)
If not all, nor even the greatest apparent goods, but
only

those

that

gain

inclusion

into

our conceptions

of

happiness can raise in us a sense of uneasiness and thereby
determine our wills,

then the essential question concerns

the framing of our conceptions of happiness:

How do we

come to regard some goods as necessary to our happiness, to
the exclusion of others of equal or even greater magnitude?
It is clear that in correcting the first edition's implicit
assimilation of human willing to that of "those superiour
Beings above us,"

Locke calls specific attention to the

commonly subrational construction of our ideas of happiness16;
acquired

some

combination

habits,

as

in

of
the

natural passions or aversions,

more-or-less

unreflectively

case

drunkard,

of

the

such as bodily pain,

and
lust,

16wood suggests that in emphasizing the various environmental influences on or obstructions of reasoning, Locke
advances the development of Bacon's "embryonic 'sociology
of knowledge' and conception of 'ideology'" (1983, 94-107).
Cf. Tully's discussion of the "normative and constitutive"
functions of mixed-mode ideas in Locke's epistemology, apparently attributing an ideological closure to particular
"language communities":
like that of Vico, Locke's political thought begins (and therefore ends) with "the constitutive and regulative ideas of a given culture" {1980, 1334).
A similar account of the origin of moral reasoning,
though with a greater emphasis on the possibility of transcending one's cultural inheritance, appears in Rapaczynski
1987, 161-176.
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or revenge (2.21.38), tends at any given moment to produce
the uneasinesses whose alleviation our happiness requires.
What is crucial, however, is that Locke does not intend by
his revision to assert the necessarily or essentially subrational character of human willing.

The doctrine of the

insufficiency of the mere intellectual recognition of prospective goods to determine volition may involve

in one

sense a diminished estimate of the subjection of volition
to reason; yet what Locke's revision ultimately denies is
less that

subjection as

understandings

such than

the constancy of our

in devoting adequate consideration to the

framing of our ideas of happiness.

Our propensity to for-

bear the pursuit of acknowledged greater goods represents
no insuperable limitation of our nature, but instead proceeds simply from our negligence in constructing conceptions of happiness.
Locke's

understanding

of

happiness

as

a

mental

construct or a complex idea points to the sense in which
his revised account of volition preserves an emphasis on
the decisive role of reason.

Because the substantiation of

our ideas of happiness is in Locke's view identical with
the specification of that complex of goods whose absence
raises in us a sense of uneasiness, in order for our ideas
of happiness to be rationally constructed we must be somehow capable of raising within ourselves feelings of uneasiness at the absence of goods that our reason approves.

In
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fact, according to Locke, the inefficacy of bare intellectual apprehension in determining volition does not signify
the inefficacy of the understanding in general; we are able
by "a due considering and examining any good proposed ... to
raise our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that
good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may come to work
upon the will,

and be pursued"

(2.21.46;

also 56,69) .17

Inasmuch as this account of our ideas of happiness as properly the products
intention

holds

of

the

reflective,
key

to

considered

Locke's

judgment or

conception of moral

agency, it is necessary for us to explore further the basis
of this "due considering."
Two seemingly closely related mental powers are at
work here.

Our ability to devote due consideration to any

proposed good depends at least in part upon a power that,
like the primacy of uneasiness in general, Locke introduces
in the revised second edition of the Essay.

In the power

17 In this explanation of our intellectual power to
raise in ourselves sensations of desire for absent goods,
Rapaczynski sees the grounds for a resolution of the commonly observed tension between rationalistic and hedonistic
elements in Lockean ethics (1987, 150-156).
Viewing "the
relation between universal moral norms and sensual inclinations [as] more 'dialectical' in Locke than in Kant," he
goes so far as to issue a rather striking denial that Lockean morality is hedonistic in the ordinary sense of the
term (167; 155-161).
See the further discussion of this
point in chapter VI below, pp. 352-364.
Cf. Colman's view
that while Locke's theory "is quite distinct from egoistic
hedonism as a psychological theory," still his "account of
rational action may be termed a hedonistic theory of
reasons for actions" (1983, 223). Contrast Lamprecht 1918,
65-118; Aaron 1955, 256-269; Von Leyden 1958, 71-75.
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of the mind "to suspend the execution and satisfaction of
any of its desires, " Locke observes "the hinge on which
turns the liberty of intellectual Beings"

(2.21.47,52).18

18This conception of liberty as dependent upon a
mental capacity to suspend the execution of our desires
appears to supersede Locke's earlier, more Hobbesian, more
behavioral or mechanical definition of liberty as the power
only to do or forbear, with out reference to the question
whether we are free also to determine our own preferences,
desires, or volitional commands.
Critics have sometimes
questioned, however, whether Locke's revised conception
represents a truly significant departure from the original.
Locke's contemporary John Jackman observes, for instance,
"that either this suspension must be no voluntary action,
or, though it be a voluntary action, the Will must not be
determin'd to it by any Uneasiness, or, it must be determin'd to it by a less Uneasiness than that, the relief
whereof is suspended.
Of the parts of which Disjunction,
the first and last, are too unreasonable to need any confutation to you, and the second is directly contradictory to
your opinion" (CJL #2105, 6/20/1696). More recently, Ellen
Meiksins Wood opines similarly that the act of suspension
must represent an act of volition determined by uneasiness,
and therefore that Locke's account of voluntary action remains close to that of Hobbes (1972, 36-40).
See also Von
Leyden 1981, 56. Colman concludes somewhat more sympathetically that "Although Locke continues to talk of uneasiness
as determining the will even on those occasions when we
stand back and deliberate on whether the proposed actions
accord with our true happiness, the tenor of his later
doctrine is that properly free actions spring, not from
some occurrent feeling of the agent, but from reason"
(1983, 221-222).
It is undeniable that Locke's revision
creates a textual ambiguity on this point (cf. especially
2.21.40,47,53); but this ambiguity is not fatal to Locke's
account of moral freedom.
Even if the act of suspending
one's desires were itself a voluntary act determined by the
most pressing uneasiness, this need imply no more than that
moral reason does not develop autonomously or spontaneously, but instead requires the cultivation of a desire in
support of it.
There would be no contradiction in holding
that once properly cultivated, such a desire could assume a
position of priority relative to all other desires, so that
in effect reason, once made the primary element of one's
"relish," would nonetheless constitute a power capable of
overriding all or nearly all more particular desires.
On
the cultivation of rationality, see STCE 36,40,41,77,81,83,
95.
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For the

"first ••. and great use of Liberty,

is to hinder

blind Precipitancy" (2.21.67); insofar as it enables us to
perform our duty to examine with "caution,

deliberation,

and wariness" the alternative courses of action available
to us and therefore provides the foundation for our power
of raising our own desires, the exercise of this suspensory
power establishes us as the justly accountable authors and
owners of our actions

But because the

(2.21.52,56,67).

idea of happiness represents more for Locke than an indefinite train of successes in attaining the objects of our
desires,19
reports

on

more

than a

successive

mere aggregation
present

mental

of goods or of

states--because

it

represents instead an ordering, an assignment of priorities
that extends properly over the courses of our entire lives-the exercise of the suspensory power as a
rational

liberty depends

requisite of

in turn upon the exercise of a

still more basic mental power, namely the power of abstraction.
Only in a narrow, casual sense does Locke hold that
"who is content is happy"

(2.21.59); he clearly believes

that there is such a thing as an irrational contentment, an
"imaginary" as well as a "real happiness"

(51).

For "the

present moment not being our eternity," and "since our vol19cf. Hobbes, Leviathan VI:
"Continual! successe in
obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual! prospering, is that men
call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life" (ed. MacPherson 1968, 129).
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untary Actions carry not all the Happiness and Misery, that
depend on them,

along with them in their present perfor-

mance; but are the precedent causes of Good and Evil"

(39,

59), it follows that a fully rational conception and pursuit of happiness must involve a consideration of prospective as well as present pleasures and pains (61,62).

This

consideration obviously involves an empirical, probabilistic assessment of the consequences of alternative courses
of action, but it involves more fundamentally the exercise
of the crucial power of abstraction in facilitating full
human self-consciousness.

For it is by virtue of the power

of abstraction that we are able to conceive of the core of
our being as the self, as the source of action and concernment, with an identity continuing over time (2.27.17ff).20
20In explaining personal identity as consisting in
identity of consciousness, Locke may seem, as some critics
have charged, to mistake the mere datum of personal identity, i.e. memory, for its cons ti tu ti ve element.
Thus he
declares, for instance, that "If there be any part of its
Existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that
present consciousness, whereby I am now my self, it is in
that part of its Existence no more my self, than any other
immaterial Being" (2.27.24).
For a thorough discussion of
this objection, see Flew 1968, especially 158-166. In making this argument Locke may intend in part to call attention to the genuine difficulty in searching for grounds for
claiming an unrecollected action as one's own. More importantly, however, Locke's description of the fragility of
our identities as persons serves to underline the human
need to struggle to overcome the attractions of present,
momentary indulgences and thus to unify one's experiences
into a single, coherent, well governed and directed life.
"This appropriating consciousness is not just memory," observes Yelton, but involves in addition a capacity of "being concerned for the deeds I have done, concerned for
their happiness-producing, for their moral worth, for their
importance in my intentional actions" (1985, 32). In main-
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we are thus able to abstract from a succession of instant,
momentary experiences a conception of our own life as an
integrated whole capable of being more or less well lived.
By projecting our selves into the future and comparing the
likely consequences of pursuing various possible or imaginable courses of action, we can frame general conceptions of
happiness or of well-lived lives whereby we can evaluate
our present alternatives.
Our construction of ideas of happiness represents for
Locke

the

most

comprehensive

indication

of

our

natural

capacity for rational liberty and therefore for law.
capacity to

transcend the present,

bring ideas of future,

or alternatively,

The
to

absent goods into the present and

deliberate on their relative merits is inseparable from the
capacity to master our inclinations or to forego more immediately available gratifications.

Moreover, the capacity

for transcendence inherent in our power of abstraction
permits us not merely to transfer,

as it were, our self-

consciousness to various past and future moments in our own
lives.
this

Locke's opinion concerning the ultimate sweep of
transcendent

capacity

may

remain

unclear,

but

in

taining that "a concern for Happiness [is] the unavoidable
concomitant of consciousness" (2.27.26), Locke comes close
to arguing that individuals possess unitary selves to the
degree that they are concerned to possess unitary selves.
To the extent to which reason succeeds in governing our
passionate pursuits, comments Pangle, "the self would seem
to unify itself, to gather itself, to become more fully a
self" (1988, 268). Cf. Wood on Locke's apparent conflation
of cognitive and conative selves (1983, 157-161).
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stressing the dangers inherent in uncritical assent to the
received

opinions

(1.4.22,

4.12.4,

of our various
4.15.6,

circles

of association

4.20.17: also cu 3,41), he seems

to imply a far-reaching power at least in some to reflect
critically upon their formative influences, to look "abroad
beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys" (1.3.2).
to be within our power,

according to Locke,

not merely our own historical present,
tural

inheritance.21

It seems

to transcend

but also our cul-

Our capacity to appropriate to our

imagination the experiences of others in other times and
places, to consider them as potentially our own, thus seems
to be an essential guarantor of our capacity to appropriate
actions by ensuring that the latter proceed from an authentic choice.
This appears to be the reasoning behind Locke's claim
that it is the mental power of abstraction, "the having of
general Ideas," in which "the Species of Brutes are discriminated from Man: and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to
so

vast

a

difference"

(2.11.10,11) .22

Notwithstanding,

21Thus Wood recognizes that, notwithstanding his contribution to the development of the 'sociology of knowledge,' Locke's conception of consciousness is essentially
transhistorical. But as Wood presents it, this recognition
constitutes less an appreciation than an accusation (1983,
94-100,157-163). Cf. note 16 above.
22under fire from Stillingfleet, Locke subsequently
disclaims any intention to argue that 'herein chiefly lies
the excellency of mankind above brutes that these cannot
abstract and enlarge their ideas, as men do.'
He replies
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therefore, his definition of happiness in wholly hedonistic
terms,

Locke is able to claim that on the basis of this

power of abstraction or generalization,

human beings are

uniquely persons, capable of both law and happiness in ways
that the lower animals,

which are capable of little more

than the mere perception
(2.27.26 ) . 23

of pleasure and pain,

are not

Therefore, insofar as "the highest perfection

somewhat condescendingly that "The ability of mankind does
not lie in the impotency or disabilities of brutes," and
claims that he had suggested in the Essay that the power of
abstraction constitutes only "one excellency of mankind
above brutes" (Works 1823, IV, 15).
As is often the case
in his exchanges with Stillingfleet, Locke's response may
seems evasive at best.
Though he does at one point in the
Essay refer to the power of abstraction as merely "an Excellency" that the brutes do not possess, his accompanying
references to the "proper difference" and the "perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes" lend support to Stillingfleet' s reading.
on the other hand, it may be that stillingfleet here pays insufficient attention to Locke's implicit suggestion that the power of abstraction represents the
original or fundamental difference between humans and the
lower animals, a difference which "at last," fully developed, widens to a vast difference.
It is not at all clear
that Locke's remark implies a reduction of the difference
in question to a matter or degree, or of power.
See
chapter VI below, pp.
23 Thus notwithstanding his conjectures and anecdotes
concerning the possibility or even actual existence of nonhuman rational persons (2.27.8; 3.6.22,29; 3.11.16,20),
Locke's account of personhood generally corroborates the
reading presented in chapter III above of the ultimately
moderate character of his critique of the doctrine of natural species. Whatever the status of the border cases, for
the purposes of his moral and political thought Locke accepts on grounds of sound, empirical, probabilistic judgment the proposition that the qualities requisite of moral
agency or personality tend to inhere in beings possessing
the shape and other qualities we ordinarily identify as
"human," or in other words that we can reliably judge moral
beings and human beings not only as natural, nonconventional kinds, but as practically identical natural kinds. Once
again, "Morality is the proper science, and Business" not
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of intellectual nature, lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness" (2.21.51), Locke sees no
denigration of human freedom or dignity in his doctrine of
the determination of the will.

To the contrary, he argues

that
A Perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by
its last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought
to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an
advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature,
that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want
of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined
by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other
side.
(2.21.48).
The freedom proper to volition consists not in pure contingency,

but

rational

instead

judgment

in the
of

the

determination
good

( 2. 21. 71) .

of the will

by

As yet unex-

plained, however, are precisely wherein this good consists,
and what substantive principles of morality follow from our
capacity for moral agency.

merely of moral beings, according to Locke, but of "Mankind
in general" ( 4 .12 .11) ; whoever violates the law of nature
violates not merely "the right Rule of Reason," but also
"the Principles of Human Nature" (TT II. 10; also II. 63) .
Cf. note 3 above.

AGENCY AS THE PARTIAL BASIS OF LAW
"Law," in Locke's understanding, "is not so much the
Limitation as the direction of g free and intelligent.Agent
to his proper interest ... Could [he] be happier without it,
the Law, as an useless thing, would of it self vanish ... "
(TT I I. 5 7 ) • 2 4

The end of law for Locke is to promote or

facilitate our pursuit of happiness.

The question arises,

therefore, as to the manner in which the form of happiness
toward which we are by nature directed determines the form
of law most appropriate to us.
this question,
tivism

as

a

Locke implicitly sharpens

in apparently maintaining an extreme relacorollary

of

his

hedonistic

conception

of

happiness:
... I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain
enquire, whether Summum Bonum consisted in Riches, or
bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they
might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best
Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and
have divided themselves into Sects upon it.
For as
pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves,
but their agreeableness to this or that particular
Palate, wherein there is great variety:
So the greatest Happiness consists, in the having those things,
which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the absence
of those, which cause any disturbance, any pain.
Now
these, to different Men, are very different things.
(2.21.55)

24cf. the propositions with which Locke introduces his
undated, unpublished fragment "Morality": "Morality is the
rule of mans actions for the atteining happynesse. For the
end and aime of all men being happynesse alone noething
could be a rule or a law to them whose observation did not
lead to happynesse and whose breach did [not] draw misery
after it" (published in Sargentich 1974, 26).
See also RC
241,245.
243
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ooes Locke hold that we can know ourselves as human beings,
only as a natural species of agents or choice-makers?

If

so, can he avoid the implication that principles of human
justice and happiness are alike relative to the societies
and even ultimately to the individuals who embrace them?
If human beings according to Locke have no fixed natural
end, if there is no common determinate content of our happiness, then to what form of common, natural law can we be
properly subject?
One traditional and still influential scholarly response to this question of moral relativism appeals to the
theological horizon within which Locke frequently claims to
view the human condition. 25
his

emphatically

Immediately after presenting

relativistic

description

of

happiness,

Locke proceeds to issue an important qualification:
may chuse different things,

"Men

and yet all chuse right, sup-

posing them only like a Company of poor Insects," supposing, that is, that "there be no Prospect beyond the Grave"
(2.21.55; emphasis supplied).

Perhaps then his statement

of relativism describes no more than the actual condition
of diversity in human judgments of the good.26 Accordingly,
25Recent variants of this view appear in Tully 1980,
41ff,105ff; Colman 1983, 6,32ff,69ff,189; Shapiro 1986,
lOlff; Grant 1987, 41-48.
26see Locke's own response to a contemporary objection
of this kind, in a note appended by his editor Coste to
ECHU 2.28.11. Von Leyden opines that a pure description of
actual modes of evaluation, abstracted from any attempt at
prescription, characterizes Locke's intention throughout
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he subsequently proposes a distinction between the actual
and the appropriate in judgments of this kind, in distinguishing natural from moral good and evil.
"Good

and

Evil,"

as

Locke

reiterates,

"are nothing but

Pleasure or Pain ... Morally Good and Evil
only

the

Conformity

or

Disagreement

While natural

of

then,
our

is

(sic]

voluntary

Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us,
from the Will and Power of the Law-maker" (2.28.5).27
specifically,

he continues,

More

"the only true touchstone of

moral Rectitude" is the "Divine Law, whereby I mean, that
Law which God has set to the actions of Men"

( 2 . 2 8. 8) .

Locke overcomes or at least seeks to overcome the problem
of relativism, in this view, by conceiving of human beings
as God's

workmanship and therefore as

God's property. 28

Virtuous

or

be

vicious

pleasures or pains,
that production.

actions

may

well

productive

of

but they are not defined as such by

Rather they are defined by their conform-

ity or nonconformity with the will of the creator God, and
pleasures or pains can be no more than their incidental
consequences.29
the entire Essay (1954, 74-76).
27 see also Locke's unpublished fragment "Of Ethicks in
General," in King 1830, 311.
28see especially TT I.53,86; II.6,56.
29Locke's most emphatic statements of this point
appear in his unpublished Questions Concerning The Law of
Nature.
In concluding the work he insists, for instance,
that "interest is not a foundation of law or a basis of
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As

commentators have

frequently

observed,

however,

including some who accept this view as the most compelling
statement of Locke's intention,
fully

developed

argument

in

Locke fails to provide a

support

of

between natural and moral good and evil.30

the

distinction

His most elab-

orate attempt at demonstrating the existence of God,

for

instance--or more precisely, of "a GOD"--appears in Book 4,
chapter 10 of the Essay.

If we accept for the sake of

argument the soundness of this demonstration as far as it
goes,

the

fact

remains

that

Locke

makes

no

attempt

at

demonstrating that the God intelligible to us promulgates
legislation, complete with otherworldly sanctions, for the
proper guidance of human action.31

It is true, as we have

noticed, that at times Locke does suggest the possibility
of deducing from the bare fact of creation by an intelligent God at least the main principle of God's legislative
obligation, but the consequence of obedience.
It is one
thing if an action entails some benefit by itself, another
if it should be advantageous by reason of the fact that it
is in conformity to the law ..• " (LN 11.251; also 8 passim.
Cf. Yolton 1958, 490; Singh 1961, 114; Tully 1980, 41-43.)
But cf. LN 10.231, where Locke affirms the viability of
"other," apparently Hobbesian arguments for defending the
obligatory force of the natural law.
30cf. the various accusations or admissions along this
line in Strauss 1953, 202-226, and 1958, 210; Ashcraft
1969; Dunn 1969, 21,187, and 1984, 30,66ff.,84; Gough 1973,
6-11; Yolton 1985, 87,90; Pangle 1988, 198-202.
31 Indeed Locke straightforwardly denies that we can
have knowledge of an afterlife:
" ... that the dead shall
rise, and live again" is "beyond the Discovery of Reason"
(4.18.7). See also Works 1823, 4.303ff., 480,489,491.
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intention for human beings (ECHU 4.3.18; 4.13.3).

Because

an intelligent God could only create intelligently or purposively, according to this deduction, the human creatures
of that God bear an obligation to preserve themselves and
their species; or to state it more precisely, they have no
right of

arbitrary

self-disposal,

no

right willfully to

destroy themselves or others (TT II.6).
above,

however,

incomplete,
constitute

Locke's

insofar
an

as

arbitrary

suggested
he

fails

deduction
to

or willful,

noble sacrifice of human life.32

As we have argued

explain
as

is

at

what

distinct

best
would

from

a

It would seem, therefore,

that the obligation to preserve human beings cannot derive
simply from the fact of creation, but must instead proceed
from a compelling account of the unity and dignity of the
species--an account that Locke's "workmanship" principle,
at least as he ordinarily presents it, does not in itself
provide.
If Locke's theological arguments thus imply that we
can gain access to God's intentions for human beings only
through our knowledge of the nature that God has given us,
then the distinction between natural and moral good and
evil must collapse.

The relevant distinction must take the

form of a distinction between true and false or apparent
happiness, or between forms of pursuing happiness that are
32For a fuller statement both of Locke's suggested
deduction and of the difficulties that it entails, see
chapter II above, pp. 73-75.
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more and less in conformity with the requirements of our
nature

and

natural

The

condition.

incompleteness

of

Locke's theological arguments therefore returns us to the
question

whether

Locke's

secular,

empirical-historical

account of human nature and the human condition can provide
an

adequate

basis

for

a

genuine

doctrine

of

political

morality.
Recently some scholars have argued that the true or
enduring significance of Lockean political morality,

once

abstracted from its ostensibly theological context, derives
exclusively from its basis in the fact of personal agency
or autonomy.33

The capacity of human beings to be agents,

to be the authors and owners of our actions,
view not

only a

necessary,

but

is in this

in fact the sufficient,

definitive condition of our moral status.

As the owners of

our actions,

according to Locke, we are the owners of our

selves,

our

of

powers

of

agency--free,

self-disposing

beings, "equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body" (TT
II.123; also 27,44).34

The priority of rights to law in

33 Parry argues that though it is Locke's intention to
present his theory of agency in a theological context, the
intelligibility of that theory does not require that context (1978, 13-17, 27,156). See also Wallin 1984, 150-157;
Rapaczynski 1987, 116-176.
34Laslett comments that this assertion of human selfownership "almost contradicts [Locke's] first principle
that men belong to God" ( 1960, 114) .
Others believe that
Locke does indeed thus retract the workmanship principle.
See Strauss 1953, especially 227,247; Wallin 1984, 155ff.
Tully suggests that the two principles are reconciliable;
Locke intends to say that an individual's "body and his
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Locke's political morality is merely a

corollary of the

primacy of this principle of agency or self-ownership. 3 5
Human

beings

as

natural

agents

or choice-makers have

a

fundamental natural right simply to act in the pursuit of
happiness--and therefore

to

act

upon,

otherwise transform the "materials"

to

appropriate or

(TT II. 41)

of the ex-

ternal natural world in order to create or recreate a home
for ourselves. 36
If our rights as human beings derive solely from our
character as self-owning,

choosing actors,

then it would

follow that our rights can be limited or circumscribed not
"vertically," by our dependence upon a higher authority,
limbs are God's property: the actions he uses them to make
are his own" ( 1980, 109; also 114) • Cf. Colman 1983, 188190; Yolton 1985, 69. It is difficult to see how this suggestion in itself can resolve the difficulty, insofar as
God's ownership of our bodies and limbs necessarily imposes
restrictions on our employment of our action-producing capacity, or in other words on our proprietorship, our right
of free disposal, over our selves. However that may be, it
is perhaps safest to adopt the conclusion of Mansfield, to
the effect that even according to Locke's workmanship principle, individuals best follow the will of their maker and
proprietor by regarding themselves as their own property
(1979, 30ff.)
35cf. Strauss:
"Through the shift of emphasis from
natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the
moral world, since man--as distinguished from man's end-had become that center or origin" (1953, 248).
3 6Thus according to Rapaczynski' s reading, "a man's
action on the world around him is capable of imposing on it
a human order and transforming it in accordance with the
dictates of the agent's will ... In this way, all human
rights--'property' in its broader sense--are tied to man's
ability to transform nature into an objective correlaie of
his own freedom" (1987, 172,180).
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but only "horizontally," 37 by the presence of other agents
with rights equal to our own.

The fact of human equality,

that as human beings we are "Creatures of the same species
and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of
nature, and the use of the same faculties ... sharing all in
one Community of Nature" (TT II.4,6), would then constitute
according to Locke the specifically moral element of the
doctrine of rights.38

Yet this justification of rights by

the principle of equality in moral autonomy has also drawn
scholarly

objections,

of

which

perhaps

the

noticed is the argument of C.B. MacPherson.

most

widely

On the basis

of Locke's apparently anomalous references to rationality
as a distinguishing characteristic not merely of, but also
and more importantly among human beings,

MacPherson con-

tends that Locke's general invocation of the principle of
equality represents at bottom no more than an obfuscation
of the morally and politically decisive inequality between
the class of "industrious and rational" property owners and
37cf. Strauss' judgment on the thought of Rousseau,
who in contrast to unspecified "earlier men" attempts "to
get rid of that which essentially transcends every possible
human reality," and thus decisively undermines the distinction between liberty and license.
"These men acknowledged
a limitation which comes from above, a vertical limitation.
On the basis of Rousseau, the limitation of license is effected horizontally by the license of other men ... The horizontal limitation is preferred to the vertical limitation
because it seems to be more realistic: the horizontal limitation, the limitation of my claim by the claims of others
is self enforcing" (1959, 51-52).
38see also II.54,87,96,159,190; TT I.27,67; STCE 117.
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that of subrational wage laborers

(1962,

especially 221-

251) . 39
Against

this

thesis

of

"differential

generating differential class rights,
persuasively

with

respect

to

the

rationality"

others have argued,

immediate

issue,

that

Locke employs the term "rationality" to refer to both a
moral and a more strictly intellectual faculty,

and that

only.his conception of the latter is significantly inegalitarian40; moral rationality, which properly qualifies us as
the bearers of rights, is a species characteristic, shared
more-or-less

equally by all

human beings. 41

Yet

if we

39In addition to Locke's apparent references to
rationality as a distinguishing characteristic of the
propertied class (II.34,50) and to property as a condition
of full membership in civil society (II .119-122, 140, 158),
MacPherson relies heavily upon Locke's observation that
"The greater part cannot know, and therefore they must
believe" (RC 243).
40ounn 1969, 250-255.
See also Seliger 1968, 49-53,
163-165; Ryan 1968, 239-242; Ashcraft 1986, chapters 7 and
9; Shapiro 1986, 86,136-139. Wood agrees that Locke implicitly distinguishes between moral and "naturalistic" forms
of rationality, but argues nonetheless that for Locke human
equality in moral rationality is not decisive for the distribution of moral and political rights; Locke "never
dreamed of a social condition of widespread equality of
opportunity" (1983, 115-118,121-123), and indeed regarded
the propertied and the mere laborers as distinct moral species (1984, 43ff.).
41In addition to his references to rationality as a
species-characteristic, Locke's explanation in the Second
Treatise of his inclusive usages of the term 'property'
(123), his clear affirmation of the reasonableness of alienating not only one's radical natural freedom in forming
civil society (128-131) but also one's labor power to an
employer or 'master' within the bounds of civil society
(41,85,131,135), and his explicit disqualification only of
slaves or aggressors and "Lunaticks and Ideots" for member-
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abstract from its particulars, MacPherson's argument raises
a

deeper

issue that remains unresolved by his critics.

Notwithstanding his common affirmations of the principle of
equality, Locke at times quite forthrightly acknowledges a
natural inequality among human beings, with respect to both
the possession and exercise of rationality.

In what is

only the most striking of such acknowledgments, he declares
it
evident, that there is a difference of degrees in Men's
Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so
great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to
Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance
between some Men, and others, in this respect, than
between some Men and some Beasts.
(4.20.5)
Admitting the possibility that Locke refers here to the
relatively small number of border cases, to "Lunaticks and
Ideots"

(II.60) or to "Naturals" (2.11.13; 3.6.22; also CU

6) disabled from birth, we must yet come to terms with his
judgment,

clearly not restricted to cases of disability,

that those

"who have fairly and truly examined,

and are

thereby got past doubt in all the Doctrines they profess,
and govern themselves by ... are so few" as to number perhaps
no more than one in one hundred (4.16.4; also 1.3.24,25;

cu

6,24,34).42
ship ( 16-24, 60) would all appear to cast doubt upon the
thesis of a moral, jural distinction between laborers and
owners in a Lockean political society.
42Thus Mansfield refers to Locke's assertion of the
proposition of equal rationality as a "pretense" ( 1979,
32) .
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The

implication

proposition

of

equal

is

that

moral

in order to maintain the

rationality--the

proposition

that whatever the differences in rationality among individual human beings, the morally relevant form of rationality
is a more-or-less equally shared species characteristic-Locke must

significantly dilute his

conception of moral

rationality.

Thus, as Tarcov observes, not only is Locke

ambiguous

to

as

whether

rationality

agency or personhood develops

as

a

condition

automatically with

of

age in

"the ordinary course of Nature" (II.60) or instead only as
the product of a proper education (II.58,61,64,69); he also
tends, more importantly, to assimilate children's irrational submission or forebearance of their desires to a rational

submission

"whether

he

is

(STCE
being

38),

thereby

similarly

if

raising
not

calling the adult rationally autonomous"
92).

the

question

equally
(1984,

free

in

72-73,91-

The Second Treatise' doctrine of natural human jural

equality

seems

to

rest

upon

a

principle of presumptive

rationality, according to which all those capable,
of discovering,

if not

at least of understanding and conforming

with the dictates of the law of nature are to be treated as
rational beings and bearers of rights.43

At bottom,

the

43compare in this regard ECHU 4. 20. 2, 3, where Locke
first deplores the "natural and unalterable ... Ignorance" of
"the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour,"
and proceeds in the immediate sequel to insist that "No Man
is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of
Living, as to have no spare Time at all to think of his
Soul."
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mere

potential

for

understanding

the

law of

nature,

in

conjunction with actual innocence of irrational action, or
action against that law, seems to be according to Locke the
practically

determinative

requisite

of moral

rationality

Possession of the morally qualifying faculty

(II.16,59).

of reason, in other words, seems for Locke's purposes to be
demonstrated

sufficiently by

our

observance

of

rational

principles, or by our respect for reason understood as the
social bond or "Rule betwixt Man and Man"

(II .172;

also

11, 181). 44
What

remains

to

be

explained,

however,

is why we

should regard as morally decisive a conception of reason
that

unites

divides us.

us

rather

than

one

that

distinguishes

or

In the face of what he himself acknowledges to

be the manifest superiority in "Parts and Merit" of some
human beings to others,

on what grounds does Locke deny,

consistently and emphatically,

the existence of a natural

right of the truly rational or wise to rule, and affirm to
the contrary the "eaual Right that every Man hath, to his
Natural Freedom"
insist that

(TT II. 54)?

On what grounds does Locke

in the morally or jurally decisive respect,

44Thus Pangle observes that "Locke promotes a rational
society, i.e. a socialized rationality" (1988, 272). For a
discussion of the deeper significance of this observation,
see chapters VI and VII below, pp. 365-390, 424-450.
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human beings constitute a single species?45

45Locke's observation of inequality among human beings
in the possession and exercise of reason brings into view a
particularly challenging instance of the moral-political
difficulty inherent in his critique of the doctrine of natural sorts or species.
If in Locke's view "each abstract
Idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct Species," then
though we are not free to construct (as representations of
real things) substance ideas by combining simple ideas that
do not coexist in nature (3.6.28), we are free to choose,
among a virtually limitless number, which clusters of particular beings bearing certain common qualities we will
designate as species.
Locke professes to hold no doubt
that this implication of his account of substance ideas and
names "will seem very strange" (3.6.38).
Applied to our
own species, Locke's argument would compel us to admit the
existence of innumerable distinct sorts of human beings,
each with as much right as any other, or for that matter as
the class of human beings itself, to denomination as a natural species.
Nature, in its presentation of ideas to our
perceptions, entitles us to form species ideas of human
beings, but entitles us equally to form such ideas of, say,
redheads, left-handers, English-speakers, and of innumerable other subgroups sharing some distinguishing quality.
Perhaps the mo~t malignant implication that scholars have
drawn from this argument is a justification of racial discrimination, based on a justification of narrow or exclusionary definitions of humankind. (See Miller 1979, 178n;
McGuinness 1989, 141. See also the overviews in Farr 1986,
and Glausser 1990, 211-213.)
To this particular objection
Locke can reasonably respond that although his account
would indeed permit, say, ancient Greeks to define nonGreeks, or North American or European whites to define
Africans as by nature distinct species and vice-versa, it
by no means permits them to define such groups as morally
inferior, as barbarians or natural slaves.
Not every
species difference carries moral significance; since Locke
regards morality as "the rule of mans actions for the
atteining happynesse" ("Morality," in Sargentich 1974, 26;
see note 23 above, and accompanying text), one must on
Lockean grounds regard Greeks and non-Greeks or Europeans
and Africans as moral equals, whatever their differences in
other respects, insofar as they share the morally decisive
capacity for the rational pursuit of happiness.
(Cf. the
arguments of Squadrito 1975 and Grant 1987, 28-31.)
How
Locke can respond to the proposition that the differential
possession of rationality justifies the division of human
beings into morally unequal subspecies, however, remains to
be shown.

THE STATE OF NATURE
The difficulty that lingers in the wake of Locke's
establishment of the capacity for agency as a requisite of
the possession of rights can be restated as follows.

Taken

in itself, the human capacity for the self-conscious, calculatingly rational pursuit of happiness implies no more
than the existence of a

natural desire among

individual

human beings for the protection of the conditions of happiness,

or at best

rights

as

powers

a

natural

against

fitness

others;

for asserting one's

it does not

in itself

imply the existence of any natural inclination to respect
others'

rights as rights,

conferring

reciprocal

as equivalent to one's own and

obligations.

Why,

in

particular,

should those of superior rationality, or those who believe
themselves to be of superior rationality, respect the claim
to equal

rights by those they consider their inferiors?

How is it consistent with their natural happiness for them
to grant such respect?
Returning briefly to the question concerning the significance of Locke's qualified assertions of the possibility of a demonstrative science of ethics,

we recall that

his qualification of this point is twofold, implying first
that not all but only "a great part" of morality is demonstrable,

and

second

that

we
256

must

apply

ourselves

with
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"Indifferency and Attention" to achieve whatever degree of
In elaborating the

demonstration we may be capable of.

latter aspect of his qualification, Locke cautions that the
achievement of "much" of a demonstrative ethic is conditioned upon the triumph of rational "indifferency" over the
obfuscations of

"Vices,

Passions,

and domineering Inter-

ests" (4.3.18), and is thus "not to be expected, whilst the
Desire of Esteem, Riches,

or Power, makes Men espouse the

well-endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments,
either to make

good

their

Beauty,

or varnish over,

cover their Deformity ... " (4.3.20) .4 6

and

According to his own

qualification, the viability of Locke's proposed science of
ethics rests not only upon an actual equality in natural
endowment, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
willingness to acknowledge such equality.

in our

To the extent,

therefore, that he is serious about the realism or efficacy
of

his

proposed

moral

science--to

the

extent

that

the

Essay's moral-political project accords with the broader
Machiavellian project,
practical works,
interest

(RC

elaborated in his more explicitly

of "endowing virtue" or aligning it with

245)47--Locke

is

compelled

to

attempt

to

measure the power of the passions and interests in ques46Hobbes seems somewhat less than optimistic, in concluding Leviathan with the observation that "such Truth, as
opposeth no mans profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome" (MacPherson ed. 1968, 729).
47cf. The Prince ch.15ff; Hobbes,
Rousseau, On The Social Contract 1.1.

Leviathan 31, end;
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He

tion.

is compelled,

in

other words,

to

extend his

empirical inquiry into the character of the subjects of his
proposal, into the area of human psychology or motivation.
If Locke's thinking about political morality is to accomplish more than the construction of mere "Castles in the
Air"

(4.4.1),

resolve

into

if the human pursuit of happiness is not to
mere

solipsism,48

the

principles

of

human

equality and unalienable rights must be not only internally
consistent, but also capable of commanding a rational consensus among human beings; in short, once again, they must
conform with nature.49
Herein lies the broader significance of Locke's insistence in the Second Treatise that "To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must
consider what State all Men are naturally in ... " (4).

The

48Rapaczynski states the question as follows:
"But
even if it is granted that men do form their own standards
of good and evil .. it could still be argued that these facts
by themselves do not guarantee any uniformity of moral values accepted by different subjects ... The norms of behavior
presented in the mixed-modes theory may then be said to be
like figments of imagination or conventional theoretical
constructs:
they can be changed for all kinds of reasons
and are in this respect unlike the principles of morality,
which must preserve a constant and intersubjective validity" (1987, 168-169).
49rt would seem then that not simply the abstract idea
of "moral man" itself, but more significantly the relation
between moral beings and human beings constitutes for Locke
the undemonstrative portion of the science of ethics.
If
so, then his assertions of a radical disjunction between
natural and moral science, and by implication of the superiority of the latter to the former, must appear still more
highly questionable.
See note 6 above, and accompanying
discussion.
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condition

of

"Men

living

together

according

to

reason,

without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
between them,
87).

is properly the State of Nature" (II.19; cf.

On its face, this reference to men "living together

according to reason" need not mean that Locke conceives of
the natural condition as essentially lawful and peaceful.
Rather it is safer to say that the character of the natural
condition for Locke reflects the extent to which the governance of each by his or her private reason can consist with
or produce social peace and lawfulness.

contrary to the

views of some commentators, Locke does not employ the concept of the state of nature as a mere heuristic contrivance;

he

affirms

quite

emphatically

"That all

men

are

naturally in that State, and remain so, till by their own
Consents

they

make

themselves

Members

Society"

(II.15; also 14,100-103).50

of

some

Politick

The state of nature

50ounn asserts most emphatically the arbitrariness of
Locke's concept of the state of nature, describing it as a
"classically feeble expository cliche ... neither a piece of
philosophical anthropology nor a piece of conjectural history. Indeed it has literally no transitive empirical content whatsoever ... In itself it is simply an axiom of theology" (1969, 100,103).
See also Von Leyden 1981, 99.
Against this view, various scholars argue for the historical reality of the Lockean state or states of nature.
See
especially Strauss 1953, 230-231; Laslett 1960, 111-112;
Seliger 1968, 83-91; Goldwin 1976; Colman 1983, 177; Pangle
1988, 244-251.
Others argue that Locke's ambiguous usage
of the concept signifies a dual intention on his part, that
the Lockean state of nature is both a historical and a moral concept.
Different versions of this reading appear in
Ashcraft 1968, especially 898ff.; Aarslef 1969, 101-104;
Waldron 1989.
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is natural,

for Locke,

in large part51 insofar as it is

revelatory of the natural constitution of the human mind,
or of the natural power of reason relative to that of the
(socially divisive)
political thought,

passions.

In the context of Locke's

it serves as a kind of historical lab-

oratory, or series of laboratories,52 in which reason and
the passions are allowed,

free

of legal

or conventional

restraint, to contest for dominion within the human mind.
In assessing the outcome of this contest,
have been and remain notoriously divided.
somewhat,

the

predominant view throughout

scholars

To oversimplify
at

least this

century has held that in clear contrast to Hobbes and to
some extent in anticipation of Rousseau, Locke conceives of
an essentially pacific, even harmonious state of nature.53
51 Moving beyond the definitions in the Second Treatise, one might more expansively define the Lockean state of
nature as the totality of the provisions of nature (as
opposed to human art) forming the constant context of the
human pursuit of happiness.
Pangle seems to have in mind
something like this more expansive definition, in including
"the drastic economic scarcity of the natural environment
in which man is situated" as a dimension of the state of
nature (1988, 244).
52 Thorough discussions of the various historical
possibilities subsumed under the concept of the state of
nature appear in Seliger 1968, 83-105; Goldwin 1976; and
Simmons 1989.
53several of Locke's commentators have tended in varying degrees to find in Locke an anticipation of Rousseau.
An early proponent of this view is C.E. Vaughan; see 1925,
134-139, 159-161, 202.
In his note to TT I. 58, Laslett
declares that Locke's contrast between the 'Brutality'of
'busie'-minded men to the behavior of the 'irrational untaught Inhabitants' of the 'Woods and Forests,' who 'keep
right by following Nature,' "reads almost like ... the Rous-
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Locke describes the early period of political society, and
by implication the prepolitical state of nature, as a "poor
but vertuous. . .

Golden Age" marked by the "Innocence and

sincerity" or the lack of "irregular," expansive desires on
the

part

of

its

inhabitants

(II.110,111:

cf.

108,199).

Because "in the beginning" each individual had not only "a
Right to all he could employ his Labour on, 11 but also "no
temptation to labour for more than he could make use of, "
there could be "no reason of quarrelling" about property.
Insofar as "Right and conveniency went together,

11

the law

of nature is at least originally self-enforcing (II.37,51:
also 31). 54
Notwithstanding

the

significant

textual

evidence

lending credence to the view of the Lockean natural condition as "a State of Peace,
and Preservation"

(II .19),

Good Will, Mutual Assistance,
the preponderance of the evi-

dence sustains the contrary view.

According to this view,

Locke more seriously conceives of the state of nature in a
seau of the Discours sur l'Inegalite" (1960, 218n.).
(For
an effective response to Laslett's reading, see Tarcov
1984, 68-70.)
More recently, Grant remarks, on the basis
of some of the evidence presented here, on the association,
common to Locke and Rousseau, "of simplicity, poverty, virtue, and good government" (1987, 88 n.50). Without specific reference to the relation between Locke and Rousseau,
Ashcraft argues for the generally, though not entirely,
peaceful character of the Lockean state of nature ( 1968,
904) .
54on the originally self-enforcing character of the
natural law, cf. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality Among Men, "Preface," 93-96:
"First Part," 128-134 (ed. Masters 1964).
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manner very similar to that of Hobbes,
antisocial, warlike condition.SS

as an essentially

In Locke's own words, the

state of nature is a condition wherein "the greater part"
are "no strict Observers of Equity and Justice," and therefore a condition "full of fears and continual dangers"--an
"ill condition" that is "not to be endured," whose subjects
"are quickly driven into Society" (II.123,127,13).S6
In order to provide a foundation for subsequent discussion, it is worthwhile for us to present at some length
the evidence in support of this reading of Locke's intenThe argument that Locke conceives of an essentially

tion.

pacific natural human condition causes us most immediately
to wonder how and why, according to Locke, political societies

and

respect

to

governments
the

are

ultimate

speaks in similar,

originally constituted.
basis

of

human

society,

and similarly ambiguous,

Essay and the Second Treatise.

With
Locke

terms in the

His summary statement in

the latter runs as follows:
God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him
under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and
Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him with Understanding and Language to continue and

SSThe most influential recent proponent of this view
is Strauss 19S3, especially 221-22S.
See also Cox 1960,
72-lOS; Goldwin 1972, 4S2-4S8; Pangle 1988, 244-2Sl.
S6cf. ECHU 1.3.9: "Robberies, Murders, Rapes, are the
Sports of Men set at Liberty from Punishment and Censure."
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(II.77) 57

enjoy it.
once

again,

in view of

such

remarks

it may

seem clear

enough that Locke holds human beings to be naturally social
creatures.

Yet here as always it is advisable to inquire

further after Locke's meaning. 58
"Obligations

of Necessity,

What specifically are the

Convenience,

and

Inclination"

that "drive" us, as he suggestively puts it, into society?
"The first

Society,"

Locke continues,

"was between

Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between Parents
and Children" (II.77).

It would seem reasonable to suppose

that this society comes about through our pursuance of a
natural inclination, and so it does, according to Locke, in
a way; but not quite in the way that we might commonly, or
perhaps

charitably,

suppose.

In his

treatment

of

this

question in the Second Treatise, Locke characterizes "Conjugal Society"

as based upon a

"voluntary Compact,"

and

rather pointedly denies, at least with respect to the generality of cases, that love alone suffices to bind men and
women together.

Instead he suggests that "a Communion of

57The parallel statement in the Essay runs thus:
"God
having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not
only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have
fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him
also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument,
and common Tye of Society" (3.1.1).
On Locke's apparently
deliberate conflation of obligation and motivation in the
Second Treatise' statement, see below, pp. 311-314.
58The following brief account of Locke's view of the
origin and basis of the family or human conjugal society
draws in particular upon the fuller discussions in Tarcov
1984, 66-76, and Pangle 1988, 172-177, 230-243.
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Interest" is "necessary ... to unite their Care, and Affection"

(II.78).

Proceeding then to reduce the nature of

human "conjugal society"

to merely a

particular form of

"conjunction between Male and Female" in the animal kingdom,

Locke holds that the true end and bond of such con-

junctions is "not barely Procreation, but the continuation
of the Species" (II.79).

This claim is consistent with his

proposition in the First Treatise that next to the desire
for self-preservation,

"God planted in Men also a strong

desire of propagating their Kind, and continuing themselves
in their Posterity"

(I. 88) .

Yet again,

however,

we must

take care to understand precisely what Locke means by his
references to the desire for continuing the species.

For

as Tarcov in particular observes, Locke here and elsewhere
in the First Treatise implies that the desire for propagation is subordinate to and even derivative of the desire
for self-preservation (1984,

69-70).59

Indeed his ef f ec-

tive annihilation of the notion that parental affection is
an

ineffaceable

human

instinct

is

unmistakable

in

his

apparently unquestioning reporting of cannibalism practiced
among

some

peoples

by

parents

upon

their

own

children

59 That Locke intends rather literally his reference to
children as continuations of their parents' selves becomes
clearer at I.97, where Locke claims that parents are
"taught by Natural Love and Tenderness to provide for
[their children], as a part of themselves."
For further
discussion of our capacity for expanding our sphere of
concernment beyond our individual selves, see chapter VI
below, pp. 309-349.
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(I. 56-59).

60

Shortly prior to delivering those reports, by means
of a

simple rhetorical

question Locke discloses what he

takes to be a more strictly natural

inclination that is

more effective in moving us to form conjugal societies even
than the parental affection that represents a form of extended self-love.

"What Father of a Thousand," asks Locke,

when he begets a Child, thinks farther than the satisfying
his

present

Appetite?"

(I.54).61

But

if

mere

lust

is

according to Locke the primary natural inclination reliably
supporting the formation of conjugal society, then we must
view with considerable skepticism even the reasoning that
60Locke presents this among several examples of like
barbarism at ECHU 1.3.9,12. See also LN 4.145-147, 7.187193, 10.217.
6 1see also ECHU 2.21.34, where Locke, apparently resolute in maintaining his bachelorhood, provides a similar,
somewhat more comedic statement of this exceedingly unsentimental view of the basis of marriage:
"It is better to
marry than to burn, says st. Paul [I Cor. 7:9]; where we
may see, what it is, that chiefly drives Men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life.
A little burning felt pushes
us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw
or allure." Moreover, his expression shortly thereafter of
a still greater austerity may recall to mind a similar expression by an earlier detractor of the institution of marriage. It is noteworthy that in listing the ordinary, constantly recurring uneasinesses of "Hunger, Thirst, Heat,
Cold, Weariness with labour, and Sleepiness" (2.21.45),
Locke makes no mention of any form of erotic desire; cf.
the well known austerity of Socrates' account of the origin
of cities, at Republic 369-372.
(See especially Strauss
1964, 111-118,138; 1972, 20-26, 38-41). For evidence indicating that such austerity may not represent the whole of
Locke's view of these relationships, and on the general
significance of his apparent abstraction from eros, see
chapter VI below, pp. 350-416.
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supports
(though

his
by

no

stated
means

estimate
lifelong)

guishes human marriages,
upon

the

presumption

of

the

naturally

conjunction

that

longer
distin-

inasmuch as that reasoning rests

that

fathers

would

be

naturally

inclined to perform their "Obligation" to care for their
offspring (II.80).62

Moreover,

if according to Locke our

natural affections are generally of insufficient power to
sustain even familial or conjugal obligations, it is difficult to

see how they could be sufficiently powerful

in

themselves to bind individuals together as members of a
common political society.
Similar difficulties

inhere in the suggestion that

convenience is the decisive factor in effecting the origin
of political society.

If we understand convenience as dis-

tinct from necessity proper, it would seem to reduce to the
desire to diminish one's labors by cooperation with one's
fellows.

Supposing, then, even that the early human beings

possessed the civility and foresight required for them to
engage
basis

in such cooperation--a dubious
of

Locke's

reference to this

discussion--we

assumption on the

would yet be unable by

factor alone to explain the origin of

6 2cf. Rousseau's objection to what he takes to be
Locke's account of the naturalness of family life, at Discourse on Inequality, note 1, 213-220.
I am suggesting
that when one reads Locke's account in the Second Treatise
in the light of what he says and implies about the same
subject in the First Treatise, it appears that the disagreement between Locke and Rousseau is much smaller than
Rousseau recognizes or is willing to admit.
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.129litical society proper.63

It would seem that in ref er-

ring to "Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination" as apparently coequal forces, Locke nonetheless implies that necessity is the primary factor motivating the creation of society.

To state it more precisely, Locke seems to imply that

human beings are moved originally to form stable societies
less by any positive, outward- or forward-looking inclination toward one or another form of fellowship than by the
inclination or "strong desire of Self-preservation" (I.86),
given direction by the naturally necessitous condition of
humankind.
A closer look at the relevant discussions corroborates this suggestion.

Following his discussion of conju-

gal society and familial relations in the Second Treatise,
Locke addresses the question of the beginning of political
society proper.
to

defend

the

His announced purpose in chapter eight is
proposition

that

"that,

which

begins

and

actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but
the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority
to unite and incorporate into such a Society"

(99).

Lest

63one might yet argue that some combination of material necessity and convenience constitutes the primary motivation for the creation and maintenance of society within a
certain stage of the state of nature, and that only later,
with the development of distinctly human vices, does the
need for genuine coercive government arise.
For a more
specific assessment of this argument, see the examination
of the character of the necessity, i.e. material or martial, to which the original human beings may be subject, in
the context of the more general problem of teleology in
Locke's account, pp. 274-300 below.
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we misinterpret his intention,

however,

in attempting to

understand this proposition we should first bear in mind
that political power in Locke's usage is not necessarily
synonymous

with

governmental

power.

In

strict

Lockean

usage, political power is by definition legitimate, involving "g_ Right of making Laws ... " (II.3).

Accordingly Locke

proceeds to offer the following qualification of the doctrine of historical consent:
Reason being plain on our side, that Men are naturally
free, and the Examples of History shewing, that the
Governments of the World, that were begun in Peace ...
were made Qy the Consent of the People ... "
(II.104)
From this remark alone we can inf er only that according

to

Locke

some

governments

consent, and some did not.

originated

in peace

and

In reaffirming this qualifica-

tion shortly thereafter, however, Locke provides a clarifying hint.
beginnings

He refers
of

in chapter 8 only to the peaceful

government,

he

now

discloses,

"because . I

shall have occasion in another place to speak of Conquest,
which

some

(II.112).

esteem

a

Chapter 16

way

of

of the

beginning

of

Governments"

Second Treatise,

"Of Con-

quest," begins as follows:
Though Governments can originally have no other Rise
than that before mentioned, nor Polities be founded on
any thing but the Consent of the People; yet such has
been the Disorders Ambition has filled the World with,
that in the noise of War, which makes so great a part
of the History of Mankind, this Consent is little taken
notice of...
(175)
If it is Locke's view that "the noise of war ... makes
so great a part of the history of mankind, " then it could
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not

be

Locke's

view that the generality of governments

throughout history began in peace and popular consent.

Nor

is

the

this

Locke's

only

significant

announced thesis of the chapter.

qualification

of

For as Pangle somewhat

tartly observes, as the chapter unfolds "even the miniscule
part of history that is the nice, peaceful, consensual part
turns out to be not so nice"

(1988, 249).

Ostensibly as

historical evidence for the thesis of original peace and
consent, Locke presents the beginnings of Rome and Venice,
and the founding of Tarentum by Palantus and his Spartan
followers (II.102,103).
sources
acts

indicate that all these cities in fact began in

of

211).

Yet as Cox points out, Locke's own

conquest,

not

consent

(1960,

42-44,100-101,210-

Moreover, Locke quotes the historian Acosta to the

effect that the early Peruvians lived for a long time outside political society, and freely chose their rulers when
they saw the need for government (II.102).

But upon exam-

ining the text in question, one finds that Acosta's concept
of choice can scarcely be said to meet the criteria of
Lockean consent.
Locke quotes,

In the immediate sequel to the remark

Acosta elaborates his opinion of the true

origin of government among the

Indians:

excelling others in force and wit,

"But some men

began in time to rule

and domineere as Nembrot did; so increasing by little and
little,

they erected the kingdoms of Peru and Mexico ... "

(1590, 72).

Later in the same work, after discrediting the
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Indians'

own accounts of the origins of their societies,

Acosta conceives of the original condition of the Indians
as "altogether barbarous," a condition wherein they existed
"without law, without King, and without any certaine place
of abode,

but [went]

in troupes like savage beasts," and

out of which "comminalties" develop through the "valure and
knowledge of some excellent men"

(427).64

It seems clear

that in this context "valure and knowledge" refer not to
virtue and wisdom, or to the perfections of civilized human
beings, but instead to "force and wit," to the virtues of
war. 65
Upon closer inspection even Locke's apparent descriptions in this chapter of an originally pacific human condition

reveal

themselves

to

be

consistent

with

the

Hobbesian or Machiavellian conception suggested here.

more
Once

again, taken at face value his references to the infancy of
political society as a "poor but vertuous Age," a "Golden
Age"

(II .110, 111)

in

which

political

growths of particular familial
harmonious,

societies

societies were

as

out-

internally

bound by affection and troubled by only the

64 see also Acosta's description of "some more barbarous" places, where "all command and govern in common, having no other thing, but wil, violance, unreason, and disorder, so as he that most may, most commands" (410). For a
fuller account, see Cox 1960, 94-104.
65 cf. Locke's reference to the tendency of the "People
of America" to pass over weak heirs in favor of selecting
"the stoutest and bravest Man for their Ruler" (II. 105;
also 109).
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simplest

of

desires

(II.105,107,110;

also

74-76),

would

tend to raise the question why political authority, which
after all involves a right of legislating "with Penalties
of Death, and consequently all less Penalties"
needed at all.
familial

(II.3),

is

Locke answers that fathers become kings, or

societies become political in character,

with a

view toward defending themselves against foreign or external

"their

enemies:

be .•. how

to

secure

first

care

themselves

and thought cannot but
against

foreign

Force"

Government appears originally less as judicial

(II.107).

authority than as federative,

especially military,

power:

" ... the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a
Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe ... are little
more

than

Generals

105,109,110).

of

their

Armies .•. "

(II.108;

also

The affection that Locke describes in this

chapter apparently serves at best as a principle of internal unity;

such "golden age" as ever existed obtained at

best within, but not among, particular societies.66
dingly,

he

observes

that

irrespective

of

Accor-

whether

mere

"Chance, Neighborhood, or Business" initially brought them
into proximity,

the uniting of particular societies under

common governments must have occurred, as a rule, as "the
stronger, or more fortunate swallowed the weaker" (II.110,
66 Beneath Locke's question whether human affection
were originally powerful enough to prevent wars lies therefore the implicit question whether it were originally powerful enough to provoke them.
See the discussion in chapter VI below, pp. 393-398.

272
115).

The

evidence

presented

thus

far

is

sufficient

to

establish the view that an essentially Hobbesian conception
of the state of nature reflects Locke's most serious intention.

Whether Locke is by his own principles or by the

relevant

evidence

entitled

to

conceive

of

the

state

of

nature in this manner, however, is another question.

Locke

himself

"'Tis

points

us

toward

the

fundamental

issue.

often asked as a mighty Objection," he acknowledges, "Where
are,

or

Nature?"

ever

were,

there

(II.14; also 100).

any

Men

in

such

g_

State

of

For if the evils of the state

of nature are such as to drive its subjects quickly out of
it, then would not that state be virtually inaccessible by
the sort of historical evidence that Locke employs to support his description of it?

Locke himself seems to concede

that "History gives us but a very little account of Men,
that lived together in the State of Nature."

But if "Gov-

ernment is everywhere antecedent to Records," and the advent of "Letters" occurs only after "a long continuation of
Civil Society has,
for
then

[a People's)
can

Locke

by other more necessary Arts provided

Safety,
counter

Ease,
the

and Plenty"

(II.101),

"mighty Objection"

that

how
the

state of nature as such necessarily eludes precisely the
sort of historical inquiry that would be required for us to
gain knowledge of it?

How can he avoid the conclusion that

whatever his intentions, his account of the state of nature
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is unhistorical,

is at bottom nothing more than an arbi-

trary or ideological contrivance?

THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY
It is useful at this point to raise this objection
not because it is in itself unanswerable in Lockean terms,
but rather because the response suggested by Locke's discussion points to a still deeper objection and thus facilitates a deeper understanding of Locke's conception of the
nature and natural condition of humankind.
ate objection

Locke

responds

in effect

To the immedithat we do have

access to ample historical evidence of the character of the
state of nature, even if our accounts of the original condition of humankind are necessarily somewhat conjectural.
Locke's concept of the state of nature is ahistorical in
the sense that

it refers to no particular historical or

prehistorical

period,

relationships

among

but

instead

jurally

free

to

a

human

set

of

possible

beings. 67

This

implies that the actions toward others of any human beings
unrestrained

by

law,

irrespective

either

of

historical

period or of the presence of government, are admissible for
Locke as evidence of the character of the state of nature.
Relations

between

independent

rulers

or

sovereigns,

or

between uncivil, nonconsensual or despotic rulers and their
subjects for this reason represent instances of the state
of nature, just as would relations among truly independent

67see note 52 above.
274
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individuals or families in a prepolitical condition.68
Locke's response to the immediate objection thus proceeds from his refusal to recognize any strict disjunction
between natural history and human history; in drawing conclusions

in the Second Treatise concerning the state of

nature on the basis of historical evidence, he simply applies and extends the appeal to natural history that marks
his empiricism in the Essay.

On the proposition that human

nature can be known through the study of history69 rests to
6 8 Locke implies a distinction between "ordinary" and
extraordinary states of nature, according to which in the
ordinary state each individual possesses a liberty roughly
equal to that of all others "to judge of his Right, and according to the best of his Power, to maintain it," whereas
in (what Locke implies would be) the extraordinary state,
the enforcement of individuals' rights depends decisively
upon the whims of "one, who being in the unrestrained state
of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with
Power" (II.91). Insofar as these ordinary and extraordinary states can be identified with pre- and post-political
states of nature, Locke's argument is that the character of
the ordinary state can be inferred from that of the extraordinary state.
See, for example, II.108, where Locke
refers to "America" as "still a Pattern of the first Ages
in Asia and Europe."
(See also II.46,49,102).
Cf. the
brief discussion of Pangle (1988, 247-248), who appears to
identify this distinction with Locke's parallel (and also
largely implicit) distinction between "perfect" and imperfect states of nature (II.14,87, 94). As Pangle observes,
Locke seems to intend both to indicate quietly the diff icul ty in conceiving of a strict separation between the
natural and political conditions.
But the difference lies
in the fact that the latter turns on the degree to which
each has a perfect right to judge and execute the law of
nature, while the former turns on the degree to which each
has the power to do so. Cf. Goldwin 1976, 135.
6 9 rn his brief essay "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading
and Study for a Gentleman," Locke opines that one can learn
of human nature "chiefly from experience, and next to that
from a judicious reading of history," as well as from certain classic texts such as Aristotle's Rhetoric (quoted in
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on

the

antisocial, warlike character of the natural condition.

As

a

considerable

extent

his

agreement with

Hobbes

he explains in a discussion of the dangers of absolute monarchy, to study "the History of this, or any other Age" is
to confirm the opinion of "the baseness of Humane Nature"
(II.92).

Precisely because human history in great part

resounds with "the noise of War" (II.175), Locke recommends
that it be taught to young pupils with a special care not
to bestow honor upon conquerors, lest such pupils be misled
"to think Slaughter the laudable Business of Mankind,
the most Heroick of Vertues"

(STCE 116). 70

and

His extensive

exploration of the travel literature of his day, offering
for Locke at least a glimpse of "the first Ages" of human
Axtell 1968, 403). When Laslett remarks that "As a political theorist ••. Locke made no appeal to history or tradition, " he seems to mean only that Locke did not appeal to
English history or tradition as the source of his conception of right (1960, 91; cf. his reference to Locke as the
founder of comparative anthropology, at 112).
Glat observes properly that the Second Treatise displays a concern
more for the history of humankind than for that of the Eng1 ish, and further that the aspiration toward a genuinely
historical analysis of politics is central not only to
Locke's thought, but indeed to early modern political
thought in general (1981, 4,15).
70rn an unpublished essay "Of Study," Locke recommends
that history of this kind be taught only "to one who hath
well settled in his mind the principles of morality," inasmuch as "the greatest part of history being made up of wars
and conquest," we would be otherwise "in danger to be misled by the general current and business of history; and
looking on Alexander and Caesar and such like heroes as the
highest instances of human greatness because they each of
them caused the death of several 100,000 men ... we are apt
to make butchery and rapine the chief marks and very
essence of human greatness" (quoted in Axtell 1968, 422,
410) .
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history and of a rather broad diversity of societies and
cultures, yields similar data.

Locke seems indeed to find

a certain relish in refuting the proposition that a natural
moral consensus binds humankind, by relaying the reports of
"authors
been,

worthy

of

confidence

on their own admission,

5.185).

that

entire

nations

have

pirates and brigands"

(LN

"Have there not been whole Nations," he asks rhe-

torically, "and those of the most civilized People, amongst
whom" the practices of exposure, or parricide, or cannibalism are widespread and publicly approved

(ECHU

1. 3. 9

et

seq.; cf. TT I.56-59)?
Once again,
the state

of

Locke's defense of the accessibility of

nature

depends

upon

the constancy of that

condition, or upon the constancy of human nature, throughout human history.

It depends,

in other words,

upon a

conception of human history as fundamentally or essentially
nondevelopmental.

Herein lies the serious issue.

In fail-

ing or refusing to recognize a strict disjunction between
natural and human history, Locke may seem to expose himself
to

the

deeper

objection

influentially by Rousseau,

formulated
who

most

powerfully

summarizes his

and

charge as

follows:
The philosophers who have examined the foundations of
society have all felt the necessity of going back to
the state of nature, but none of them has reached it.
Some have not hesitated to attribute to man in that
state the notion of the just and unjust, without troubling themselves to show that he had to have that notion
or even that it was useful to him ... All of them, finally, speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression,
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desires, and pride, have carried over to the state of
nature ideas they had acquired in society: they spoke
about savage man and they described civil man.
(Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality
.Among Men, in Masters ed. 1964, 102)
There can be no doubt that at the head of the list of
philosophers to whom Rousseau refers are Hobbes and Locke.
As Bloom comments, Rousseau's charge amounts to a characterization of the two English founders of modern liberalism
as

"cryptoteleologists"

(1972,

535).

Hobbes

and

Locke

accept and indeed significantly advance the modern critique
of

the

classical

teleological

understanding

of

nature,

according to Rousseau, but they do not pursue this critique
to its ultimate conclusion.

They seem to conceive of the

natural condition of humankind as the condition prior to
all conventional acquisitions, yet in describing this condition they fail to appreciate the profundity of the act of
abstraction that such a conception properly requires.

At-

tributing to the nature of human beings a developed rational faculty and various socially dependent and divisive passions (such as, most fundamentally, pride or vanity), they
fail to appreciate nature's beneficence in providing for an
original

human

condition

of

simplicity

and

peace,

and

therewith the decisively conventional character of humankind' s

historical

ills.

Finally,

their failure to grasp

the naturally indeterminate, evolutionary character of the
human

species

and

the

human

condition

determines

their

blindness to the need to discard entirely the traditional
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notion of a

natural

civil societies,

law or right that

is applicable to

and to replace it with purely abstract,

formal principles of legitimacy,

capable of accommodating

as much as possible the radically malleable character of
human beings and therefore the radically historical, relativistic character of substantive principles of justice.71
Adding to the difficulty is the fact that at times
Locke himself appears to anticipate Rousseau's position and
thus to contradict

(what seems to be)

his own.

Locke's

conception of the relation between nature and custom is of
particular importance in this respect.
of the moral,

intellectual,

human development,

In his discussions

and political

dimensions of

Locke stresses in varying degrees the

principle that in its influence over human behavior, "Custom [is]

a greater Power than Nature"

(ECHU 1. 3. 25).

In

the Essay, this principle appears primarily in the form of
Locke's observations of the ordinarily enormous power that
traditional, received opinions exercise over our understandings

(1.3.23-27,

2.33.6).72
principle

In Some Thoughts Concerning

Education,

the

that

"Custom ... prevails

over

everything"

(STCE 164) appears primarily in the form of a

repeated insistence on the power of habituation as an educational device; the possibility of success in the forming
71see the discussion of Rousseau's critique in Strauss
1953, esp. 264-294.
72see also

cu

34,41; STCE 146.
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of a child's character seems to rest decisively for Locke
upon the possibility that "Habits" can be "woven into the
very Principles of his Nature" (42; also 64,66,67) .73
Locke's descriptions of the power of custom and habituation raise the question whether this subtle interweaving
of habit into nature in the end leaves nature influential
or

even

recognizable

in

any

significant

respect.

They

raise the question whether according to his own principle,
Locke must ultimately acknowledge that the faculties

and

passions that he ordinarily ascribes, with Hobbes, to human
nature are in fact in the decisive respect not natural, but
products

of

custom or convention.

To what extent does

Locke's estimate of the power of custom apply to the formation or development of species characteristics as well as
those of individuals?

With respect to the most apparently

"human" of the faculties,

namely reason or the understan-

ding, we should consider in this context the implications
both of Locke's fundamental insistence that the understanding is originally or naturally unfurnished (ECHU 2. 1. 2) ,
and

of

his

occasional

usages

of

the term "naturals"

to

ref er to human beings lacking any developed rational f ac73As an apparent corollary of his estimate of the great
power of custom, Locke offers a similarly expansive estimate of the power of education:
" ... I think I may say,
that of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are
what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education.
'Tis that which makes the great Difference in Mankind" (STCE 1).
Locke remarks somewhat ambiguously on the
common propensity to acquire a customary attachment to
traditional constitutional forms, at TT II.223,225.
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ulty.74

And with respect to the passions, we should con-

sider as well Locke's important distinction between "ordinary" or natural and "fantastical" uneasinesses, according
to which nature besets us with certain constantly recurring,

apparently

physiological

"necessities"

or

uneasi-

nesses, such as "Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with
labour, and Sleepiness," whereas such other primarily mental uneasinesses as
es ... and

a

thousand

"itch after Honour,
other

irregular

Power,

desires"

or Richrepresent

"acquir'd habits by Fashion, Example, and Education ... which
custom has made natural to us"

(2. 21. 45). 75

On the basis

of this distinction taken in itself, one would expect that
Locke, like Rousseau, would consider the advent of civilization on balance a misfortune that reflects and perhaps
also hastens the historical degeneration or corruption of
humankind.7 6

To what extent then does Locke agree with the

position of Rousseau on the relation of nature to custom,
and to what extent does he therefore undermine his appar74see pp. 251-253 above.
7 5cf. the very similar distinction between "Natural
Wants" and "Wants of Fancy" at STCE 106ff.
Cf. also Rousseau's famous description of the passions of the natural
man, Discourse on Inequality, QR. cit., 116:
"His desires
do not exceed his physical needs, the only goods he knows
in the universe are nourishment, a female, and repose; the
only evils he fears are pain and hunger ... "
76vaughan (1925, 138,160) and Seliger (1968, 71)
attribute to Locke the thesis of historical degeneration.
Albritton's inference of an original human like-mindedness
at the level of simple ideas appears to point to a similar
conclusion (1976, 263).
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ently Hobbesian conception of the antipolitical, antisocial
character of the state of nature?
Here is the basic issue.

If Locke does, like Rous-

seau, intend a completely nonteleological conception of the
natural condition,

constituted only by what is originally

given to humankind and excluding what is acquired or produced by human labor of any kind,

then we would be com-

pelled to acknowledge as an implication of Locke's principle

that

neither

socially

divisive

desire could be in the strictest sense natural.

On the

other hand,

rationality

nor

any

if we ascribe to Locke an insistence on the

naturalness of the latter as human qualities, then it would
seem that Rousseau's observation is sound, at least to the
extent that Locke's failure or refusal to identify the natural and the original marks him in some sense a teleologist.

We will argue, first, that Rousseau's observation is

indeed sound in the respect that Locke's conception of the
state of nature does mark him,

in his way,

as a teleolo-

gist; but second, that Locke employs the teleological principle self-consciously and in a manner that distinguishes
him not only from radically anti-teleological modern philosophers, but also from the classical teleologists.
Within the context of their political theories, Locke
and Rousseau

appear to

disagree most

fundamentally with

respect to the extent to which our natural concern for our
own

well-being

necessitates

the

advent

of

society,

and
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necessitates thenceforth the development of the faculties
and passions that we commonly take to be definitive of or
distinctive in human nature.

We have established above the

fact of Locke's appeal in the Second Treatise to natural
necessity,

to

the

natural

endangerment

of

individuals'

preservation or well being, as the efficient cause of the
origin of political society.

We must now inquire further

into the grounds of that appeal, or more specifically into
the character of that motivating necessity.
In chapter 5 of the Second Treatise in particular,
Locke gives the impression, by means of his widely noticed
references therein to the original condition as one of penury, want, need and wretchedness and to nature's spontaneous provision as mere waste

(II.32,35,37,42,43,45)

that

the natural necessity of which he conceives is a fundamentally material

condition. 77

Yet

even

if we dismiss

as

anti-Hobbesian rhetorical evasions his descriptions in the
same chapter of an original condition of material plenty
featuring harmonious property relations,

the fact remains

that Locke provides therein no real argument in support of
the proposition that pure material necessity or scarcity is
the decisive force that drives the early human beings into
77 Cf. ECHU 2 .16. 6, where Locke refers to the "Americans, " whom he regards in the Second Treatise as paradigmatic of the first ages in Asia and Europe (108), as "accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple
Life."
Recall also Locke's assimilation of the naturally
unprovided material and intellectual conditions
(ECHU
2.2.2, 2.12.1).
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socie

He never retracts or contradicts his conjecture

that the originally small number of "spenders," in conjunction with the severely limited productivity of their labor,
would leave "no reason of quarrelling about Title" in the
first ages

(II.31,44,51).

Of course,

that there may have

been no reason for such quarrels would not imply that they
could not have occurred; but it does imply that if they did
occur, they must have proceeded either from the obstinate
incapacity to resolve an honest dispute or from covetousness of one form or another.
that

any

"necessity"

of

It implies, in other words,

sufficient

power

to

original human beings "quickly ... into Society"

drive

the

(II .127) 7 9

must have been at least as much psychological as material
in character; the advent of stable,

enduring human socie-

ties would then represent an effort to achieve security not
so much against the prospect of starvation as against the
prospective

consequences

of

conflict

with

other

human

beings.
In fact, when Locke mentions the forces that drive us
out of the state of nature into society, he makes no men78cf. again Rousseau's apparently contrary estimate of
the fertility of the natural material condition, Discourse
on Inequality, First Part, 105, and noted, 186-187.
79or perhaps in some cases to drive them apart from
one another, into a condition of dispersion.
See II.101:
"The inconveniences of that condition, and the love, and
want of Society no sooner brought any number of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if they
designed to continue together" (emphasis supplied).
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tion of primarily material necessity.

Instead he refers to

the baseness and viciousness of human nature

(II .13, 125,

128); he maintains that the state of nature is "full of
fears and continual dangers,"

an "ill condition" that is

"not to be endured," precisely because "the greater part"
of its subjects are "no strict Observers of Equity and Justice"

(II.123,127).

In chapter 8,

as we have seen,

in

identifying the original necessity that binds families and
political societies, Locke refers not to any material privation, but rather to a desire on the part of the stronger
or more fortunate to conquer the weaker (115).

His expla-

nation is somewhat more elaborate in chapter 5, wherein he
implies that at work very early in the development of the
human mind if not from the very beginning is an expansive
desire, a "desire of having more than Men needed," an "amor
scleratus habendi"

(II. 37, 111),

even a

desire to conquer

and subdue, a desire for power for its own sake.
Locke

introduces this desire abruptly in this con-

text, apparently to mark a transition from one stage of the
prepolitical state of nature to another. He suggests that
"in the beginning, before" this expansive desire "had altered the intrinsick value of things," the right to appropriate was limited to what one could directly use or consume
(II.37, emphasis supplied).

But the significance of this

transition is questionable.

Strictly speaking, Locke re-

fers to a condition before desire beyond necessity had a
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specific effect, namely the alteration of intrinsic or use
values;

he

makes

or

implies

no

comment here

concerning

whether such desire were present in the beginning and simply otherwise focused. 80

While it is true that Locke pre-

sents in chapter 5 an account of early property relations
as generally peaceful,

he by no means discounts entirely

the passion of covetousness, or the desire for "the benefit
of another's Pains" or labor, as a possible cause of contention. 81

Early

in

his

discussion,

he

qualifies

his

statement of the originally pacific character of property
relations,

claiming only that "there could be then little

room for Quarrels or Contentions about Property so establish'd," that is, little room for quarrels so long as property is taken directly from nature and limited to one's
immediate use

(II.31; emphasis supplied).

Shortly there-

after he raises directly the possibility that theft might
80cf. the similar procedure at II.111: Locke's reference to a golden age "before vain Ambition, and amor scleratus habendi, evil Concupiscence, had corrupted Mens minds
into a Mistake of true Power and Honour" does not imply the
existence of an age from which such passions were simply
absent; it seems to mean that in an age of tribal, patriarchal monarchy, such passions were typically directed outward against other peoples rather than inward against one's
own.
81rt is interesting in this respect, as Pangle observes ( 1988, 161) , that in his chapter "Of Property,"
Locke makes no mention of the state of nature.
Taken in
conjunction with the evidence indicating that he intentionally exaggerates the peaceful character of property relations in that chapter, this seems to imply that the state
of nature as such, whatever its particular manifestation,
cannot be characterized as a condition of peace. See Mansfield 1979, 36; Pangle 1988, 170.

287
be the first of the labor-saving arts discovered by human
beings, that covetousness might be a natural outgrowth of
the

ignorant

early

wanderers'

subjection

penurious material circumstances (34).

to

uncertain,

Most significantly,

he suggests a few paragraphs later that "Men, at first, for
the most part,

contented themselves with what un-assisted

Nature Offered to their Necessities"

(II.45; emphasis sup-

plied); he suggests that at least in some or a few human
beings, from the earliest period onward, operates some deep
and potentially dangerous desire to transcend or conquer
necessity,

to magnify oneself by expanding the realm of

one's own freedom and power.82
It seems clear then that whatever the form in which
it

manifests

itself

historically,

the

Lockean

state

of

82without denying the developmental aspect of Locke's
account of the prepolitical state of nature, one must conclude that that development cannot be described as a lapse
from a peaceful, nomadic, pre-money stage to a contentious,
sedentary, post-money stage.
MacPherson is much closer to
the mark in arguing that Locke does divide the prepolitical
state of nature into pre- and post-money stages, and yet
denying that this division corresponds to Locke's descriptions of peaceful and warlike states of nature; the division is important for Locke, in this view, because it
brings to light the conditions under which truly rational
appropriation can flourish (1962, 197-221,232-236, 241242).
In ascribing to Locke a conception of "a monetary
and commercial state of nature, which is nonsense historically" (235-6; also 209), however, MacPherson seems erroneously to assume that the Lockean state of nature must be
without government altogether, not merely without civil
government.
As is evident in his repeated references to
early wandering peoples as living under rudimentary governments (II.41,102,107-110), Locke does not suppose that the
advent of money historically precedes that of government.
Nor, therefore, does he suppose that the conflicts facilitated by money are the originating cause of government.
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nature, understood as a condition necessitating the constitution of political societies, refers ultimately at least
as much to a

natural mental condition as to a

What

condition.

seems

to

impress

material

Locke most about the

natural human condition is the power of the human will to
overwhelm

or

obfuscate

the

understanding's

charting the course of true happiness,
and Honour"

(II.111).

"perfect Freedom"

attempts

or of "true Power

The state of nature as a state of

(II. 4)

harbors

the constant danger of

degenerating into a state of complete mental license,
which the mind's
operates

power to create whole worlds of

virtually without

tion. 83

Absent

human beings,
moderating

such

rational

rational

guidance

restraint,

unlike other animals,

instincts84

at

explains why

or

the

in

fancy

regula-

fact

that

possess by nature no
"Robberies,

Murders,

Rapes, are the Sports of Men set at Liberty from Punishment
and Censure"

(ECHU 1.3.9).85

Locke's comment in the First

83see Pangle 1988, especially 179-180.
8 4In response to humans' capacity for neglect of and
even cruelty toward their own offspring, Locke asks:
"And
is it the Priviledge of Man alone to act more contrary to
Nature than the Wild and most Untamed part of the Creation?" (I.56).
In this denial of the power of instinct
seems to lie Locke's real similarity to Rousseau.
See
Discourse on Inequality, First Part, 113-115; also Tarcov
1984, 68-70.
85cf. 1.3.13: "Principles of Actions indeed there are
lodged in Men's Appetites [i.e. the pursuit of pleasure and
the avoidance of pain], but these are so far from being
innate Moral Principles, that if they were left to their
full swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all
Morality."
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D'."eatise on Vega's account of Peruvian cannibalism is worth
quoting at length:
Thus far can the busie mind of Man carry him to a Brutality below the level of Beasts, when he quits his
reason, which places him almost equal to Angels.
Nor
can it be otherwise in a Creature, whose thoughts are
more than the Sands, and wider than the Ocean, where
fancy and passion must needs run him into strange
courses, if reason, which is his only Star and compass,
be not that he steers by.
The imagination is always
restless and suggests variety of thoughts, and the
will, reason being laid aside, is ready for every
extravagant project; and in this State, he that goes
farthest out of the way, is thought fittest to lead,
and is sure of most followers ...
(I.58)
An acute
willfulness,

sensitivity to

fancy

or

this

human

propensity for

"busy-mindedness"--ultimately

for

madness--not only underlies his urgent insistence in the
Two Treatises on the proper limits of governmental, political power,86 but also runs as a recurrent, unifying theme
throughout Locke's work.87

As we have seen, he undertakes

in both published and unpublished works a wide-ranging historical refutation of the proposition that a natural moral
consensus binds humankind, employing evidence gleaned both
from his extensive exploration of the travel literature of
his day and from his knowledge of more conventional historical sources to illustrate the prevalence of war and via86Thus Locke warns of the power and danger of human
ambition, and particularly of the dangerous effects of
flattering the powerful, at II.91,135n.,143,226, and I.10.
8 7 On the power of fancy, see Locke to an otherwise
unidentified "Tom," 20 October 1659, CJL #81. More generally on the human propensity for fancy, "busy-mindedness"
and ultimately madness, see ECHU 1.1.4; 2.1.2,16; 2.33.4,9.
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1ence throughout human history. 88
tant,

The overridingly impor-

transhistorical constant among human beings,

ding to Locke,

accor-

is the extreme fragility of human reason,

and thus our easy susceptibility to the most extravagant,
grotesque mental or psychological disorders.
natural

mental

condition

of

humankind,

This, as the

constitutes

most

essentially the necessitous condition of which we must be
ever cognizant in our attempts at constructing and maintaining political societies.
This is the character of the Lockean teleology,
manifest in Locke's account of the state of nature.

as
The

preceding discussion has made it clear that Locke regards
the acquisition of expansive, fanciful desires (both social
and antisocial) as well as of some rudimentary, instrumental rationality as occurring very early in human development.
well,

Yet at the same time,
on

the

basis

of

his

it seems tolerably clear as
psychological

hedonism,

his

distinction between natural and fanciful desires, and his
critique of innatism, that he does regard these as acquisitions, not as innate or instinctual qualities.
then to Rousseau's objection:

To return

How can Locke, in a manner

consistent with his rejection of the classical principle of
teleology,

conceive

of certain human properties

as both

natural and historically acquired?
As we have observed at some length above, throughout
88see the evidence presented above, pp. 275-277.
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the Essay Locke conceives of the natural in the strictest
sense as the causally necessary, the constant, the invariant. 89

Upon occasion he further refines this conception

in a manner that seems to anticipate Rousseau, associating
the natural with the original or native. 9 0
to

infer that according to

Locke

a

Now, if we are

property natural

to

human beings must be innate in individuals and present at
the origin of the species,

then we must conclude that he

cannot consistently maintain his account of the state of
nature or the natural condition in the form that we have
described.

But

in

conceiving

of

these

developmental,

acquired properties as natural, what Locke seems to have in
mind is the proposition that while such properties are not
in themselves strictly original to individuals or to the
species,

they are natural in the sense that they develop

according to the promptings of an original, constant human
condition of necessity.
cussions

remain

somewhat

And although Locke's textual disambiguous

with

respect

character of this necessity or to the mode

to

the

in which it

89once again, Locke implies such a conception especially at ECHU 2.21.73, 2.23.32, 3.5.8ff., 3.9.7, 3.10.20,
4.16.6.

90rn his discussion of various relations in the Essay,
for instance, he observes that among the occasions of
comparing things, and by implication the properties of
things, "is (sic] the Circumstances of their origin or
beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make
the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong ... and these I call natural Relations" (2.28.2; also 2.33.7).
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effects the expansion of human desires, the following seems
the most powerful among the available alternative interpretations.
Although according to the Essay's natural-historical
sketch of the development of the human understanding, the
first, most basic mental faculty of sensory perception is
virtually innate (2.1.23; 2.9.1), only "in time" does the
mind come "to reflect on its own Operations" (2 .1. 24).
fact,

according to Locke,

"'tis pretty late,

In

before most

Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds;
and some have not any very clear, or perfect Ideas of them
all their Lives" (2.1.8)

Herein lies then a further state-

ment of Locke's observation that many people remain unreflective or less than fully self-conscious throughout their
lives; but what is important in the present context is to
understand the limits of this observation.
that most

Locke's denial

children early or ever make extensive use of

their powers of reflection is by no means equivalent to a
denial that any form of reflection is in the strict sense
natural to human beings.

He argues to the contrary that

the most basic form of reflection, the capacity for selfconsciousness,
perception:

is

"inseparable

from

thinking,"

or

from

"It being impossible for any one to perceive,

without perceiving, that he does perceive" (2.27.9).
Thus at least as something akin to a felt intuition,
if not necessarily as a fully articulated concept, the idea
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of one's self is according to Locke natural to human beings
or coeval with human thought.

However dimly or crudely, we

are in the most basic respect naturally reflective, inward
When Locke denies that reflection is among our

creatures.

natural or native capacities, he is referring to the failure of most children and some adults to reflect on their
own mental operations,
ing,

reasoning,

their powers of perception, think-

and so forth;

this failure signifies not

the absence in them of any idea or consciousness of self as
such,

but rather a more specific failure to

that

self

powers.

as

a

seat

or

repository

of

conceive of

clearly

defined

Locke's explanation of the source of this failure

is helpful in clarifying more positively what in his view
our natural idea of self represents.
presents

it

understood

derives
involves

from

the

attentive

fact

The difficulty as he
that

action,

a

reflection

thus

redirecting

of

one's attention from

(mainly)

outward objects to inward,

subjective operations

(2 .1. 7, 8); Locke contrasts the more

generally active operation of reflection to the generally
passive
2.21.72).

operation
We

of

have

sensory
described

perception
above

in

( 2. 1. 2 5;
some

2. 9. 1;

detail

his

hedonistic account of human motivation.91

In its relevance

to the present discussion,

implies that we

that account

91rn the absence of experiences of pleasure and pain,
according to Locke, "we should have no Reason to pref err
one Thought or Action, to another" ( 2. 7. 3) .
On Locke's
tendency to conflate reasons and motivations for action,
see Colman 1983, 223-224.

294
most basically, naturally, vividly experience the self less
as the seat of perception in general than as the seat of
our more specific "concernment," the subject of our pleasures and pains.
is

"the

A "concern for Happiness," observes Locke,

unavoidable

concomitant

of

consciousness,

which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain,
that self,

that is conscious,

that

desiring,

should be happy"

that

(2.27.26;

also 2.1.11; 2.27.17).92
To this point the divergence between Locke's conception of natural self-consciousness and Rousseau's depiction
of the original,
insignificant.

natural human beings appears relatively
It seems clear that,

like Rousseau,

Locke

conjectures that the original human beings must have possessed at best a minimal rationality,
to

make

crude

instrumental

sufficient for them

calculations

necessities of daily survival,

in

meeting

the

but devoid of any signif-

92Taken as a description of the experience of the
basic Lockean self, the following statement by Wallin is
essentially accurate:
" [Locke's] denial of innateness is
radical because it is equivalent to a denial of any correspondence between man and the world he lives in except on
the purely sensual level ... That which is other does not
exist, or cannot be known, or is limited to that which can
produce pleasure or pain" ( 1984, 155) .
In the following
chapter, however, I will try to show that according to
Locke this conception of the basic materials of selfconsciousness does not circumscribe human experience as
severely as Wallin claims; especially the development of
various mental pleasures and pains out of the sensual means
that the potential sphere of human concernment, of what is
capable of producing in us pleasure or pain, and therefore
worthy of inquiry, is virtually infinite.
See ECHU 2.7.2,
10; 2.20.15.
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icant

foresight,

let

alone

any

scientific

curiosity.93

There may be some ground for disagreement in Locke's account of the basic operation of willing, though as is usual
in this matter he leaves it to the reader to construct the
Inasmuch as according to Locke we can

relevant argument.

scarcely perceive anything without thereby acquiring, however dimly,

some

idea

of the

self,

and we can have no

experience of self-consciousness that does not include a
concern for the well-being of that self,

it follows that

action in pursuance of our own well-being is for Locke a
concomitant of perception.

Thus the "two great and prin-

cipal Actions of the Mind ... are these two:
Thinking,

and Volition,

or Willing"

Perception, or

(2.6.2).

Now if we

consider the naturalness of willing in the light of Locke's
account of the "Association of Ideas," of the human propensity to form mental associations between ideas more or less
"ally'd

by

Nature"

(2.33.6,

and passim),

we might well

inf er the virtual naturalness of an association between the
ideas of pleasure and power,
the

pleasures

in

human

at least insofar as many of

experience

require

some

sort

of

9 3 Locke tends to scatter throughout various works the
argumentation and evidence in support of this conjecture.
In the Essay, for instance, he observes, apparently with
reference to no specific historical period, that "Men are
apt enough," in accordance with "our feeble passionate
Nature, " to ignore future pleasures in favor of attending
present uneasinesses (2.21.65,67). See also STCE 45,48,50.
At TT II.44,45,94,107,111, Locke depicts the inhabitants of
the first ages as wanderers, living hand to mouth, and also
as tacitly consenting to the unlimited prerogative power of
monarchs--both marks of innocence or lack of foresight.
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volitional

act

for

their

production.

In this way

Locke

seems to contend that human beings come naturally to take a
kind of pleasure simply in the act of willing, of exercising power,

irrespective of its object. 94

The presence of

expansive desires according to Locke would then be coincident

not merely with human social

consciousness itself.

life,

but with human

Such desires would be not strictly

innate, but nonetheless operative virtually from birth.

It

is perhaps in-this fairly precise sense that Locke declares
in his work on education that "we are all,
cradles,

vain

and

proud

Creatures"

(STCE

even from our
119;

also

38,

148) .
It is true that Locke's presentation is not free from
ambiguity

with

respect

to

the

scope

and

intensity with

which this expansive desire prevails over human behavior.
Nothing in the preceding account, of course, would compel
Locke to deny that the power of these expansive desires and
the specific mode of their development or awakening may
vary with the particular experiences and the natural constitutions of individuals. 95

In fact the willful desire

9 4 The "peculiar" character of Locke's hedonism rests
according to Strauss in the fact that for Locke the greatest happiness consists less in enjoying the greatest pleasures than in having things that produce the greatest pleasures.
"Locke says in effect that the greatest happiness
consists in the greatest power" (1953, 249; see ECHU
2.21.55). Cf. Pangle 1988, 167.
9 5 on natural constitutions, see STCE 66, 101, 102; cf.
Tarcov 1984, 109.
For Locke's statements ascribing the
expansive desires to "the greater part" (II.123) or to the
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for power as Locke describes it does appear in many people
to lie dormant or to assume passive or attenuated forms,
perhaps

in

some

gratifications,
desire

for

subdued

by

an

absorption

in

immediate

in others overpowered by the more urgent

security or regulated by the desire

esteem of one's fellows.

for the

Yet it is clearly Locke's view

that in the generality of human beings inheres at least an
"apt(ness] to grasp at Power" (TT II.143), and further that
notwithstanding his references to self-preservation as the
object of "the first and strongest desire" (I.88)96 and to
the great power of the desire for esteem, 97 the species
generality of human beings, see II.13,92,125; I.10,106;
STCE 103, 119.
Cf. however his reference at II. 45 to the
contentment of the early human beings "for the most part"
with the necessitous existence provided spontaneously by
nature, and his later somewhat ambiguous reference to "Ambition, Revenge, (and] Covetousness" as "irregular" passions (II.199; also ECHU 2.20.14).
I take "irregular" as
Locke uses it here to signify nonregularly occurrent, and
thus to refer to passions whose objects are not strictly
necessary for biological survival.
96In view of Locke's estimate of the power of the expansive, fanciful desires, it appears that Cox goes too far
in ascribing to Locke the opinion that there exists "a discernible natural hierarchy among the desires; the desire
for self-preservation ... is primordial, universally operative, and the most powerful of all desires" (1960, 88).
Goldwin exaggerates similarly:
"The desire for preservation can be diverted, directed, or cajoled, but there is no
way to diminish or eradicate its overwhelming power" (1972,
484).
Were this simply true, the law of nature would be
far less "hidden" than it is for Locke (see LN 1.111,
2.135, 10.217), and the need for him to write books like
the Two Treatises much less urgent.
97 on the power of the desire for esteem, see ECHU
2.28.10,12; STCE 56,58,61.
See the further discussion in
chapter VI below, pp. 339-344.
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manifests

no

shortage

of

overtly

ambitious,

aggressive

individuals in whom the desire for more than is necessary,
for self-magnification, for power or dominion suppresses or
overwhelms the other desires.
The essential point is simply that in Locke's view
the operation of such expansive desires is "ordinary and
natural"

(STCE 103).

The wants of fancy are in their way

also wants of nature. 98

As thus

far presented,

Locke's

argument implies a rejection of the classical notion that
human nature points toward definite natural ends or states
of perfection, 99 but it involves a rejection also of the
inference that he is thereby compelled to understand human
nature exclusively or strictly in terms of the species'
beginning.

Apparently recoiling from the more radically

modern view on the grounds that a total rejection of the
teleological principle is neither desirable nor ultimately
possible, 100 Locke presents what he seems to consider a
98Tarcov draws this conclusion also from Locke's comparison of mental to bodily pain, at STCE 112-114 ( 1984,
152) .
99Locke's most explicit rejection of the classical
teleology appears at ECHU 2.21.55.
Elsewhere, however, he
seems to appeal to a different, somewhat democratized or
relativized form of teleology, according to which our natural "perfections" fit us not necessarily for high virtue,
but rather for our personal preservation and happiness.
See ECHU 2.7.4-6; 2.9.14; 2.21.50,51; 4.11.8.
Cf. Colman
1983, 40,240-242; Tarcov 1984, 134,173.
lOOcf. the discussion of ECHU 4. 6. 11, in chapter IV
above, pp. 167-186.
It is worth noting, though it is difficult to know what to make of the fact, that in an unpublished 1696 fragment entitled "Deus," Locke expresses sus-
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partially or moderately teleological
His

nature.

appeal

in the

Essay to

applied to the human condition,

conception of human
"natural history,"

represents a continuation

of the Machiavellian project of early modernity to understand human nature as it manifests itself in the generality
of human beings, to view human beings as they are historically, 101 not as they ought to be or might be in exceptional cases, whether of exceptional virtue or of radical
(solitary

or

socially

creative)

freedom.

That

appeal

implies, in other words, that in Locke's view on principle
there can be no strict separation between nature and history, that human nature is revealed in and throughout history.

Human nature as Locke conceives it is a product of a

condition

of

necessity

that

is

both

original

and

con-

stant, 102 that brings forth faculties and passions in human
picion of Descartes in response in part to the latter's
"shutting out the consideration of final causes out [sic]
of his philosophy" (in King 1830, 314). Why Locke chooses
not to remedy in his own published philosophy this defect
of Descartes remains to be explained.
lOlsee Machiavelli's famous statement of his realistic
intention, in The Prince 15:
"But since my intent is to
write something useful to whoever understands it, it has
appeared to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual
truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many
have imagined republics and principalities that have never
been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from
how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of
what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather
than his preservation" (ed. Mansfield 1985, 61).
102Lockean human nature seems in other words to be the
product of something standing between, or some combination
of an essential and an accidental necessity.
Cf. Strauss
1953, 272.
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beings

that,

cannot be

however

variously

eradicated or

manifested

fundamentally

or

directed,

transformed.

The

teleology that Locke espouses takes its bearings from the
historically

observable

II.60;

2.26.4;

ECHU

"ordinary

4.16.6);

course

of

Nature"

(TT

the considerable degree of

observable human malleability notwithstanding, according to
Locke a common subjection to certain constant, basic necessities conditions the psychological formation of both presocial and fully civilized peoples in fundamentally similar
ways.
On the basis of this account of Locke's attenuated
teleology, we can see in part how it makes sense, contrary
to the objection of John Dunn

(1969,

102),

for Locke to

present his account of the human condition in the first
ages as in important respects normative for modern peoples.
The original condition is normative for us, insofar as it
is,

not because it is original,

according to Locke,

but

rather insofar as it reveals with particular clarity the
fundamental

characteristics of the historically constant

human condition.
itly

toward

a

Yet Dunn's objection does point implicpotentially

serious

difficulty

in

Locke,

insofar as it brings us to wonder how Locke's account of
the human nature that is formed by this human condition can
be normative

for any people,

ancient or modern.

Having

constructed the likely Lockean grounds of resistance to the
Rousseauian conception of radical human malleability,

we
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recall the point of departure for the foregoing discussion
of the natural human condition.

In exploring Locke's view

of the basic constancies in human nature and in the human
condition,

we

have

unearthed

some

undeniably

evidence relative to the psychological
beings

for

conforming

with

the

troubling

fitness

principles

of human

of

natural

rights.
We

have

argued

that

Locke

presents

a

hedonistic

account of human motivation, but in a rather complex form.
Though he seems to hold that in the strict sense "the only
thing, we naturally [i.e. natively, originally] are afraid
of,

is Pain, or loss of Pleasure" (STCE 115), he observes

more particularly that the focus of our egoistic concern
for

our

own

well

being

ordinarily

between two polar extremes:

a

falls

or

oscillates

"strong desire of Self-

preservation" (I.86), and an expansive, transcendent desire
for self-magnification.

In this way Locke's view recalls

to some extent Machiavelli's observation of the two diverse
humors or appetites that divide the human race into two
fundamental classes.103

But with respect to Locke's thee-

103"For in every city these two diverse humors are
found, which arises from this:
that the people desire
neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the
great desire to command and oppress the people. From these
two diverse appetites one of three effects occurs in cities: principality or liberty or license" (The Prince 9, in
Mansfield ed. 1985, 39).
Locke appears to differ from
Machiavelli in replacing the desire not to be oppressed
with the desire for self-preservation, which would seem
much more consistent with submission to despotism.
(See
e.g. II.223,230).
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ry of justice, what are the implications of this implicit
What if

questioning of . the unity of the human species?

nature endowed a relative few with an overpowering ambition, a proud desire of dominion insatiable except by the
exercise of despotic power over others,

and endowed the

greater number with,

if not a positive desire for subjec-

tion to such power,

at least a preference for suffering

rather than resisting it?

Would we be compelled to con-

elude that nature has constituted humankind, in the morally
decisive respect, not one but two or at least two species-that nature does not mandate moral equality or government
by consent, but instead sanctions the rule of the stronger,
for the interest of the stronger?
By means

of his

natural-historical

account

of the

fragility of human reason, of our frequent proneness to a
destructive,

fanciful will to power and even to madness,

Locke appears to imply that moral dissensus is natural to
human beings not only or primarily on epistemological, but
also on psychological grounds.104
question

whether

his

account

of

He therefore raises the
the

state

of

nature

describes so powerfully the naturalness of wrongs that it
overwhelms
rights.

any

attempt

at

def ending

the

naturalness

of

In rejecting as he does the Rousseauian, radically

104Thus observes Miller:
"Locke's emphasis on the
variability of moral and political ideas makes us wonder
how the agreement necessary to political life can ever be
secured" (1979, 184).
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evolutionary argument for the conventionality of justice,
does Locke necessarily commit his assent to a version of
the Machiavellian or Hobbesian argument for the conventionality of justice?

In the following chapter, we will final-

ly explore in detail the arguments whereby Locke seeks to
show how the materials that nature provides can both guide
our construction of and sustain our commitment to certain
fundamental, transhistorical principles of justice.

CHAPTER VI
THE NATURALNESS OF RIGHTS
In calling attention in the Essay to the character of
our moral rules and concepts as mixed-mode constructions,
Locke implies that not merely their practical efficacy, but
indeed the very existence of our conceptions of morality
and

justice

is

to

a

societal consensus.1

considerable degree

dependent

upon

Moreover, as the preceding chapter's

account of the Lockean state of nature makes clear, Locke's
emphasis on the dependent status of morality serves also to
underline the difficulty of achieving a rational consensus.
When his only published suggestions of the possible content
of his proposed demonstrative science of ethics point in
the end from natural theology back to human nature,
might

understandably

conclude,

therefore,

that

one
that

proposal fails utterly.2
lsee chapter III above, pp. 99-115.
2This is the conclusion most notably of Dunn, who
explains the "persistently abortive" character of Locke's
sketches of his proposal of a demonstrative ethics by
reference in the end to Locke's recognition of the fact
that "such a demonstration is not in principle possible"
(1969, 80,187; also 1984, 66ff.,84).
Cf. Von Leyden 1954,
74.
For Locke's own explanations of his apparent failure
to accomplish or even to attempt seriously such a demonstration, see especially Works 1823 4.187,407ff., and CJL
#1538, 9/20/92 and #2059, 4/5/96, both to Molyneux.
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Yet, perhaps in more ways than the most obvious is
Locke's

insistence on the naturalness of moral dissensus

similar and indeed closely related to his statement of the
natural uncertainty of our definitions of the names of substances and species.

It is striking, of course, that he

seems so urgently concerned 3 to discredit both the traditional

scholastic

doctrine

of

natural

species

and

the

quasi-innatist doctrine of a moral consensus gentium.

In

both cases, however, alongside his emphatic denials of the
adequacy

of

the

definitions

that

nature

provides

us,

whether of species or of moral laws, he more quietly admits
that though it surely does leave the business of precise
definition to human convention, nature contributes significantly

in furnishing the basic "materials" of consensus.

Locke indicates the character of those "materials" relevant
to the issue of moral consensus, in thus qualifying one of
his

more

dissensus:

extreme

statements

condemned by
he

absolutely

prevalence of moral

"there is scarce that Principle of Morality to

be named ... which is not,

Men,"

of the

the

somewhere or other, slighted and

general

observes,
necessary

Fashion of whole

"those
to

hold

only

Societies

excepted,

Society

that

together ... "

of
are

(ECHU

1.3.10).4

3cf. Miller 1979, 178.
4Locke goes on to say of these rules of social necessity that they "commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct
Societies"; but this is to say only that they are not self-
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The rootedness of morality in societal necessity is
present

as

a

recurrent,

Locke's

published

therefore take

and

it as a

if understated
unpublished
premise,

theme throughout

works. 5

If

we

may

the above qualification

would suggest something like the following as a sketch of
the foundations of the Lockean principles of justice.

In

the modernized, empirically circumscribed form of teleology
common
relevant

to

Machiavelli,

nature

Hobbes,

comprises those

and
forms

Locke,

politically

of necessity that

originally and constantly move human beings to
maintain political societies.
concepts

and

rules

as

the

form and

The construction of moral

regulative

conditions

of

the

human pursuit of happiness is nonrelativistic, according to
Locke's suggestion, insofar as it is guided by a consciousness of the sway of necessity in human affairs.

The recog-

nition of the fundamentally necessitous character of the
human condition, in its psychological as well as its material dimension, represents according to Locke the beginning
of human wisdom about politics; this would explain especially the great emphasis he places on the fact of moral
enforcing, or that the law of nature is not generally observed in the state of nature.
The present argument does
not maintain that such rules require no conventional supports, but only that they provide a natural basis for the
promulgation of positive laws.
For similar qualifications
of Locke's rejection of the notion of a consensus gentium,
see ECHU 1.3.6, 2.28.11.
5see ETG 125, 172; LN 1. 115-117, 5. 169; "Of Ethics in
General," in King 1830, 309-310; RC 243.
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dissensus, rooted in the virtually boundless potential for
disorder in the human mind.
sents
beings

the

fundamental

confront

condition.

and

Political society then repre-

convention whereby
manage

their

rational

naturally

human

necessitous

It is reasonable, according to this argument,

to expect that human beings reasoning in common about their
fundamental
the minimal

interests can achieve a consensus at most on
conditions necessary

for

the maintenance of

society and thus for the management of natural necessity.
The principles of justice or natural rights represent the
minimal personal guarantees that rational,

naturally free

individuals require in submitting themselves to a

common

authority; their preservation constitutes, in other words,
the minimal condition in which subjection to a governmental
authority is rationally preferable to a more direct confrontation

with

the

forces

of nature

and human

nature.

Inasmuch as "no rational Creature can be supposed to change
his condition with an intention to be worse," individuals
surrender the "Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they
had

in the State of Nature ... only with an

intention in

every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and
Property" (TT II.131).6
6Moreover, by pursuing this line of reasoning we may
gain at least some further insight into Locke's puzzling
proposal of a demonstrative science of ethics. The connection between that proposal and Locke's necessitarian doctrine of justice--and by implication, between the Essay's
and the Two Treatises' accounts of political morality-becomes explicit in his unpublished fragment "Morality."
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It is clear,
or

dissensus

in view of the fact of moral diversity

across

societies,

that

the

"necessity"

to

which Locke appeals signifies only the causal (material and
psychological)
maintain

forces that move human beings to form and

societies.

The

consensus

that

such

necessity

Here, in contrast to his suggested adumbrations of moral
demonstration in the Essay, Locke limits himself to a principle of secular hedonism as the source of his fundamental
"definition" and axioms," acknowledging "a state after this
life" only as a bare possibility (in Sargentich 1974, 26,
27; cf. ECHU 2.21.70) and proceeding to develop "a rule of
action" for beings "who have noe prospect beyond this
life."
More precisely, just as in the more modern or
Hobbesian strands of argument in the Two Treatises, Locke
adopts as his premise the naturally necessitous condition
of humankind, wherein the arbitrary dispensations of "want
rapin and force" (ibid.) inevitably violate the equal
birthright of individuals to enjoy nature's provisions, or
to create for themselves the "plenty and security" that are
the necessary conditions of happiness.
Having therefore
established justice as the determination of "peoples
rights" by societal compact, Locke declares that "the rest
[of the virtues) will not be hard"; he breaks off the manuscript after the briefest mention of "Civility Charity Liberality," which "relate to society and soe border on Justice" (27, 28).
In this presentation, the demonstrative
morality thus reduces to a demonstration, on the basis of
an empirically well-grounded but non-self-evident proposition, of the minimal, core principles of justice that form
the bond of society.
Finally, one might object that if
Locke were truly interested in promoting a sober, tolerant,
empiricist probabilism, he would not advertise the possibility of (and therefore raise his readers' demand for)
certitude in moral reasoning.
Thus Wallin 1984, 149-150,
argues that the intensification of political conflicts
occurs as a direct consequence of Locke's mixed-mode
science of ethics, rooted in a vision of moral autonomy.
To this I can respond only that in asserting the possibility of achieving such certitude, Locke seems only to be
following an intellectual fashion, while his real interest
seems to lie in indicating the extreme difficulty involved
in achieving consensus, let alone certitude in matters of
morality, and therewith the minimalist character of the
principles of justice (or theology) with which we should be
satisfied.
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produces consists at best in a more-or-less tacit agreement
on the necessity of society itself,
content

of

the

rules

maintain society.

whose

not on the specific

observance

is

necessary

to

Locke does not make the unsustainable

claim that natural necessity produces an actual, historical
consensus

across

human

societies

on

natural rights principles of justice.

the

truth

of

the

Rather, his appeal

to necessity represents an appeal to what we might consider
rationalized
consensus

necessity,

inherent in a

or

to

the

rational,

potential

grounds

well considered,

of

fore-

sighted response to the actual conditions of necessity that
prompt

the

development

of

human

societies.

A rational

response must of course derive from a sound understanding
of actual necessity, but not all responses to necessity are
equally rational.7

To put it another way, Locke does not

propose a complete reduction of the rational to the actual
in morality;B the actual for Locke by no means in itself
circumscribes, though it may imply the limits of the possible or the rational in morality.
Yet it remains unclear precisely how even this appeal
to a minimalist,
resolve

the

necessitarian conception of justice can

problem

that

Locke

naturalness of moral dissensus.

raises

concerning

the

In the fact that "even

7 Again contrast Wallin 1984, 157.
Bon the rationalization of the actual or the conquest
of chance as the animating purpose of modern political
philosophy in general, see Strauss 1959, 41-55.
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outlaws and Robbers, who break with all the World besides,
must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves"
(ECHU 1. 3. 2) ,

Locke may find some cause for hopefulness

with respect to the potential of a consciousness of social
necessity to provide reliable
consensus.
upon

the

natural

grounds

for

jural

Whether such hopefulness is reasonable depends
willingness

or

motivation

of

individuals

to

respect the sway of a particular form of necessity, namely
that imposed by the presence in the world of others whose
power and cunning at least equal one's own.9

But it seems

questionable precisely on the grounds of Locke's own account of human psychology whether such a general attitude

9 This is the substance also of Locke's immediate
response to the pregnant objection that he raises in the
fragment "Morality."
To the argument that "it may be
sometimes a mans advantage to break his word and then I may
doe it as contributing to my happynesse," Locke responds
that such a rule generalized would render it "impossible
for any man to be happy unlesse he were both stronger and
wiser than the rest of man kinde, " and thus capable of
prevailing in "a state of rapin and force" (in Sargentich
1974, 28; cf. LN 10.231).
Cf. Hobbes' defense of the
principle of equality: "Nature hath made men so equall, in
the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of
quicker mind then [sic] another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so
considerable, as that one man can claim to himselfe any
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as
he ... If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equali tie is to be acknowledged:
or if Nature have made men
unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall,
will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon equall
terms, such equalitie must be admitted" (Leviathan 13,15,
in 1968, 183, 211).
Among the fundamental grounds of the
Lockean virtues, as Tarcov comments, is the insight "that
there are more and stronger men in the world than oneself"
( 1984, 183) .
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We have

of deference represents a realistic expectation.

seen that Locke traces in large part the disorders prevailing in the natural human condition to the natural aptness
of the human mind to fall subject to expansive,
desires;

indeed

Locke

views

much

if

not

all

fanciful
of

human

criminality as the product of the desire for more than one
needs. 10

On what grounds does Locke see in humankind in

general a potential to def er to the sway of natural necessity, when perhaps the most immediately threatening component of that necessity is a natural human desire to transcend necessity,

to acquire more than one's share,

more

than one needs?
A two-dimensional question is implicit here.

Arising

more immediately is the familiar question of obligation, or
of the reasons for submitting oneself to the dictates of
Lockean justice.

Yet inasmuch as Locke tends to view this

question as reducing to the question of motivation, or of
the presence of a effective enforcement system of rewards
and

punishments,11

thought

is

the

inseparable

question
from

the

of

obligation

deeper

question

in

his

of

the

lOncovetousness, and the desire of having in our Possession, and under our Dominion, more than we have need of,
being the Root of all Evil, should be early and carefully
weeded out ... " (STCE 110). Cf. STCE 105; TT II.37.
ll 11 Reward and Punishment," consisting in pleasure and
pain of one form or another, Locke maintains, are "the only
Motives to a rational Creature" (STCE 54; also ECRU 2.7.3).
Therefore they constitute the only possible grounds for any
rational creature voluntarily to assume any obligation.
See especially ECRU 2.21.51-52; TT II.77.

312
consonance of Lockean

justice with human happiness,

therefore with human nature.

and

Could rational human beings,

rational pursuers of happiness,

render their truly free,

voluntary consent to the Lockean regime, or would instead
their consent to that regime rest ultimately on an act of
repression, of internal if not external coercion?
Herein lies the ultimate significance of objections
such as that of Strauss,

to the effect that the Lockean

ethic consists in a "peculiar hedonism," that is, a peculiarly repressive, ascetic hedonism.
conception
human

of

nature

understood

happiness
he

implies

abstracts

it.12

It means,

from
as

Locke's relativistic

that

in his account

eros

as

the

Strauss argues,

of

ancients
that in

attempting to elaborate the proper course of action for
human beings as political creatures, Locke must focus not
on the attainment of happiness itself, but instead on the
process of creating the conditions for the attainment of
happiness.

Politically relevant nature consists in a set

of "necessities" or "mere inescapabilities" that it is the
proper

business

of

rational

action

manage, if never finally to overcome.

to

confront

and

to

Rational action for

Locke consists in subjecting oneself to labor as "the pain
which relieves pain," or more generally in acquiring power
sufficient to remedy or to manage the natural condition of
powerlessness.

Human life is reduced to an exercise in

12cf. Pangle 1988, 213.
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aimless self-denial, or in Strauss' memorable description,
a "joyless quest for joy" (1953, 249-251).13
The

implication

of

this

and

like

charges

is

that

Lockean justice is decisively if not wholly conventional in
character, an alien imposition requiring the suppression of
natural human desires.

In view of its apparent design to

subject the transcendent desires of the powerful

to the

levelling principle of moral

one

and

jural equality,

is

tempted to regard Lockean justice as in its essence nothing
more than a restatement of the ancient conventionalist conception of justice as the ideology of the weak or timid.14
Yet

in

the

scope

of

its

conventionalist

implications,

Locke's doctrine may ultimately surpass even those of the
ancients.

For if our natural inclination toward our own

well being is bipolar in the manner that Locke describes-if

nature

inclines

at

least

some

of

us

to

employ

our

13rn the context of a very different interpretation,
John Dunn reaches a similar conclusion on this point, maintaining that the Lockean-Calvinist imperative of laboring
in one's "calling" constitutes a neurotic and nearly Sisyphean ethic of "boundless repression," a seemingly "odd
norm to extract from a utilitarian calculus" ( 1969, 259260, 265, 263; see, however, ECHU 2.21.68-69).
Also Wood
1984, 102.
Cf. Oakeshott's similar judgment on Hobbes
(1962, 257-259), and Tocqueville's description of the restlessness and anxiety prevalent among the Americans, whom he
seems to regard as the world's pre-eminent rational pursuers of happiness, and thus as the world's pre-eminently
Lockean people (Democracy in America 2.2.13).
14see especially the statements of this view by Callicles, in Plato's Gorgias 482-492; by Glaucon, at Republic
358b-362c; and by Philus, summarizing the teaching of Carneades, in Cicero, Republic 3.5-21.
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liberty so

as

to

indulge our

fantasies

of conquest and

dominion, and inclines others to look after their own well
being in a timorous,

slothful submission to such conquer-

ors15--then it would seem that not merely the powerful, but
rather

in

various

ways

virtually all

human beings must

experience the socialization required for membership in a
Lockean

commonwealth

as

unnatural

or

repressive.

The

advent of the consensually minded homo civilis would seem
to involve not merely the costuming in respectable attire,
but instead the thorough suppression or conquest of homo
naturalis. 16
manner,

Though perhaps in a significantly different

civilization would then represent a

condition of

alienation no less for Locke than for Rousseau; the alienation, as a condition of membership, of one's natural freedom

would

constitute

an

alienation

of

one's

happiness,

ultimately of one's self.
The aim of the present chapter is to show how it is
possible

to

construct,

out

of

the

resources

that

Locke

provides, an appropriate Lockean response to this fundamen15rn the Second Treatise, such sloth and timorousness
manifest themselves in many peoples' historical contentment
in material poverty (II.31,41-45,49,51), and in the relatively common fact of popular acquiescence in, or nonresistance to, umlimited, despotic government (cf. 75,94,107-110
with 92, 223, 230) .
Cf. Gorgias 493-499, where Socrates
brings Callicles to concede that his identification of the
good with the pleasurable implies that a life of cowardice
is at least as choiceworthy or admirable as one of bravery.
16cf. Caton' s judgment on the disproportion between
these two human types in Hobbes (1983, 8).

315

We will argue that notwithstanding either

tal challenge.

the various levels of sacrifice that consent entails or the
various forms of happiness pursued or asserted by various
types of human beings,

the Lockean regime and the Lockean

psychology of human motivation are fundamentally compatible; Locke does provide, albeit in a rather muted or even
concealed

manner,

the

theoretical

grounds

of

a

defense

against tyranny, of an argument for its ultimate unnaturalness as distinct from its mere imprudence.

Yet the fact

that Locke does not always directly confront the relevant
difficulties, and therefore that he requires his readers or
commentators to construct his response to such challenges,
in itself requires explanation.

By exploring in the final

section of the chapter the question of Locke's

relative

silence with respect to questions that his thought does, as
we will attempt to show, contain the means for answering,
we will come,

finally,

to the heart of Locke's political-

philosophical enterprise,

and to an understanding both of

the essential problem posed by political life and its proper solution as he views it.

More specifically, we will

argue that the thesis of Lockean esotericism need not yield
a radically modern, nihilistic Locke, but may instead yield
a relatively moderate Locke,

one whose modernity is more

genuinely ambiguous than the Straussian reading seems to
imply,

and

yet

whose

traditionalism

is

more

genuinely

philosophical than the most vocal detractors of Strauss on
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this point have recognized.

THE PRINCIPLE OF BALANCE
A fair portion of textual evidence does appear to
support the conclusion that reason functions as an essentially repressive power in Locke's moral-political thought.
This

appears

as

a

particularly

prominent

theme

in

his

educational writing, wherein he frequently suggests that
the great Principle and Foundation of all Vertue and
Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny
himself his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations,
and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho' the
Appetite lean the other way.
(STCE 33; also 17,38,45,
52,107,108,200)
Yet

such

suggestions

cannot

in

themselves

justify

the

characterization of Lockean morality as proceeding from a
simple neo-Stoicl 7
desire.

As

or Puritan18

Tarcov

explains

opposition of
(1984,

reason to

87-91,96-100),

the

relevant antagonism exists less between reason and passion
as such than between those passions authorized and those
unauthorized
particularly,

by

reason

or

Locke tends

rational
to

foresight.19

conceive

of

rational

More
self-

mastery as the ability to "resist the Importunity" not of
all desire, but in particular of "present Pleasure or Pain"
17cf. Axtell 1968, 138n., 218n., 219n.
18cf. Dunn 1969, especially 214-261.
19on the relation of the power of foresight to the
humanizing power of abstraction, see chapter V above, pp.
237-242.
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(STCE

In

45).

Some

Thoughts

Concerning

Education,

he

elaborates with great subtlety the means whereby a skillful
educator can cultivate and direct the passions of children
in such manner as to promote most effectively their longterm virtue and happiness.

At the same time, he indicates

that his observations regarding both the predominant passions and even the means whereby they are to be cultivated
and directed often apply similarly or analogously to adults
as well as to children.20
The potential implication for Locke's understanding
The question arises whether

of politics is significant.

Locke's educational project extends beyond the Thoughts'
discussion of childrearing and continues in the Two TreatMore specifically,

ises.

withstanding

his

apparent

the suspicion arises that notentrustment

of

the

task

of

education to the privacy of the family21 and his restriction of the act of political consent to adults

(II. 59),

Locke acknowledges the limits of the presumptive rationality

of

adults

and

therefore

does

not

fully

accept

the

modern liberal separation between politics and education or
character-formation.

Perhaps

instead

he

views

the

Two

Treatises' discussion of the principles of legitimacy and
constitutionalism as completing, in the relatively unobtru20we have noted above (chapter v, pp. 253-254) Locke's
assimilation of children's and adults' respective acts of
consent. See also STCE 73.
2lsee especially STCE 70; also Tarcov 1984, 4-8.
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sive manner appropriate to the characters of adults,

the

project whose beginning he sets forth in the Thoughts, of
cultivating the virtues necessary to membership in political society.

What we seek, therefore, is to discover wheth-

er or how Locke can address the objection to his political
thought as alienating or repressive,

by showing how the

principles of political legitimacy and constitutionalism in
the Second Treatise can perform the related functions of
moderating and

channelling the

polar passions

of narrow

self-preservation and covetousness or dominion,

such that

the adults animated by those passions can reach a rational
accommodation enabling them to live together in civility if
not

indeed

in harmony,

as members

of a

common society,

subjects of a common regime.
It

is helpful to employ Aristotelian categories in

conceiving
response.22

of

the

essential

Aristotle observes

problem
in all

and

the

Lockean

actual political

communities a tendency toward class division, and therefore
views the achievement of the best practicable regime as
dependent upon the identification of a principle of balance, whereby opposing class interests and conceptions of
justice can be moderated and rendered mutually compatible
(Politics 3.6-13,

4.1-12).

Without precisely identifying

the Lockean polarities with the Aristotelian principles of
22For this conception of the Lockean commonwealth as a
mixed regime, I am indebted to the discussion in Mansfield
1978, 1-15.
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democracy and oligarchy, we can state the Lockean problem
in similar terms.

What principle of balance can serve in a

nonrepressive, nondespotic manner to moderate the interests
of the classes of people whose predominant passions or interests consist respectively in individual self-preservation and dominion over others, such that they can come to
coexist as elements of a common political society,
the governance of common rules of reason and law?

under

What is

the specific formula of a Lockean mixed regime?
In order to avoid lending unintended support to the
dismal proposition that Jefferson would later reject with
virtually the
mass

of

backs,

final

mankind
[and]

a

stroke of his pen,

has ... been

born

with

namely that "the
saddles

favored few booted and spurred,

ride them legitimately ... , 1123 Locke must show,

on

their

ready to
first,

how

the natural desire for well being can be raised or expanded
from its common expression in a narrow, unforeseeing, even
slavish concern for self-preservation into a more energetic
disposition to assert and defend one's rights.

Second, he

must show how the same basic desire for well being,

once

hardened into its more expansive expression as a desire to
aggrandize

oneself,

consist with a
others'

rights.

can be

so

tamed

or moderated as to

forbearance of aggression,

a

respect

for

The middling solution that Locke's psy-

23Thomas Jefferson to Roger
in Koch and Peden eds. 1944, 729.

c.

Weightman,

6/24/1826,
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chology poses consists in an elaboration of the psychological grounds of a somewhat attenuated or modernized principle of republican liberty.

Those inclined toward content-

ment with bare self-preservation at the cost of liberty
must come to embrace the principle that consent is the
indispensable guarantor of preservation, that "Freedom from
Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely
joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with
it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together" (TT II.23).

On the other hand, those inclined to value

liberty only insofar as it facilitates their domination of
others must come,

according to this solution,

to regard

self-dominion as the fullest and only truly desirable form
of dominion;

they must come to experience the defensive

capacity

resist

to

the

tyrannical

assertions

of

other

individuals, and ultimately of their own fanciful desires,
as the only source of true freedom and power.
Let us consider first the project of expanding the
desire of self-preservation to a posture of defensiveness,
such that

it encompasses a desire for liberty.

Locke's

attempt at cultivating such an expansion operates on both
rational

and

sentimental

levels.

On the

former

level,

Locke argues that one cannot reasonably claim a right of
life or of self-preservation without also claiming a right
of liberty or of self-disposal.

We have referred above to

his observation that self-preservation is "the first and
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strongest desire God Planted in Men"
ceives of this

"strong desire"

Locke con-

(I. 88).

as the foundation of our

right to our own preservation (I.86), and moreover seems to
regard the natural primacy of our sense of concernment for
ourselves (see ECHU 2.27.17,18,26) as the foundation of the
unalienable character of that right; each individual must
retain the ultimate right of judging and enforcing the conditions of self-preservation, because the wills of others
are ultimately opaque to us, and (to say the least) cannot
be

presumed

to

preservation

harbor

a

reliable

(II.13,22,123,127-131).

concern

for

The

our

own

individual's

subjective concern for preservation or, more broadly,

for

well-being requires that the individual retain the ultimate
power of agency or of self-disposal, the power of judging
and

enforcing

being.

In

the

this

conditions
way

the

of

right

preservation
of

and

preservation

well-

becomes

inseparable in Locke's argument from the right of liberty,
as the principle of self-preservation entails logically the
principle of self-disposal or self-ownership

(II.6,23,27,

44,55,59-60,123) .24
As it is necessary,
not merely to know,

in Locke's view, for individuals

to assent cognitively to the interde-

pendence of preservation and liberty, but also for them to

24on self-disposal or self-ownership,
above, pp. 248-250, and below, pp. 365-385.

see chapter v
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feel it,25 the project of practically binding the two prin-

~

ciples must include an attempt at forming the passions or
sentiments as
forms

well.

throughout

healthy
instance,

desire
of

This

Locke's
for

Locke's

attempt

The

work.

liberty
advice

assumes a

is

variety of

cultivation

clearly

the

aim,

of

a

for

in Some Thoughts Concerning

Education that children be treated as rational creatures
long before they approach full, adult rationality, or that
they be indulged in the illusion that their activities are
for the most part self-directed. 26
manifest

in

his

attempts

via

the

A similar design is
rhetoric

of

the

Two

Treatises at raising in his audience a proud contempt for
the condition of slavery27 and a righteous indignation or
2 5 Thus in addressing the objection that his doctrine
of resistance must issue in anarchy, Locke argues that the
people are "not apt to stir" until "the ill designs of the
Rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the
greater part ... Are the People to be blamed, if they have
the sence of rational Creatures, and can think of things no
otherwise than as they find and feel them?" (TT II. 230;
also 168,225).
In their larger significance, Locke's educational, rhetorical, and political-constitutional schemes
represent elements of a larger enterprise of cultivating
"the sence of rational Creatures" in both constitutive
majorities and also, to a somewhat lesser extent, in governing elites.
2 6upon observing that children "love to be treated as
Rational Creatures sooner than is imagined," Locke suggests
that "'Tis a Pride should be cherished in them, and as much
as can be, made the greatest instrument to turn them by"
(STCE 81).
In a similar way, the child's natural, proud
love of freedom can assist in the cultivation of industry
as well as of rationality. See STCE 41,72-77,95,123,148.
27Thus Locke introduces the work: "Slavery is so vile
and miserable an Estate of Man, and so directly opposite to
the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation, that 'tis
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even

hatred

for

the

wielders

and

seekers

of

absolute,

arbitrary power. 28
Of potentially far greater effect, however, than the
Two

Treatises'

rhetoric

alone

as

means

of

infusing

a

healthy spiritedness into the desire of self-preservation
are the Lockean principles of legitimacy themselves and the
constitutional
ambiguity

of

provisions
Locke's

that

account

flow

from

renders

it

them.

The

difficult

estimate precisely the intended or likely effect,

to

in this

respect, of his insistence on meaningful, rational consent
as a condition of governmental legitimacy.

Yet if Locke's

practical sympathies are as democratic, in the whole or in
part, as some have argued,29 it seems reasonable to suggest
hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a
Gentleman, should plead for't" (TT I.1; also II.23,163,
239).
28Laslett remarks upon the ferocity of the sentiment
expressed in the epigraph from Livy that Locke placed
immediately after the title page of the 4th edition of the
work (1960, 170).
See also his references to the beastly
character and jural status of tyrants and other criminals,
at II.10,11,16,93,172,181,228. In view of such references,
it seems clear that Locke is hardly squeamish with respect
to the right of a liberal society to punish criminal offenders; his restriction of the grounds of legitimate punishment to "Reparation and Restraint," including deterrence
of others (II.8), is less severely restrictive than this
discussion taken in isolation may suggest.
Contrast Brubaker 1989.
29Kendall is the earliest and the most radical recent
proponent of the reading of Locke as a majority-rule democrat; see 1941, passim.
Ashcraft argues that the Second
Treatise is best viewed in its context as a radical Whig
manifesto, though with significant points of contact with
the doctrines of the Levellers, especially concerning the
right of a majority to constitute a perfectly democratic
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that a

significant part of the value or potential value

that Locke assigns to the principle of popular representation

lies

in

the

quiet pride that

accompanies

ordinary

people's understanding that their explicit approval

is a

necessary condition of governmental legitimacy.30
In any event, a clearer illustration of this aspect
of Locke's intention appears in the "most characteristic
part" of his teaching, that in which he most clearly takes
issue with Hobbes, 31

namely his

discussion

of property.

government if it so chose ( 1986, 530-589; see II. 95-98) .
Strauss' Locke is somewhat more ambiguous, adumbrating a
regime that appears to strike a balance between democratic
and oligarchic principles (1953, 231-234).
Thus although
Locke "cannot be said to have had an implicit faith in the
majority" as a guarantor of individual rights, he nonetheless places his greatest emphasis on the right of the community, not the individual, to resist an illegitimate government (especially II.168,208-209).
Similarly, though he
stipulates somewhat ambiguously that legislative representation be apportioned according to "the assistance, which
[a given portion of the population] affords to the publick," Locke seems to intend that numbers as well as riches
be taken into account (II.157-158).
Moreover, if we consider his expectation that the protection and encouragement
of industry will enhance social mobility and broaden the
distribution of property, it follows that the Lockean
regime is potentially more democratic than circumstances in
Locke's own England would permit, and likely to become more
democratic as it matures. See Pangle 1988, 168-170.
30on representation as the preferred modality of legislative authority, see II.143,153-154,157-158. On Locke's
concomitant emphasis of the illegitimacy of usurpation or
benign conquest, see II.141,197-198,212,215-217.
On the
capacity of the principle of political representation to
raise the proper sense of civic pride, contrast Rousseau,
Social Contract I.
For Locke's own implicit qualification
of the attempt at raising directly political forms of
pride, see the discussion below, pp. 393-396.
31strauss 1953, 234.
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Locke

begins

this

discussion

by grounding the

right

of

property or appropriation in the right of "Preservation"
broadly conceived as the right to provide for the "Support
and Comfort"
Locke

of our being

conceives

of this

(II.25,26).

right becomes

Just how broadly
clearer,

however,

when he almost immediately thereafter introduces an alternative principle as the basis of legitimate appropriation.
Because "every Man has a Property in his own Person," Locke
continues, the
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands ... are
properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
(II.27)
If laboring is in itself sufficient to create an original
property right,

then the

right of

appropriation obtains

irrespective of any purely material considerations,

irre-

spective of the claimant's level of material need or comfort.

To repeat, the labor theory of appropriation consti-

tutes in the end only a particularly crucial corollary of
the fundamental principle of human agency. Locke's doctrine
of

self-ownership

natural

right

means

most

simply to act,

generally
to

that

one

has

a

employ one's agency or

action-producing faculty so as best to secure one's own
well-being, up to the point at which one's actions threaten
the domination,

the unjust appropriation of the labor or

the agency, of another.
Locke finds the psychological significance of proper-
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ty most clearly evident in the behavior of young children:
"Another thing wherein they shew their love of Dominion, is
their desire to have things to be theirs; they would have
£_,ropriety

and

Possession,

pleasing

power which that seems to give ... "

themselves

with

the

It would

{STCE 105).

appear then that Locke's insistence on constitutional protection for an expansive, even virtually unlimited right of
appropriation

represents

much

more

than

an

attempt

at

ameliorating the natural condition of material unprovidedness

or

at

creating

the conditions

happiness in material plenty.

for

general

private

At least as important as its

effect on material conditions is its psychological effect;
the

protection

concomitant

of

raising

the

right

and

of

appropriation

channelling

desire serve with peculiar efficacy,
argument,
more

of

the

and

the

acquisitive

according to Locke's

to cultivate in ordinary subjects an expanded,

assertive,

dignified,

vigilant

sense of

self.

As

Locke explains in the Essay, actions, the experiential data
of human agency or freedom, have in themselves no enduring
existence save, perhaps,
actions

as

transient

mixed

in the human mind; our ideas of

modes

Combinations

represent

of

simple

only
Ideas"

"fleeting,

and

( 2. 22. 8) .

But

whereas the merely transient, momentary existence of most
actions
the

limits their psychological or pedagogical power,

particular

action

of

appropriating

represents

the

employment and manifestation of one's freedom to create or
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enlarge

visible,

a

tangible,

more-or-less

enduring

domain,32 and for this reason carries a peculiar power to
expand the

individual's

sense

or consciousness

of self.

Locke intends the protection and encouragement of the right
of

productive

appropriation

to

cement

in

the

minds

of

ordinary individuals the association between the virtue of
industriousness and a dignifying sense of personal potency
or efficacy; by virtue of the Lockean stress on property
and its inculcation of an enlarged sense of one's own, of
one's personal domain of freedom and power, the imperative
of preservation transcends the Hobbesian concern for mere
biological existence and becomes a more vigilant, assertive
concern

for

preservation

chief end therefore,

in

freedom.33

"The great

and

of Mens uniting into Commonwewalths,

and putting themselves under Government,

is the Preserva-

tion" not narrowly of themselves, but "of their Property"
(II.124) .

By expanding, as it were, the boundaries of the

32Polin (1969, 6) calls attention to the relation of
Locke's conception of property to that of Hegel, observing
that property for Locke "is the external manifestation of
freedom, its expression and its very concrete existence for
others," and not only for others.
"Every man, being equal
to every other, manifests his liberty by the domination,
the ownership of his property" (1969, 6).
Rapaczynski's
reading is similar:
Lockean "appropriation is the fundamental activity which permits man to overcome his estrangement from the natural environment and to achieve his autonomy" (1987, 180).
The difficulty to which this conception
of appropriation leads is implicit in Strauss' observation
that labor, for Locke as for Hegel, "is a negative attitude
toward nature" (1953, 250).
See the discussion below, pp.
346-349.
33see chapter II above, pp. 39-45.
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self and its sphere of privacy, Locke hopes to contract the
proper sphere

of governmental

"forward defense"

strategy,

authority.

In a

sort of

he hopes to raise the proper

spirit of defensiveness against tyranny or illegitimacy by
expanding and thus making more visible and more complete
that which is to be defended.

Thus understood,

Locke's

defense of the natural, unalienable right of private property or appropriation signifies a defense not of a sordid,
mean-spirited materialism,34 but rather of an indispensable
bulwark of civil or political liberty.
A complementary design is evident in Locke's attempt
at moderating or taming the desire for dominion.

There is

in fact a certain symmetry in the relation between these
two attempts.

Just as the achievement of a rational, civil

consensus requires the leavening of the desire for selfpreservation by its blending with a moderate love of dominion, so also it requires the moderation of the extreme love
of dominion to bring that desire into conformity with the
imperative of preservation.
of

Locke's

attempt

at

This two-dimensional character

identifying

and

reinforcing

the

foundation for a liberal consensus appears most clearly in
34The most apparently materialistic of Locke's recent
commentators agree on this point.
MacPherson's employment
of the term "possessive" to describe Lockean individualism
may appear to carry this connotation, though MacPherson explains that he refers fundamentally to a doctrine of possession of self, or of the individualist assertion of independence of others, with the implication that the materialist form of this assertion is only incidentally related to
it (1962, 3). Cf. Wood 1983, 34-35; Wood 1984, 31-33,102.
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the fact that alongside his declaration that "the end of
_gaw is not to abolish or restrain,
enlarge Freedom"

but to preserve and

(TT II.57), Locke proclaims with signifi-

cant emphasis that political power properly conceived "hath
no other
order

end but preservation"

properly

to

moderate

(II.135;

the desire

also 124).
for

dominion,

In
in

order to defend the principle of liberty as distinct from
that of sheer license or arbitrariness, Locke maintains the
grounding of that principle in a respect for the enduring
sway of natural necessity.

Therefore he avoids a simple

reversal

priority

of

liberty. 35
dominion

the

Hobbesian

of

preservation

to

But the key to the taming of the desire for
so

that

it

preservation

lies

once

may

coexist

again

with

in Locke's

the

desire

defense

of

for
the

right of appropriation.
The association of the activity of appropriation with

35The failure to devote sufficient attention to this
fact, or in other words the failure to take seriously the
naturalness of the ills of the state of nature, accounts
for the partiality or one-dimensionality in the reading of
Locke as a teacher of individual moral autonomy.
In his
attempt at revealing a genuinely moral dimension of Locke's
thought, Rapaczynski tends, for instance, to underemphasize
(though he does not simply ignore) Locke's concern with our
natural alienation from other human beings, not merely from
nonhuman nature, and thus to underemphasize the essentially
defensive character of Locke's political thought (1987, 9,
113-217). The real difficulty in this partial reading lies
in the fact that an unmixed emphasis on the aim of pure
moral, that is, individual autonomy would ultimately undermine any limitations on the assertions of individual wills,
and therewith exacerbate precisely those natural ills that
the Lockean regime is intended to overcome.
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the

desire

for

dominion

implies

the usefulness

of

that

activity not only for expanding the ordinary concern for
self-preservation, but also for channelling the desire for
dominion in a socially beneficial direction.

As we have

seen, Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning Education conceives
of the desire to appropriate or to possess as an expression
of the

desire

for

dominion.

He clearly associates the

possessive desire with the vice of covetousness, declaring
it one of the "two Roots of almost all the Injustice and
contention, that so disturb Humane Life," and as such to be
"early ... weeded out" of children's prevailing motivations
(105; also 110).

Yet contrary to the judgment of Axtell,

this does not imply that Locke in the Education takes a
"low ... view of acquisitiveness"

(1968, 207), in opposition

to the view he presents in the Two Treatises.36

Even in

the discussion in question, Locke distinguishes the unjust
desire for possession from more direct expressions of the
desire for dominion; the possessive desire to have "things"

36seliger goes further than does Axtell, asserting
that even in the Two Treatises Locke's evaluation of the
moral and social role of money "remains negative" precisely
because "a money-economy makes it possible for different
degrees of industry to cause a gross inequality of possessions" ( 1968, 157-158) .
Dunn holds similarly that Locke
"felt deeply ambivalent" about the advent of money because
money introduced reasons for quarreling over title and
largeness of possession, sundering the connection between
right and conveniency (1984, 40).
For Tully, the acquisitive desire for more than one needs "is not the motor of
technological advance and a more refined form of life," but
rather the morally condemnable motive of mere miserly
hoarding (1980, 148).
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or objects at one's disposal appears less directly productive of injustice than the desire to be "submitted to by
others," or to have actual persons at one's disposal (STCE
105,104).
More importantly, Locke's solution of the problem of
covetousness or unjust possessiveness in the Education does
not require the radical suppression or extirpation of the
desire to acquire.

It would appear, after all, a highly

curious

radically

manner

of

"weeding

out"

children's

acquisitiveness to teach them, as Locke shortly thereafter
recommends, that "the most Liberal has always most plenty,"
that the child "loses nothing by his Liberality"

(110).

Locke recommends a method of moderating children's desire
to acquire or possess that would surely serve to strengthen
their sense of the legitimacy of that desire. 37
does

indeed

approve

the

legitimacy

of

an

That he

appropriately

moderated desire to acquire is confirmed by his subsequent
suggestion
children.
ousness"

concerning

the

provision

of

playthings

for

Lest they be taught "Pride, Vanity, and Covetalong

dissatisfaction,

with

a

perpetual,

inherently

immoderate

children according to Locke should have

few or no playthings bought for them, but should instead be
required to make them for themselves.
them to seek for what they want

"This will accustom

in th ems elves ... whereby

they will be taught Moderation in their Desires, Applica37cf. Tarcov 1984, 141-145.

333
tion,

Industry, Thought,

(STCE

130) .

The

Contrivance,

and Good Husbandry"

acquisitive desire

is

not

to be

sup-

pressed, but instead to be subjected to the discipline of
industry or laboring as the condition of its gratification.
Locke's legitimation of acquisitiveness by associating it with liberality and self-reliant creativity in the
Education is in perfect harmony with the teaching of chapter 5 of the Second Treatise.

Appropriation in unlimited

amounts is a natural, unalienable right,
latter,

so long as it is accomplished

rectly) through productive laboring.

according to the

(directly or indi-

Whoever "appropriates

land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase
the common stock of mankind"

(TT II.37;

also

40-44,48).

The possibility of genuine liberality rests above all on
the creation of wealth,
productive

industry.

and thus on the encouragement of
Indeed there

is

a

sense

in which

productive appropriation represents for Locke an obligation
as well

as

a

right conferred by nature.

"God and his

Reason commanded [Man) to subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it
for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon
it

that

Natural
(32; cf.

was

his

own,

necessity,

his

or the

labour"
natural

(II.32;

also

34,35).

condition of "penury"

35,37) obliges us to labor in order to eliminate

or minimize the need for charity traditionally understood,
and

thereby

to

lay

the

Locke's ambiguous argument

foundation

of

civil

concord.

in the First Treatise to the
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effect that charity,

if not justice,

"Right" to another's surplus

(42)

accords the needy a

implies that the desti-

tute have in the extremity of their condition a right to
theft or even robbery; 3 8 if so,

then the establishment of

justice as the foundation of civil society,
protection

of

everyone's

"Title

to

the

implying the

product

of

his

honest Industry, would require the creation or preservation
of

an

abundance

enable

all

industry.

to

of

material

subsist

and

opportunity

even

to

profit

sufficient
by

their

to
own

Locke proposes the replacement of traditional

charity with modern technology,
"Invention and Arts"

(II. 44)

with the

development of

that will revolutionize the

productivity of human labor, as the solution of this aspect
of the problem of the state of nature.39
The appeal of this solution, from the perspective of
38Thus Strauss, commenting on the same paragraph:
"in
a state of extreme scarcity everyone may take away from
others what he needs for mere self-preservation, regardless
of whether or not the others starve" (1953, 239n.)
Pangle
adds that "what [Locke] means by 'charity' is just a subdivision of justice:
an expression, in desperate circumstances, of the inalienable right ... to self-preservation"
(1988, 144). See also chapter II above, note 31.
39 As we have noted in another context, Locke's most
explicit statement of this intention appears at ECHU
4 .12 .12:
"The study of Nature ... if rightly directed, may
be of greater benefit to Mankind, than the Monuments of
exemplary Charity, that have at so great Charge been
raised, by the Founders of Hospitals and Alms-houses ... "
This emphasis in the Essay and the Two Treatises on the
technological overcoming of the need for charity represents
Locke's resolution of the problem of scarcity that he had
formulated in the early Questions Concerning the Law of
Nature, 11.245-249.
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Locke's promotion of the "endowment" of justice,
its psychological realism.

lies in

While the acquisitive passion

may become legitimate, in Locke's scheme, by virtue of its
service to the cause of preservation,

it is equally clear

that it remains attractive to individuals, notwithstanding
its subjection to the condition of laborious productivity,
by virtue

of

its

enduring potential

desire for dominion or inequality.
defense

of

the

right

considerable emphasis

of

for

gratifying the

In the course of his

appropriation,

Locke

on the proposition that

places

"Men have

agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possessions of the
Earth"

(II. 50);

the invention of money in particular has

"introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and g_ Right to
them" (II.36; emphasis supplied).

Recognizing not only the

natural differences among individuals in "Parts and Merit"
(II.54), but also the equally important human desire to be
credited for such distinction, Locke insists that a wellconstituted

political

superior industry.

society

guarantee

the

rewards

of

"God gave the World to Men in Common,"

but gave it especially "to the use of the Industrious and
Rational, " to those who enlarge the common stock by their
rational,

productive

industry

(II.34;

also

37,48).

The

Lockean social contract requires then not the categorical
repression of the desire for inequality or dominion,
rather its transformation.

but

Its traditional manifestation

in the "Quarrelsom and Contentious" idleness of unproduc-
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tive

upper

instance)

classes

(of

hereditary

aristocracies,

must give way to the more energetic,

productive,

genuinely

self-validating

modern commercial classes.40

expression

for

socially
of

the

Thus transformed or rechan-

nelled by the Lockean principles of education and constitutionalism,

the natural desire

for self-aggrandizement is

diverted from its preoccupation with dominating other human
beings.

Locke even expects that the pride that the indus-

trious experience in their own providence, in their partial
mastery of nature, will provide the grounds for a certain
generosity

toward

their

social

inferiors.

Just as

his

suggestion in the Education for moderating the desire to
possess serves also to legitimate that desire, so in this
case he suggests that children should learn civility or
respect for the principle of natural equality in part by
learning that "No part of their Superiority will be hereby
lost; but the Distinction increased ... The more they have,
the better humour' d they should be taught to be ... "
117;

also

109).

The psychological

subtlety of

( STCE

Locke's

defense of the principle of natural jural equality is perhaps best revealed in this educational stratagem, according

40For Locke's critique of the traditional aristocracy,
see STCE 207; Works (1823) 5.54,64,72,163; CJL #1693,
1/19/94; King 1830, 97-98.
Wood observes aptly that in
"Locke's vocabulary, labor, industry, perseverance, sobriety, and usefulness replaced aristocratic honor, pride,
dignity, spirit, and the non-utilitarian" (1983, 148; also
128)--though this does not imply that Locke disregarded the
vices of the gentry (45-46).
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to

which

respectful

assent

to

the

principle

of

common

humanity appears less as a duty than as a mark of dignity,
a privilege of a distinguished status.41

41This apparent attempt at cultivating a somewhat
attenuated sense of noblesse seems to apply not only to the
propertied class in Locke's design, but also to the scientifically or technologically skilled elite upon whose "generous pains" (ECHU 4. 3 .16) the wealth of the commercial
classes ultimately depends. Whereas morality is the proper
business of "Mankind in general," according to Locke, the
"several Arts, conversant about parts of Nature, are the
lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common
Use of humane Life ... " (4.12.11; emphasis supplied). Locke
seems to intend his recognition of the particularity of
such talents as a reward for their serving the common good.
He in effect treats the generosity of society's powerful
benefactors as in itself a privilege.

THE LIMITS OF LOCKE'S UTILITARIANISM
Let us reflect briefly upon the nature of Locke's
solution,

as thus far described,

dissensus.
rhetoric

We
of

the

have

seen

Second

at

of the problem of moral
length

Treatise

how,

much

notwithstanding,

of

the

Locke

raises very serious questions concerning the status of the
principle of human equality.
naturalness

to

the

human

In affirming specifically the
species

both

of

significant

inequalities in the possession of rationality and of class
divisions based upon the relative powers of the passions
for

self-preservation

implicitly

questions

humankind as,

and
the

self-aggrandizement,
propriety

of

Locke

conceiving

of

in the morally decisive respects, a single,

unitary species.

He questions,

in other words,

whether

there exist natural principles of justice, or whether the
natural distributions of reason and passions among human
beings provide adequate grounds for the development of a
moral-political
beings as such.

consensus naturally appropriate to human
His answer,

again as described to this

point, consists in a sophisticated form of utilitarianism. 42
influence

It
of

consists

in

appropriate

the

proposition

educational

42strauss 1953, 235 n. 107.
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and

that

under

the

constitutional

339
principles,

self-interest

and

the

common

good

can

be

harmonized; rational seekers of well-being who are unequal
both in the power of their rationality and in their substantive

conceptions

of

their

own

well-being

can

come

freely to agree upon and to live harmoniously according to
the principles of natural rights.

In the Lockean stress on

the preservation of property and on the right of appropriation lies the basis of a sound mixed regime, the capacity
to accommodate at once the lovers of equality and those of
inequality.

The rewarding of rational industry can appease

the lovers of dominion or aggrandizement without fostering
the resentment of the lovers of preservation,
bases social

distinction upon a

that is understandable,

in that it

standard of achievement

accessible, and beneficial to the

common majority.43
Yet

the

ultimate

efficacy

of this mixture or the

compatibility of these two principles remains in question.
In order to see this,
notice

the

role

that

it
a

is necessary for us

sense

of

maintenance of the Lockean regime.

justice plays

first to
in

the

The foregoing account

of Locke's psychological realism in addressing the problem

43This explains more adequately why Locke includes
little mention of violence and avoids altogether the
concept of the state of nature in the Second Treatise'
discussion of early property relations.
While property
surely provides often enough the occasion for conflict,
Locke's aim is to show how the desire to appropriate,
suitably directed, can operate as a pacifying principle.
See chapter V above, p. 286, n. 81.
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of natural class divisions does not imply that Locke indulges, in anticipation of Mandeville, in a kind of uncritical
moral

alchemy,

that he believes in the possibility of a

perfect harmonization of communal well-being and private
interest narrowly understood. He suggests at one point in
the Second Treatise that to sacrifice in the performance of
one's obligations ·is to act on the basis of what is "not
only necessary,

but just; since the other Members of the

society do the like" (II.130).

In Some Thoughts Concerning

Education, he declares that the inculcation of "an ingenuous Detestation ... will be a better Guard against Dishonesty,

than any Considerations drawn from Interest"

( 110).

Also in the latter work, he explains that the psychological
basis

of

this

sense

of

justice

lies

not

so

much

in

abstraction from interest altogether as in its enlargement.
"Reputation" in Locke's view is "not the true Principle and
Measure of Vertue ... yet it is that, which comes nearest to
it"

(STCE

61).

Thus

courage or fortitude,

he

recommends that children learn

"the Guard and Support of the other

Virtues, " by learning to "pref err the Reputation of being
Brave and stout, to the avoiding a little Pain," and with
time to the avoiding of progressively greater pains

(STCE

115). 44

44Thus Locke stresses that "the great Secret of
Education" is the cultivation in children of "a Love of
Credit, and an Apprehension of Shame and Disgrace" (STCE
56; also 58,200).
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It is possible to argue that in this enlarged concern
for reputation or esteem lies the sentimental support for
conformity with the demands of Lockean justice even at the
extremities of political life,

in those circumstances in

which political obligation requires the greatest apparent
personal

sacrifices

or

acts

of

devotion.

"Esteem

and

Disgrace are, of all others, the most powerful Incentives
to the Mind, when once it is brought to relish them" (STCE
56; also ECHU 2.28.12).
1678,

In his diary entry of 12 December

Locke remarks on the power of this desire to make

"the Hurons and other people of Canada with such constancy
endure

such

153n.).45
believes

unexpressible

torments"

(in

Axtell

1968,

There can be little doubt, therefore, that Locke
the desire

for

esteem sufficiently powerful to

support what must be at least for most the greatest personal sacrifice for their community.

"Laurels and Hon-

ours," he takes care to affirm, "are always justly due to
the

Valour

Country"

of

those

who

(STCE 115). 46

venture
Moreover,

their

Lives

for

their

the case seems similar

45see also Horwitz 1979, 136-141.
4 6 Grant concludes that the performance of this ultimate obligation "cannot be defended on the grounds of
[Lockean] self-interest"; considerations of justice are
entirely distinct from those of self-interest, and must
supersede them (1987, 133).
The argument presented here
requires the following qualification of this conclusion:
for an individual with the proper Lockean education or
moral formation, self-interest would support justice inasmuch as the disgrace of failing to defend a free government
or of subjection without resistance to an unfree one would
be worse than the prospect of an honorable death.
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with respect to an alternative form of personal sacrifice,
involving a different sort of political extremity.
lovers

of

extreme

ambition

and

ordinary

acquisitive

inequality,

therefore

animated

incapable

pursuits,

of

Locke

by

the

To the
highest

appeasement
suggests

in

that

the
that

"Prince" who secures "protection and encouragement to the
honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of power
and the narrownesse of Party," not only "will quickly be
too hard

for his neighbours," but in preserving a

truly

legitimate government--especially by prerogative power, at
a moment when legitimacy is most vulnerable and arbitrary
absolutism therefore most inviting--would become "wise and
godlike," worthy of the highest distinction and esteem, the
bearer of "true Power and Honour" (II.42,111,166).47
According to this reading, therefore, Locke's apparently stark indication of the ultimate ground of military
obligation in the Second Treatise does not imply that in
his view sheer terror or the fear of capital punishment by
one's military superior is the only support of discipline

4 7cf. in this regard Locke's reference to the unknown
discoverer of iron, without which "we should in a few Ages
be unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the
ancient savage Americans," as the quasi-divine "Father of
Arts, and Author of Plenty" (4.12.11).
Once again, Locke
holds before the "Master-Builders" of the new natural science with its implicit technological providence the promise
of a share of the "true honor and power" merited by the
godlike princes. See note 41 above.
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in combat.48

It may be significant that in the passage in

question Locke holds that it would mean not simply death,
but "justly death" to disobey one's superior (II.139).

But

in any event, in view of Locke's estimate of the power and
usefulness in this respect of the desire for esteem,
more to the point,

and

in view of the fact that the entire

argument of the Second Treatise depends upon a spontaneous,
defensive but foresighted popular willingness

in extreme

circumstances to risk death in resistance against tyranny,
it seems safest to conclude that in this brief discussion
of absolute military power, Locke intends primarily to make
plain the extent of the government's authority, and perhaps
also to lay bare the teeth of the law in such matters, but
not

to

comment

on

the

ultimate

grounds

or

supports

of

members' obligations.
Still, it may be possible to grant the seriousness of
Locke's appeal to the concern for esteem or reputation and
at the same time to persist in the argument that members'
performance

of their obligations

to the

Lockean common-

weal th could not be judged in the decisive respect free,
nonalienating or nonrepressive, on Locke's own principles.
Locke's
involves

apparent
the

reliance

following

two

on

the

concern

difficulties.

for

esteem

First,

the

48 contrast the view of Goldwin ( 1972, 483-484) .
In
differing from Goldwin on this point, however, I am not
implying that he is wrong to call attention to Locke's
evident abstraction from appeals to a sense of patriotism
or civic duty in the Second Treatise.
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concern for esteem can take the form of either a desire or
an aversion; it can move us to action through the positive
attraction of the pleasures attendant upon a good reputation, or through our repulsion by the prospect of incurring
Indeed it may be very difficult to separate the

shame.
desire
But

from the aversion

to

the

extent

that

in our concern

for

reputation.

our

our

obligations

performing

proceeds from the latter motive, it proceeds from a kind of
fear,

and

cannot

be

judged wholly

second, and more importantly,

free

or voluntary. 49

inherent in the concern for

reputation, whether a desire or an aversion,

is a psycho-

logical dependence upon the opinions of others.50

Although

a "Mind free, and Master of it self and all its Actions ...
is what every one is taken with" (STCE 66), yet "We are all
a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from Things
near us"
consent

(67).
at

least

The

implication once again

in many

cases

cannot

be

is that our
wholly

free,

wholly self-affirming or in accordance with our nature.
49see, for instance, STCE 110: The cultivation of "an
ingenuous Detestation of this shameful Vice [i.e. of injustice] ... is the true and genuine Method to obviate this
Crime; and will be a better Guard ... than any Considerations
drawn from Interest."
50see especially STCE 57.
The fact of dependence, as
Tarcov observes, "lies at the bottom of the concern for
esteem" (1984, 116-117).
Thus Bloom epitomizes Rousseau's
characterization of the bourgeois, including the Lockean
individual:
" ... to describe the inner workings of his
soul, he is the man who, when dealing with others, thinks
only of himself, and on the other hand, in his understanding of himself, thinks only of others" (1979, 5).
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In view of these characteristics of the concern for
esteem or reputation, it is perhaps not surprising that in
the second Treatise Locke de-emphasizes his appeal to this
concern as the proper mode of governing the most ambitious
individuals,

those

who

profound, expansive forms.

desire

sovereignty

in

its

most

It is highly significant in its

way that Locke refers to any prince or political ruler as
"God-like"; yet it is also significant that he does so in
the larger context of an argument to the effect that "the
reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to
the Liberties of their People," and therefore that princely
prerogative

is

to

be

jealously

monitored

(II.166).51

Apparently distrusting the power of esteem to govern the
profoundly expansive desires,

Locke maintains in the end

that "the best fence against Rebellion" or against tyrannical designs on the part of rulers lies not in the desire
of the latter to be or to appear godlike in their justice
as well as their power, but rather in the "Doctrine of a
Power in the People of providing for their safety a-new by
a

new Legislative"

(II.226).

A heal thy respect for the

balance of powers within the commonwealth will provide the
most reliable means for attaching the ambition of rulers to
51Locke thus recognizes the force of the argument that
the young Lincoln would make roughly 150 years later, to
the effect that it is unsafe to assume the self-moderating
character of that high ambition characteristic of "the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle," which would
sooner destroy than preserve ("Address Before the Young
Men's Lyceum," in Current ed. 1967, 19).
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The Lockean "appeal to heaven"

the cause of legitimacy.
reduces

in

the

end

to

an

appeal

in

extreme

illegitimate

circumstances

rulers,

Locke

popular

vigilance

By raising a popular willing-

(II.20,21,168,176,241-242).
ness

to

to

hopes

take
to

up

arms

intimidate

against
egoistic

rulers and thus to diminish their appetites for the sorts
of

actions

that

would

properly

provoke

popular

resis-

tance. 52
Locke's employment of this "best Fence" or balanceof-powers argument points most clearly to the persistence
of

the

fundamental

Lockean regime.

question

of

the

naturalness

of

the

The issue is not merely Locke's acknow-

ledgement that the reconciliation between private interest
and the common good remains imperfect in the regime that he
envisions,
forms

or that the laws made in accordance with the

and goals of that regime

"teeth" for their enforcement.

require,

dangerous

"best fence against

the best defense against the greatest,

form of criminality

laws,

Locke maintains that the

threat of popular resistance is the
Rebellion,"

like all

(II.218,230).

most

But can it

indeed provide in the long run the best defense against
tyranny, if it is not a theoretically satisfying, coherent
defense?
motivation,

Given his

own account of human psychology or

on what basis is Locke entitled to conclude

52rn this striking manner, as Pangle observes, Locke
reaffirms the old identification of the vox populi with the
vox dei (1988, 204).
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that such rebellion or tyranny is naturally undesirable,
and

therefore

nature?
subjects,

that

its

suppression

is

not

contrary

to

It appears clearly undesirable, of course, for its
for those who are incapable of becoming tyrants

themselves; but what of the others, those among the classes
of natural oligarchs or aristocrats whose ambitions cannot
be satisfied by mere inequalities in material acquisitions?
If power in the service of a relativistic pursuit of happiness is the only aim of rational human action, then would
it not be in the highest sense natural for human beings to
seek

radical

freedom

or

sovereignty,

to

experience

all

limitations on personal freedom as alienating and to harbor
a radically revolutionary animus against all conventional
or political restraint?53

For the truly ambitious individ-

uals, would not Locke's acknowledgement of the primacy of
the human pursuit of happiness serve only to expand still
further the inegalitarian desires, not to diminish but to
heighten a sense of the injustice of the demand for equal
rights?

If so, then Locke ultimately fails in his attempt

at designing a mixed regime, or at discovering in the prin5 3 such is the great fear of Burke, of course, who sees
in the French revolutionaries an intoxicated lust for innovation for its own sake, a radically negative, destructive
willfulness that is the direct consequence of the theoretical doctrine of natural freedom as pure negation or indeterminacy (Reflections on the Revolution in France, in
Mahoney ed. 1955; see, e.g., 7-9,40-42,65-66, 86-89,97-101,
107-111, 126-129, 181).
Herein lies, once again, the full
significance of the observation that labor, for Locke as
well as for Hegel, expresses "a negative attitude toward
nature" (Strauss 1953, 250). Cf. note 32 above.

348
ciple of equal natural rights the grounds of rational consensus among all the partisans of democracy and oligarchy. 54

At best, according to this objection, the Lockean

regime may secure the interests of the large majority, but
it does not secure the interests of everyone.55

At worst,

it may establish a laborious, emotionally and spiritually
ascetic regime in which those who believe themselves happy
are so by virtue of a sort of internalized timidity, or a
forgetfulness of their own nature,56 and a relative few-and these the most dangerous, the desirers of the grandest
inequalities--are both miserable and restless.
In thus noting the tenacity of the objection to the
54rn sympathy with Locke, one might argue that Locke's
achievement lies not so much in balancing the opposing
principles of oligarchy and democracy as in showing how the
principle of democracy properly understood comprehends a
moderated form of the oligarchic principle.
Still, if we
continue to employ Aristotelian categories in analyzing the
Lockean regime, it would seem according to this objection
that implicit in Locke's best fence argument is an admission of the need for ostracism, or of the impossibility of
doing justice to all relevant claimants to power.
Would
this not constitute an admission of the partiality, of the
nonuniversality of Locke's principles of justice?
Cf.
Aristotle, Politics 3.13.13-25.
55cf. Strauss 1959, 218.
56Locke observes that "in this life there are not
many, whose happiness reaches so far, as to afford them a
constant train of moderate mean Pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness" (ECHU 2.21.44), and clearly suggests
that his readers would do well to habituate themselves to
find contentment in a moderated, mixed happiness (see e.g.
2.21.43,46; STCE 130). The question is whether such moderation can be truly choiceworthy, whether in practicing it
we act in accordance with our nature, or merely under the
constraint of a necessity that we desire most deeply to
escape.
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"peculiarity" of Locke's hedonism, even in the face of his
manifest
mixed

Machiavellian

regime,

ambiguity

we

and

philosophy.

cleverness

come

to

therewith
Having

the

to

in

designing

heart

the

of

heart

established the

a

Locke's

of

his

modern
textual

political

sophistication,

but

also the essential utilitarianism of Locke's nontheological
moral-political reasoning,

as presented thus far;

conced-

ing, that is, that Locke does proclaim the moral primacy of
the self and its happiness, and does present the rational
pursuit of happiness in large part as a persistent struggle
against various
finally

forms

the decisive

of natural

necessity,
What

question.

we confront

has Locke to say,

concerning the available sources of meaning or experiences
of completion that might serve to redeem the ordinary and
the

extraordinary

struggles

rational

and

industrious

serve

the

natural,

as

that

occupy

individual's

rational

so

much

of

life,

that

might

limits

destructive projections of the human will?
pleasure

and

its

plenty, 57 what,

instrumentalities
finally,

on the

a

negative,

Beyond abstract

of health,

ease,

and

is to be affirmed according to

Locke?

5 7 rn a 1677 fragment Locke observes that the happiness
of this world "certainly is nothing else but plenty of all
sorts of those things which can with most ease, pleasure,
and variety, preserve [us] longest in it" (in King 1830,
88; also 90).

THE NATURE OF HUMAN HAPPINESS
Of

fundamental

importance here

is

not whether the

Lockean self is capable of any genuine self-transcendence,
any devotion to a cause larger than itself,
whether

the

natural

happiness

devotion,

Lockean

or

Irrespective
experiences,

and

the
of

regime

how

is

capable

therefore

of

inspiring

devotion

of

Locke

chooses

a

but instead
securing
our

rational
to

our

positive
subject.

denominate

such

it is clear that the Lockean self is capable

of so extending the sphere of its vital concernment as to
make

it capable of actions practically indistinguishable

from those motivated by a genuine self-forgetting or selftranscendence.58

What is less immediately clear,

and of

58Notwithstanding his general avoidance of appeals to
patriotism, it is clear, for instance, that Locke views
patriotism, an expansion of one's sphere of concernment
such that the well-being of the country or nation implicates one's personal well-being, as at least a psychological possibility, if not indeed a commonplace. Albeit rather
casually, he even appeals to the sentiment of patriotism in
scattered passages in his published works, most prominently
in the "Introduction" to the First Treatise, which begins
with the declaration that "Slavery is ... so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation; that
'tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less
a Gentleman, should plead for' t" (I. 1; also STCE "Epistle
Dedicatory," 115).
Leaving aside whether Locke thus indicates a more powerfully self-expanding attachment to England or to the gentry, we find the most extreme illustration of this capacity in the surprisingly common human
readiness not only to risk death for the sake of one's
country, but even "at any time to seal with their Blood"
their most cherished principles, or to "contend ... fight,
350
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decisive importance here, is whether it can do so rational-

1.Y' and in accordance with our natural happiness.

In the

final analysis, the fundamental question for Lockean political philosophy concerns the possibility of genuine reasoning about human happiness, or to put it more simply, concerns the status of human reason itself.
On the basis of what has been said thus far,
seem that the case against Locke is compelling.
and

colorful

denials

of

the

existence

it may

His urgent

of any

consensus

gentium in matters of law and morality, and above all his
assertion

that

enquire"

after

because

"those

Pleasure •.. to
(ECHU

"the
the

Philosophers
nature

things,

different

2. 21. 55),

of

the

which
Men,

are

of

old

human
produce
very

did

in

vain

"Summum bonum,"
the

different

greatest
things"

appear to mark him clearly enough as

thoroughly modern moral and political utilitarian.

a

Yet his

apparently clear denials of the possibility of teleological
moral reasoning must be considered in conjunction with the
fact that Locke not only affirms the possibility throughout

and die in defence of their Opinions" (ECHU 1. 3. 27, 26).
Pangle suggests that such self-enlarging identifications
are "ultimately dubious on strict Lockean grounds" ( 1988,
212), but I fail to see the evidence for this. It seems to
me perfectly defensible on Lockean grounds to argue that
given the power of habituation, the self-concerned love of
esteem becomes very difficult after a certain point to disentangle from an extra-personal love of the source of that
esteem, just as in a more general way after a certain point
the love of any particular pleasure may become practically
indistinguishable from a love of the source or object of
that pleasure.
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the Essay and exhorts his readers accordingly,

but even

affords occasional, partial glimpses of his own attempts at
Once again, nothing is more dangerous in

such reasoning.

Locke's view than to allow one's moral principles to go
unexamined. 59

More

affirmatively,

he

insists

that

the

nature of human beings as rational creatures concerned for
happiness imposes on us a kind of obligation to reason as
carefully

as

possible

about

the ultimate

ends

of human

"[W)hen, upon due Examination, we have judg'd, we

action.

have done our duty ... in pursuit of our happiness ... "
just as

"the highest

perfection of

For

intellectual nature,

lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid
happiness; so the care of our selves, that we mistake not
imaginary for real happiness,

is the necessary foundation

of our liberty" (2.21.47,51).
This
reasoning
"true

and

requires

suggestion
about
sol id"

further

of

the

happiness,
or

of

"real"

elaboration.

possibility
rationally

from

of

distinguishing

"imaginary"

At times

genuinely

Locke

happiness,
seems to

indicate that this distinction rests upon no more than a
prudent comparison of the immediate and the more distant
consequences of particular courses of action 60 ; the moral
rightness or wrongness of a given action would then depend
59 see chapters II and v above, pp. 61-65, 239-240.
60 commenting directly on STCE 110, Tarcov suggests
that
"Locke ... equates
reason with
serious
long-range
considerations of interest" (1984, 149).
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upon quantitative but not qualitative considerations,

or

upon the intensity and duration of the attendant pleasures
and pains, not their content (2.21.58-65).

As Rapaczynski

notices, however, Locke's discussion of the possibility of
teleological moral reasoning does imply a movement beyond
such narrowly prudential calculations.

Indeed Rapaczynski

goes so far as to deny that Locke's moral theory is in the
final

analysis hedonistic or utilitarian,

on the grounds

that our particular ideas of happiness for Locke are prior
to

and

pain.

cons ti tuti ve
Locke

of

our experiences

of pleasure

is according to his reading a

and

theorist of

moral autonomy who closely prefigures the precritical Kant,
in that his rejection of psychological hedonism allows him
also to deny the necessity of abstracting moral principles
altogether from natural motivations or principles of action
(1987, 124,154-161).
A significant

strand of

argument

in

Locke's Essay

does at least to some extent support this reading.
the

experience

of

present

uneasiness

is

in his

While
revised

account the immediate determinant of volition (2.21.31ff.),
Locke
within

nonetheless
our

power

produce uneasiness

makes
to

plain

determine

in us:

examining any good proposed,

his

opinion

which

"by a

that

absent

it

lies

goods

will

due consideration and

it is in our power, to raise

our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that good,
whereby ... it may come to work upon the will ... " ( 2. 21. 4 6) .
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What we find desirable,
previously

in other words,

constructed

and

happiness (2.21.41,43).

depends upon our

internalized

complex

idea

of

Thus by means of consideration or

habituation we are capable of correcting our "palates," of
changing

"the

pleasantness,

and

accompanies any sort of action, "

unpleasantness,

that

in accordance with the

requirements of our conception of happiness (2.21.69).
are capable,

We

in Locke's most far-reaching estimate of our

powers of moral reasoning, of conforming "the relish of our
Minds

to

the

true

intrinsick

good

or

ill,

that

is

in

things" (2. 21. 53; emphasis supplied).
This line of argument obviously raises a number of
difficult

questions.

How,

for

instance,

are

naturally

pleasure-seeking creatures capable of discovering "the true
intrinsick good or ill" in things?

Does our capacity for

reflectively modifying

of

the

content

our

pleasures

and

pains imply that the human self is infinitely malleable?
If the content of our pleasures and pains is determined by
our prior conceptions of happiness,

on what nonhedonistic

basis do we construct those conceptions of happiness?

The

answers to these questions remain unclear in Rapaczynski's
reading,
agency,
tion

of

which

focuses

via the appropriative transformation or humanizanature,

as

pursuit of happiness
the

only on the achievement of moral

content

of

the

necessary means of the

(1987,

happiness

rational

171-176); as for the end,
itself,

Rapaczynski

offers

or
no
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satisfactory

explanation

of

how

according

to

Locke

our

choice of ideals of happiness could avoid an unreflective
"heteronomy" and at the same time avoid collapsing into
sheer

arbitrariness

or

willfulness

in

the

guise

of

"autonomy" (161-168).61
It is unfortunate though (as we will argue)
standable

that

Locke

devotes

relatively

little

reasoning toward addressing these questions.
it

is possible to

under-

explicit

Nonetheless

construct out of the materials Locke

provides at least a partial account of his conception of
the ultimate grounds and ultimate ends of moral reasoning.
In the midst of his more prominently displayed arguments,
Locke more quietly provides the materials of an ultimately
6 1Rapaczynski argues that Locke's emphasis of productive appropriation provides the means for avoiding the
problem of heteronomy and establishing a genuine moral
autonomy, insofar as the progressive recreation of nature
in accordance with human ends guarantees that the experiential materials out of which we construct our ideas of happiness will be themselves products of human creation;
therefore our construction of ideas of happiness, its
dependence on the external environment notwithstanding,
represents ultimately an act of self-legislation (172-176).
Yet it is unclear how this suggestion resolves the problem
of heteronomy in any but the most abstract, speciesoriented manner.
It is unclear, that is, precisely how an
individual's moral autonomy is enhanced by the inheritance
of a cultural environment in the construction of which he
or she played no part.
Moreover, even if we accept this
suggestion as a resolution of the problem of heteronomy,
absent an explanation of how we reason about the ends that
are to govern our transformation of nature, it would seem
that the rationale for productive appropriation as Rapaczynski presents it reduces in the end to a celebration of
creativity, of sheer arbitrariness or willfulness, for its
own sake.
Indeed the manner in which Rapaczynski frames
the problem of heteronomy forecloses any possibility of its
nonarbitrary solution.
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nonutilitarian argument that is nonetheless independent of
the more doubtful of his theological propositions.
sionally,

at

points

private work,

scattered throughout his

Occa-

public and

Locke offers some apparently rather casual

pronouncements concerning the content of human happiness,
showing us in effect the results if not the process of his
reasonings.

In the Essay's chapter "Of Modes of Pleasure

and Pain," he suggests but declines to elaborate what appears to be a crucial,

fundamental distinction concerning

objects of pleasure and the forms of pleasure that they
produce in us.
Were it my business here, to enquire any farther ... I
should remark, that our Love and Hatred of inanimate
insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure
and Pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our Senses, though with their Destruction:
But Hatred or Love, to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or Delight,
which we find in our selves arising from a consideration of their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being
and Welfare of a Man's Children and Friends, producing
constant Delight in him, he is said constantly to love
them.
(2.20.5)
It is true that Locke immediately reverts to a more
common line of argument, excusing himself from pursuing the
implications of this observation by merely noting "that our
Ideas of Love and Hatred, are but the Dispositions of the
Mind,

in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however

caused in us" (2.20.5).62

But how does it come about, and

62In an unpublished 1676 journal entry, Locke observes
that love "is a sympathy of the soul and is nothing but the
union of the mind with the idea of something that has a
secret faculty to delight it ... " (in Von Leyden 1954, 267).
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what is the significance of the fact, according to Locke,
that we

"often"

experience an apparently nonutilitarian,

selfless delight in the very existence or happiness of our
children and
certain

friends,

animate

or

beings

in other words that we regard
as

possessing

intrinsic

worth,

irrespective of the uses or applications to which we might
put them?

Is there some quality inherent in such beings

that can produce such a response?

Or if love and hatred

are

Mind, "

"but

the

Dispositions

quality in us,

of

the

in our natural mental

is

there

some

constitution,

that

makes such experiences uniquely or especially gratifying
for us?
In the face of his prominently displayed evidence of
the predations to which various peoples have subjected even
their own children,63 it would be difficult to attribute to
Locke the opinion that something inherent in children, let
alone

in

anyone who

is

not

our direct,

blood relative,

could in itself exercise such a power over us by nature.
Locke therefore explains our devotion to our children,

in

the normal cases in which we are devoted to our children,
by

reference

as much

something in them.

to

something

in our selves

as

to

"God planted in Men a strong desire

also of propagating their Kind,
in their Posterity ... "

and continuing themselves

Parents are taught by "Natural Love

and Tenderness to provide for [their children] as g part of
63see chapter V above, pp. 264-266.
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.tJlemselves"

(I.88,97;

emphasis

supplied).64

devotion or love is thus natural,

Parental

according to Locke,

at

least in the most basic, minimal sense that it grows out of
one's natural self-concernment.
self-concernment explains

To be sure, its origin in

its uneven power over parents,

and explains more particularly its occasional subjection to
other,

more fanciful visions of self-expansion.

But the

crucial question in this context concerns the character of
the

need

that

is

expressed

and

fulfilled

in

extending activity of devotion to one's children.

the

self-

Does our

ordinary if nonuniversal devotion to our children express,
and fulfill more adequately than the relevant alternatives,
a need on the part of the human self not merely to expand
its sphere of concernment,
identifying

with

another

but to do so specifically by
self?

In

his

references

to

parenthood as self-extension, does Locke quietly suggest a
greater natural sociality than he is willing consistently
or unambiguously to attribute to the human self?
A fuller consideration of Locke's treatment of the
experience of friendship produces further support for this
proposition.

In conceiving of parental love as rooted in

our more fundamental capacity and desire for self-extension
64In the unpublished fragment "Ethica 92," Locke explains parental love as one of the pleasures of the mind,
which "are the greatest as well as most lasting" pleasures.
"Who ever was soe bruitish as would not quit the greatest
sensual pleasure to save a childs life whom he loved. What
is this but pleasure of thought remote from any sensual de1 ight" (in Sargentich 1974, 30).
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or for identification with another self, Locke implicitly
As we will see

assimilates parental love to friendship.

more fully below, 6 5 this assimilation appears in the Second
Treatise mainly in the form of an admonition.
in Some Thoughts Concerning Education,

But just as

in which education

appears as an essentially private function, Locke seems to
correct the one-sidedness of the Second Treatise in this
respect

by

familial

presenting

life,66

so

a

also

somewhat
he

warmer

reveals

conception

elsewhere

in

of

both

private and public writings that he is by no means insensible of the power and sweetness of the sentiment of friendship or interpersonal love.
hints

to

the

contrary,

In the Essay, he provides only
contenting

himself

to

mention

without comment the common acceptation of the word "Friend"
as "a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another"
(2.28.18), and to offer as an instance of "other Modes of
Pleasure"

undiscussed

in

the

chapter

devoted

to

that

65see below, pp. 396-398.
66Locke does warn in this work, as he does implicitly
in the Second Treatise, that "Parents, being wisely ordain'd by Nature to love their Children, are very apt, if
Reason watch not that natural Affection very warily ... to
let it run into Fondness," and thus too often to "cherish
their Faults" (STCE 34).
This means, however, only that
parental love should be informed by reason, or by an understanding of the long-term interests of the child; it does
not mean that Locke conceives of a callous, calculating
utilitarianism as the proper bond of the rational family.
To the contrary, Locke argues that an essential means of
rendering a child receptive to instruction in virtue is to
make the child "sensible of your Care and Love of him,"
thereby planting in him "a peculiar Affection for you"
(99). See also STCE 95-96. Contrast Pangle 1988, 230-243.
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subject

"the

pleasure

of

rational

conversation

with

a

Fri end ... " ( 2 . 2 o • 18 ) .
Striking a much more personal note, however,

in the

"Epistle Dedicatory" of Some Thoughts Concerning Education,
addressed to his friend Edward Clarke, Locke confesses to
"know

no

greater

Pleasure

in

this

Life,

nor

a

better

Remembrance to be left behind one, than a long, continued
Friendship,

with an honest,

lover of his Country"
sentiment

finds

still

private correspondence.
his

dear

friend

useful,

and worthy Man,

(in Axtell 1968, 113) . 67
more

powerful

expression

and

The same
in

his

In one of his numerous letters to

William

Molyneux,

upon

expressing

his

heartfelt disappointment at the postponement of a planned
meeting,

Locke

confesses that

"when the

life are moderately provided for,"

conveniences of

our earthly existence

holds for him "nothing of value ... equal to the conversation
of a knowing,

ingenious, and large-minded friend ... "

(CJL

67rn an unpublished journal entry for 7/16/1676, Locke
distinguishes between purer and more utilitarian forms of
friendship.
Although men, observes Locke, "often love
their friends with whose good offices or conversation they
are delighted, endeavoring and wishing their good, thereby
to preserve to themselves those things they have pleasure
in ... [s]ome wise minds are of a nobler constitution, having
pleasure in the very being and happiness of their friends,
and some yet of a more excellent make are delighted with
existence and happiness of all good men, some with that of
all mankind in general, and this last may be said properly
to love" (in Von Leyden 1954, 266).

361
#2115,
vided

8/4/1696). 68
the

declaration

occasion
by

a

The untimely death of Molyneux profor

a

genuinely

similar,

still more

grief-stricken

heartfelt

Locke.

Upon

receiving the news, he wrote to Thomas Molyneux that
Death has with a violent hand ... snatched from you a
dear brother .•. I bear too great a share in the loss,
and am too sensibly touched with it myself ... to do
anything but mingle my tears with yours.
I have lost
in your brother ... an intimate and sincere friend whom I
truly loved and by whom I was truly loved. And what a
loss that is, those only can be sensible who know how
valuable and how scarce a true friend is and how far to
be
preferred
to
all
other
sorts
of
treasure.
( 10/27 /1698; ·quoted in Cranston 1957, 441) . 69
68see also #3088A, 2/10/1702, to William Popple:
"When necessarys are provided for, friendship is the best,
most useful!, and most delightful! treasure that I know ... "
69rt may be relevant in this context to note further
that although the published works of the bachelor Locke are
notably free of any discussion of romantic love, his private correspondence indicates that in his younger years and
even beyond, his life manifests no similar freedom.
The
young Locke writes, for instance, in a draft letter to an
unnamed "Madam":
"To catch the eyes of forward gazers, or
by degrees to fire a heart that courts its flames is the
effect of an ordinary face ... But M. to Captivate at a distance and takeing a heart (that supposed it self well fortified) without either surprise or seige is the priviledg
only of your beauty which scorns to conquer ordinary
ways ... thinke it not strange that you finde at your feet an
unknowne captive, who may be permitted to submitt to a passion hee had noe means left him to resist and can noe more
conceale then those flames that comeing from heaven are
more violent then others and seldome burne slow or secreatly" (CJL #45, date unknown [de Beer estimates 1658 or
1659]). That his heart was not completely "fortified" even
in his later years against such "non-Lockean" passions (see
Tarcov 1983) is indicated by his lengthy and somewhat mysterious relationship with Damaris Cudworth, later the Lady
Masham. See the discussions of this relationship in Cranston 1957, especially 215-224,236,335-336; Yelton 1985, 810.
It is perhaps suggestive too that in his apparently
casual enumeration of "other Modes of Pleasure" in the
Essay Locke implies that the "Pleasure of Musick" lies at
least in part in its power to soothe "the pain of tender
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Is it plausible that this is not the expression of a
Further,

genuinely grief-stricken man?

is

it plausible

that Locke, who relied so heavily on introspective evidence
in the development of his empiricist epistemology,
have

failed

to

reflect

on

the

significance

of

could

his

own

To the

sentiments for his account of human motivation?

extent to which these propositions are indeed implausible,
it is all the more necessary for us to consider a host of
difficult

questions.

What

reasoning according

explains the experience of

friendship,

and

supports the

its superiority to other pleasures?

claim of

to Locke

What more

basic needs or desires in our selves are fulfilled by the
experience

of

friendship

or

interpersonal

What

love?

qualities in our friends or in those whom we love appeal to
us,

make

them

distinct

from

and

preferable

to

others?

Furthermore, insofar as friendship and love involve such a
sense of distinction, to what extent could even a capacity
on our part for genuine friendship or love provide support
for the broader public principle of human equality?
Once again, there is no question that Locke wishes to
leave

with

at

least

some

of

the

Essay's

readers

the

impression that his remarks on the content of our pleasures
and pains express merely subjective valuations,

that the

love of friendship represents a mere private "relish" or
taste.

It is therefore impossible to eliminate entirely

Eyes" ( 2. 2 o. 18) .
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the element of conjecture from our attempt at uncovering
the reasoning that underlies those remarks. 7 0

It is safest

70one might offer the following conjecture, for instance, in defense of the proposition that even an originally radical egoism of the kind that Locke sometimes suggests contains the materials for the development of at
least a partial sociality or sense of sympathy.
Locke observes the most extreme expression of our natural desire
for well-being or pursuit of happiness in the desire to
have more than one needs or to transcend necessity, to
overcome all natural or conventional limits on one's own
volition.
But insofar as this desire for radical freedom
and sovereignty represents a desire to transcend limits, it
remains essentially relational in its object; one's sense
of self, of the degree of one's self-magnification, depends
on the degree of resistance, whether from the realm of
nature in general or from other people, one encounters and
overcomes. Locke seems to hold that the primary expression
of the desire for dominion is a desire to be "submitted to
J:2Y others" (STCE 104), to have one's greatness attested by
others more-or-less like oneself. From this arises a question.
How is self-magnification to be gained through the
experience of power over others or even over nature in general, when it would seem that the very fact of their subjection would render one's subjects contemptible, unworthy
to attest to the scope of one's powers or greatness?
(Cf.
Aristotle's denial that there is dignity in the ruling of
unequals; Politics 1.5.2-3, 1.7.4, 7.14.15-19). The desire
for self-magnification would seem then to require for its
fulfillment recognition by another whom one respects or
even admires, by another equal to or even superior to oneself. Perhaps from the perspective of the great, the Lockean ethic consists less in a joyless quest for joy than a
limitless quest for limits.
The very logic of the desire
for dominion or aggrandizement would then paradoxically
culminate in a certain desire for equality, a desire for a
certain kind of fellowship with another whose greatness
confirms one's own, makes it recognizable.
To be sure,
such a desire for equality does not necessarily entail a
desire for human equality; it could very well manifest
itself in a fanciful desire for fellowship or identification with a god.
(See the discussion below, pp. 398-408.)
For the desire for self-magnification to generate more than
a partial sociality and in particular a desire for human
equality, it must somehow discover grounds for identification of oneself with other human beings as such.
The
completion of this conjectural argument turns in the end on
whether Lockean reason forms a proper basis for community
or for distinction among human beings.
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here, however, to begin by considering Locke's own testimony concerning the grounds of the respect or sympathy he
feels

for

his

own

friends,

the

quality or qualities by

virtue of which he could desire to identify himself with
another.

In the remarks we have cited, Locke makes clear

that he values friendship in general, and that of Molyneux
in particular, by virtue of the friend's knowledge, ingenuity, and large-mindedness--in other words, by virtue of the
perfection of the friend's rationality.

A rational person

finds the highest pleasure in a rational friendship;
pleasurableness
ultimately

or

goodness

inseparable

from

of
that

friendship
of

is

reason,

the

therefore
or

of

the

pursuit of truth.

In fact, in his published work Locke is

considerably

reluctant to proclaim his

less

devotion to

reason or to the truth for its own sake than he is to expound the joys of friendship,

though in neither case does

he appear completely forthcoming.
comes:

The question then be-

Why or in what respect does Locke find the exercise

of reason a dignifying pursuit, a pursuit worthy of respect
or admiration?

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF REASON
In the Essay's "Epistle to the Reader," Locke remarks
that as the understanding is "the most elevated Faculty of
the soul,

so it is employed with a greater, and more con-

stant Delight

than

any

of the

other,"

and

insists that

"'tis Truth alone I seek" (Nidditch ed. 1975, 6,11).71

In

virtually the same breath, however, he describes its exercise as mere "Sport" or "Entertainment" or "Diversion," as
though it held no more significance than the play of children,

or

at best than the

"recreation"

by which adults

restore the energy they must apply to their truly serious
pursuits.72

It

is

surely

implausible that

Locke

loved

Molyneux and mourned his death for no more profound reason
than

that

Molyneux

was

a

clever

or

witty

conversation

partner; and it is perhaps still more implausible that he
thought of the Essay, on which labored for over two decades
and

in

the

process

placed

at

least

his

reputation

at

7 1tte reiterates directly or indirectly this devotion to
the truth throughout the Essay and The Conduct of the
Understanding in particular.
See ECHU 1. 2. 28, 1. 4. 2 3, 25,
2.21.72, 3.5.16, 3.9.21, 3.10.13, 4.19.1, 4.20.17; cu 3,6,
11,14,33,34,42.
72see Pangle 1988, 269-270.
For Locke's thoughts on
recreation, see STCE 108,206-209; also CJL #328, 3/12/1677,
#426, 11/26/1678, both to Denis Grenville; #1655, 8/23/1693
to Molyneux. Cf. the sophistic conception of philosophy as
a child's pursuit, a nonserious form of play, in Plato,
Gorgias 484c-486d, and Republic 328d.
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considerable risk,73 as nothing more than the product of a
One might then argue that he partially

pastime or hobby.

corrects this impression in ascribing to his intellectual
labors a more serious purpose, in his famous self-description as an "Under-Labourer" to the true natural philosophers or scientists; perhaps Locke locates the dignity or
seriousness
indirect,

of

to

his

the

work

in

development

its
of

contribution,
"Philosophy,

however
which

is

nothing but the true Knowledge of Things" ("Epistle to the
Reader," 10).
But in stating this alternative we merely restate the
question.

The dignity of Locke's own work as a contribu-

tion to philosophy would depend ultimately upon the dignity
of philosophy itself as a non- or trans-utilitarian pursuit.

As we have seen, Locke indicates clearly enough his

support for the modern project of placing scientific inquiry,

that is,

reason,

in the service of the technolog-

ical enhancement of human power over material nature.74
this

respect

it

is true,

as Pangle observes,

In

that Locke

73For a historical account of the controversies that
the Essay aroused, see Yolton 1956, passim.
On the Oxford
attempt in 1703 at suppressing the teaching of the Essay,
see Cranston 1957, 466-469.
7 4In addition to the remarks we have discussed at ECHU
4 .12 .10-12, see the unpublished fragments "Knowledge, Its
Extent and Measure," and "Of Study," in King 1830, 87-91,
106-107; also "De Arte Medica," in Fox Bourne 1876, I 222227.
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does "'sell' philosophy" to the utilitarians (1988, 270).75
sut the important questions concern to what extent and why
If, as Pangle seems to charge,76 Locke pre-

he does so.

sents utilitarian arguments for utilitarian reasons, if he
endorses a wholly utilitarian, technological or instrumental conception of reason,
nihilistic,

Hobbesian or Nietzschean implications of the

subordination
There

is,

he then commits himself to the

or

reduction

however,

fundamental,

an

of

reason

to

will-to-power.

alternative possibility.

the

unifying principle of Locke's thought is the

rejection of arbitrariness in all its forms,
the

If

rejection

of the

or in other

words

is

sovereignty of the human

will,

then his apparent endorsement of the technological

75In the end Locke's suggestion of the technological
applications of knowledge is only a particularly important
implication of his more frequent assertion that the end of
reason is action, not contemplation. "Our Business here is
not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct" (ECHU 1.1.6; also 2.7.3, 2.18.7, 2.22.10, 2.23.13,
3.6.30ff., 3.11.5, 4.2.14, 4.11.8).
76The nature of Pangle's objection to Locke is somewhat
unclear, inasmuch as in the passage just cited, he seems to
characterize Locke as a thoroughgoing utilitarian, whereas
in the same context he describes Locke as a fundamentally
Socratic philosopher whose failure to provide a complete
account of the philosophic life reflects his failure or
miscalculation in considering the "preconditions for the
survival and fostering of that extraordinarily rare sort of
young mind or self or personality that alone has the potential to become philosophic in the precise sense" ( 1988,
272; in general, 262-275).
We will argue below that what
appears to Pangle as a failure or miscalculation may just
as well proceed in Locke's mind from a different assessment
of the nature and limits of the philosophic experience, and
in particular of its capacity to serve as a model for human
striving in general.
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conception could not represent Locke's most serious thinking concerning the status of human reason;

Locke's most

serious thinking must somehow contain an affirmation of the
ultimate sovereignty of human reason over human willfulness.
The present reading stands or falls by a qualified
rejection of the former alternative and affirmation of the
latter.

In this view, Locke does not unqualifiedly endorse

an instrumental conception of reason and is not a Hobbesian
or proto-Nietzschean nihilist, but instead presents such a
conception in pursuance of a somewhat paradoxical rhetorical strategy to promote a more moderate,
politics.

rational form of

There can be no doubt that Locke's support for

the modern technological project rests to some extent on
the pragmatic or utilitarian justification that it serves
the cause of social peace; it binds as tightly as possible
the interests of the few and the many, in that it creates a
material abundance that provides both comfort and security
for

the

latter,

and

opportunities

eminence for the former.
at present, however,

for

power

and

pre-

What requires particular emphasis

is the significance of the fact that

Locke explains his support for the technological project by
reference not only to such pragmatic considerations,

but

also to the proposition that that project properly conceived serves also, and indeed cannot serve its pragmatic
ends without

serving also,

the

cause

of truth,

or more
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precisely, of respect for truth.
As

zuckert

perceptively

observes

(1974,

555~564),

Locke's distinction in the Essay between civil and philosophic

forms

of discourse

( 3 • 9. 3)

carries

the

initially

surprising implication that the former is all too often in
the

most

important

respect

more

genuinely

philosophical

than the latter:
Vulgar Notions suit vulgar Discourses:
and both,
though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the Market, and the Wake.
Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and
Taylors, have Words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and
Disputants too, if they had a Mind to understand, and
to be clearly understood.
(ECHU 3.11.10)
Paradoxically, according to Locke, its task of facilitating
and regulating the affairs of ordinary practical life tends
to impose a discipline upon civil discourse, guiding it to
a degree of respect for reason and truth that is unfortunately absent from much of what purports to be philosophic
discourse. 77

People wholly ignorant of the concepts of

real essences or substantial forms, who know things only by
their

sensible

qualities,

are

often

according

to

Locke

"better acquainted with their Differences" and "can more
nicely distinguish them from their uses ... than those learned quick-sighted Men"
unlike

the

(3.6.24)

pseudo-philosophers

in large part because they,
of

the

schools,

have

a

77Recall Locke's repeated disparagements of the school
philosophers' licentious management of their verbal currency, by contrast with the practical men of affairs' more
sober and honest treatment of their own currency. See ECHU
3.10 passim.
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genuine, practical interest in making reliable identifications and distinctions (cf. 3.10.8-13).

Locke's suggestion

can be viewed as a corollary of his more general political
project of endowing virtue or justice.
ly

to

combat

the

theoretical

In order effective-

obfuscation

and

political

divisiveness that often proceed from an unregulated desire
for power, Locke seems to reason, it is necessary not simply

to

suppress

that

desire,

but

instead

toward material nature as its proper object.
ed,

to

direct

it

Thus direct-

the desire for power can provide crucial support for

the creation of material abundance and the cultivation of
respect for reason and truth, both of which are indispensable elements of a free,

stable,

secure political society.

In accordance with this reasoning, Locke expresses the hope
that in bringing his readers to reflect on their use of
language by first reflecting on what practical

interests

their use of language serves, he shall have served not only
the

cause

of

"Peace,"

but

also

that

of

"Truth ... and

Learning" (3.5.16; also 3.9.21).
Like Strauss before him and Pangle after him, Zuckert
doubts Locke's sincerity in claiming service to the cause
of truth as a standard that transcends ordinary considerations of interest and that therefore enables him to judge
civil discourse in the most important respect superior to
philosophic discourse.

Instead

Zuckert

infers

from the

reversal of the rank ordering of the two forms of discourse
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that according to Locke "there is no realm of 'pure' philosophic discourse ... for there is no class of philosophers
aiming at 'true knowledge'; all men have a by-interest" and
thus all thought reduces ultimately to ideology, to willful
self-assertion (1974,

In response to this reading,

559).

it may be relevant for us to observe preliminarily that it
would be by no means beyond the capacity of a writer such
as Locke, ever-sensitive to the character of his audience,
to present for rhetorical purposes a reductionist account
of

reason

while

maintaining

a

greater

reserve

in

the

presentation of what he considers a more serious account.
Locke does after all describe the intended audience of the
Essay,

however

nonphilosophic

learned

or

audience;78

capable,
the

fact

as

an

that

he

essentially
chooses

to

appeal to nonphilosophic, often self-interested persons on
the level of self-interest does not in itself imply that he
categorically rejects the possibility that human thought or
discourse can transcend mere self-interest.
Nor

does

it

in

itself

affirms this possibility.
Locke

does

quietly

imply,

of

course,

that

he

The more powerful evidence that

affirm

the

sovereign,

transcendent

78eis addressees, as he claims, are not primarily "men
of large Thoughts and quick Apprehensions," but rather "Men
of my own size" or scholars ("Epistle to the Reader," in
Nidditch ed. 1975, 8). If we concede the ambiguity evident
in the reference to "Men of my own size," it seems obvious
nonetheless that Locke's intended audience consists primarily, if not exclusively, in nonphilosophers.
Cf. Wood
1983, 41-47.
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character

or

potential

inference

from

the

human

of

spirit

of

reason

modesty

guides Locke's theoretical writing.

appears

or

as

humility

an

that

It is understandable

and to some extent justifiable that some might view as a
kind of inverted Platonism Locke's suggestion that the most
rationally adept turn their attentions away from useless
disputations about the nature of

"separate Spirits"

and

like issues, and toward the "useful Arts," whose improvement

promises

to

ameliorate

the

material

humankind (4.12.11,12; also 1.1.5-7).
Republic

promotes

a

turning-away

condition

of

As Socrates in The
from

the

ephemeral

practical world and toward a realm of eternity accessible
(if

at

all)

(515c-521b),

only

through

pure

theory

or

contemplation

so Locke may seem to suggest a turning-away

from whatever intimations of eternity our experience may
contain, and toward an ever-more comprehensive accumulation
of

power

in

our practical,

secular

lives.

Perhaps

as

prominently as one could expect in view of the prevailing
circumstances, Locke does indeed make this suggestion.
when we consider well the context of his suggestion,
find that Locke's
complete.

Yet
we

inversion of Plato is not necessarily

What is of decisive significance here is the

evidence that Locke's promotion of the technological project proceeds not from a dogmatic skepticism or an act of
willful ideological closure, but instead from a more genuinely moderate spirit of intellectual modesty and open-
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ness.
As we have shown at length in chapters III and IV
above,

Locke's attempt at reforming the study of nature,

and therefore at enhancing our technological power,

rests

upon both our recognition of our immense ignorance of the
natural order and our acceptance of the possibility that
through empirical and rational investigation, we can make
genuine discoveries and lessen that ignorance.

As a prac-

tical matter, the degree of care we take in our investigations

of

nature

depends

upon

our

ability

to

moderate

between a dogmatic assurance of the adequacy of our present
knowledge and a skepticism so thoroughgoing as to commit us
to intellectual paralysis or arbitrariness.

The point of

those earlier chapters was to emphasize Locke's view that
nature is not simply a human construction, that the world
external to the mind is not simply a chaos into which we
project our ordering, creative wills, and thus that reason
in cooperation with empirical investigation can produce at
least probabilistically reliable claims of knowledge.

What

is equally necessary in the present context, however, is to
emphasize Locke's characteristic refusal to assent to any
dogmatic claim of finality for our knowledge of the external world.

As we have seen, seldom in the Essay does Locke

miss an opportunity to reiterate the point with which he
introduces the work, that "the Comprehension of our Understandings,

comes

exceeding

short

of the vast

Extent

of
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Things," though not so far short as to justify despair of
the availability of the knowledge required for our genuine
concernments (1.1.5) .79
Now,

one might argue that taken in itself,

Locke's

skepticism regarding the accessibility of a comprehensive,
finally

adequate

provisional
mind--that

science

or tactical
it

proceeds

of

nature

skepticism
ultimately

represents
of

the

from

a

only

the

technological
conception

of

nature as a sort of void that we cannot comprehend, yet
into which we can freely, experimentally project our will,
so that

our recognition of the

limits of our potential

knowledge prepares an effective denial of the limits of our
potential power.

It is for this reason that Locke's modest

skepticism regarding our capacity for resolving the ul timate questions of theology is of decisive importance in
elucidating

the

character

Plato.

However

literal

formulations

of

incomplete
and

the

or

Lockean

inadequate

however

inversion

of

in their more

exoterically

intended,

Locke's theologically oriented arguments can be taken to
represent the surface or exterior of a more philosophically
serious core.

Looking beyond his perhaps deservedly ill-

received arguments purporting to demonstrate the existence
of God or "a god" (especially ECHU 4.10) or to show us how
to

verify

9.256ff.),

the
in

authenticity
addition

to

of
his

miracles
bare

(Works

assertions

1823,
of

79see especially chapter III above, pp. 127-147.

the
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authenticity of the Biblical revelation, 80 we find intimations

of

a

more

these questions.

subtle,

even more Socratic approach to

For example, when we attempt seriously to

give an account of it,

what seems to be the outstanding

characteristic of our idea of God, according to Locke, is
its mysteriousness or incomprehensibility.
divine

revelation,

mankind"
"the

the

"rational

and

Prior to any

thinking

part

of

or the "heathen philosophers" could conceive of

one,

supreme,

invisible

God,"

though

they

were

compelled for the most part to maintain this discovery in
secrecy (RC,

in Works 1823, 7.135,138).

We

(monotheists)

commonly attribute to God infinity in the possession of
such qualities as duration, power, wisdom, goodness, and so
forth,

but

in so

doing,

we

can only conceive

of

infinities as negations of boundaries or limits,
products of endless additions.

these
as the

The upshot for Locke is

that "GOD ... is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow
capacities" (2.17.1; also 2.16.8).81

More clearly stated,

80see chapter II above, pp. 69-72.
81cf. ECRU 3.6.11:
" ... even the most advanced Notion
we have of God, is but attributing the same simple Ideas
which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our
selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in
them, than would be in their absence, attributing, I say,
those simple Ideas to him in an unlimited degree.
Thus ...
we have the complex Idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, and happy Being."
See also ECRU
1.4.15, 2.23.35; journal entry of 8/17/1681, in King 1830,
123. Cf. Jaffa, commenting on the meaning of the appeal to
"Nature's God" in the Declaration of Independence: "Whether the God whom the Signers assume to exist can be proved
to exist is not necessary . to the argument ... What can be
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the upshot seems to be that the philosopher's god is in
Locke's

view

virtually

experience of infinity,

identical

with

the

questioning

or with the transcendent mysteri-

ousness of the human condition within the order of being.
Locke's view is similar with respect to the question of an
afterlife.

As reason compels us to maintain an openness to

the possibility of the existence of a god,

so we "cannot

but be certain," as Locke cleverly puts it, "that a future
Life is at least possible" (2.21.70; also 44) .82
Some commentators cite such remarks as evidence of
Locke's

severe

narrowing

theology on reason.83

of

the

claims

of

religion

or

We do not deny either that this is

proved is that a divine nature is of a certain sort.
Such
a nature would carry to absolute perfection those partially
existing perfections perceivable in man ... Men form the idea
of such a perfect being, as much to understand the limits
of their own humanity, as to decide objectively of that
superior being's existence" (1975, 153).
82 11 This therefor is evident that there is pleasure and
pain to be had in this life and all that it is possible
there may be a state after this life wher in men may be
capable of enjoyments or sufferings" ("Morality," in Sargentich 1974, 27).
See also "Knowledge, Its Extent and
Measure," in King 1830, 89-90.
83According to Strauss, even if we attribute to Locke
no more radical thought than "some misgivings" concerning
the power of his arguments in support of the authenticity
of the Christian revelation to persuade all his readers, we
must yet conclude that "he was forced to make his political
teaching ... as independent of Scripture as it could possibly
be" (1953, 209; see, more generally, 202-226, and Strauss
1959, 197-220).
Pangle "hasten[s] to stress" that "No one
who possesses a sympathetic understanding of Locke's political theology could ever pronounce against him the accusation of atheism" (1988, 149), although the general thrust
of his assessment of Locke's political theology leads us to
wonder whether a "sympathetic" understanding is in Pangle's
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Locke's

intention or that his remarks have this effect.

For present purposes, however, that we cannot know whether
there is a personal god or an afterlife is less important
than

the

implication

reasonably
radical,

deny

most

the

that

according

existence

of

to

Locke we

either;

implicitly skeptical

cannot

Locke's

statements

most

concerning

these questions do not surpass an insistence on an attitude
of

rational

reason,

openness

to

the

possibilities.

"everyone," every rational,

For

mortal being,

this

"has a

concern in a future life which he is bound to look after,"
according to Locke, and indeed cannot avoid pondering the
possibility, at least "sometimes" (CU 8; ECHU 4.20.6).84
The

implication

of

Locke's

theoretical

modesty

is

that no matter how much practically reliable knowledge, or
more pertinently no matter how much power over nature we
acquire, there is always a beyond,
mysterious

to

us,

something

something that remains

that eludes

efforts at comprehension or control.

or resists

our

Expressed somewhat

more broadly, the posture of openness with respect to the
questions of god and afterlife means an acknowledgement of
a realm of authentic, permanent mysteries, and therewith an
view equivalent to a fully adequate, reasonable, penetrating understanding.
See idem 131-158, 204-211.
See also
Mansfield 1979, 28, and 1989, 209; Bluhm et al. 1980;
Zuckert 1988, 112-117.
84cf. Pascal on the rationality of "wagering" in favor
of the existence of God and an afterlife (Pensees III, especially aphorism 233).
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openness to the possibility that those permanent, ultimate
mysteries provide intimations of the existence of a dispensation that orders insofar as it transcends our practical
and theoretical strivings.

Therefore, in suggesting to at

least some of his readers that they redirect their intellectual energies away from fruitless efforts at resolving
the deep questions of ontology and theology and toward the
more practically useful, more genuinely charitable study of
nature
or

(ECHU 4.12.12),

reveal

a

posture

Locke does not necessarily suggest
of

intellectual

closure,

a

willful

denial of the existence or legitimacy of such questions.
He suggests not,

for instance, that such questions proceed

from a deformed or alienated consciousness whose overcoming
is the historical task of humankind,85 but rather that we
simply

acknowledge

reconcile

ourselves

their
to

a

status

as

authentic

condition of

"quiet

mysteries,
Ignorance"

with respect to them (1.1.4), and focus our attentions on

85The classic expression of such a posture of closure
appears in a manuscript of the young Marx, who acknowledges
that "the idea of creation is thus one that it is very difficult to drive out of the minds of people," because to do
so would contradict "all the evidences of practical life,"
and yet who proceeds to demand of an imagined interlocutor
that the latter give up the "abstraction" from which such
questions proceed.
"Once the essential reality of man in
nature, man as the existence of nature for man, and nature
for man as the existence of man, has become evident in
practical life and sense experience, then the question of
an alien being, of a being above nature and man ... has become impossible in practice" ("Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts," in McLellan ed. 1977, 94-95).
See the commentary on this passage by Voegelin 1968, especially 23-28,
44-45.
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those pursuits whereby we can more directly address our
basic concernments.
In the context of this argument, Locke's suggestion
that we refocus our intellectual energies on technological
pursuits represents not a negation, but to the contrary an
affirmation of the limits of human knowledge and power; it
implores us not to fancy ourselves the absolutely sovereign
creators and masters of nature,

but rather to create the

conditions for securing that degree of freedom appropriate
to our station in the order of being.

Our possession of

the faculty of reason could supply no firm grounds for the
"Dignity and Excellency" of the human species (STCE 31) if
it were no more than a technological faculty, an instrument
for the achieving of practical aims.

Such a faculty would

be no more than a power, capable of distinguishing us from
the other animals only by virtue of the superior cleverness
or facility with which we pursue the objects of our happiness;

our claims of human or natural rights could be at

bottom nothing more than assertions of power.

According to

this strain of Locke's argument, the technological mind is
not simply identical or coextensive with the human mind,
because the realm of human experience is broader than the
realm of experience amenable to technological experimentation and control.

The dignity of the faculty of reason,

and therewith of the human beings who possess it,

rests

upon its capacity to transcend merely practical objects, to
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rise to an awareness of the permanent mysteries that forever stand before and challenge the human understanding as
proper objects for

its contemplation,

Only as a contemplative faculty,

projects of our wills.
exercised
genuine

for

its

own

independence

that transcend the

sake,

of

the

can human reason achieve a
will

or

the

passions,

and

therewith a position of sovereignty within the human self
or sou1.86

When Locke insists that we begin our inquiries

in a spirit of modest recognition of our own ignorance, he
does not refer merely to the sort of ignorance that assiduous

empirical

or

experimental

exertions

can

dispel;

he

refers to the fact that there are some questions, ultimate
questions, about which we are permanently ignorant.
Herein consists the serious core of the principle of
"workmanship" that Locke commonly presents as the foundation of much of his moral and political argumentation.
briefly

elaborating

that

principle

in

the

Essay,

In

Locke

argues that whoever considers together the two ideas of God
and man as God's workmanship must "certainly find that the
Inferior, Finite, and Dependent, is under an Obligation to
86Eisenach remarks that "Locke scholars always seek to
resurrect elements of autonomous reason in Locke's politics, despite Locke's own denials in his epistemology"
(1981, 239 n.28).
I do not doubt that Eisenach would find
herein a similarly futile effort. It seems to me, however,
that, even leaving aside for the moment the fact that a
consistent denial of reason's autonomy would make nonsense
of the whole of Locke's thought, Locke's implicit denials
of that autonomy are hardly unambiguous and must be understood in the light of the spirit of intellectual modesty
that inspires and pervades the Essay.
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obey the Supreme and Infinite" (4.3.13; also 1.4.13).
beit in a somewhat revised form,

Al-

the proposition that the

human condition is in the morally ultimate respect a condition of dependence remains tenable even in the absence of a
demonstration of the existence of a creating god.

If we

understand this condition of dependence as signifying more
precisely a

condition of limited independence or limited

sovereignty,

we can then maintain the principle of human

dependence as a corollary of Locke's theoretical openness,
or as an implication of our negative knowledge, our Socratic knowledge of our own ignorance.

If we know that there

are permanent questions, that the human condition is in the
ultimate respects permanently mysterious, that the ultimate
origin and destiny of human beings transcend our understanding and our power, then we know that the human condition is in the decisive respect a condition of "mediocrity"
or in-betweenness in the order of animate being. 87

We know

87In a 1678 letter to Grenville, Locke remarks that "I
have often thought that our state here in this world is a
State of Mediocrity which is not capeable of extreams
though on one side or other of this mediocrity there might
lie great excellency and perfection. Thus we are not capeable of continual! rest nor continual! exercise, though the
later has certainly much more of excellency in it.
We are
not able to labor always with the body nor always with the
minde.
And to come to our present purpose, we are not
capeable of liveing altogeather exactly by a strict rule,
nor altogeather without one. not always retired nor always
in company. But this being but [an] odde notion of mine it
may suffice only to have mentioned it ... " (CJL #374; see
also "Of study," in Axtell 1968, 419-420).
In addition to
its expressions in the workmanship principle, this "odde
notion" appears in the Essay in Locke's acknowledgment of
"the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity,
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then that we are not gods,

not the all-knowing sovereign

creators and masters of nature, 8 8 and that it would involve
a

dishonesty,

a

willful

obfuscation,

a

contraction dis-

which we are in this World, " in particular for acquiring
final knowledge of nature ( 4 .12 .10; also 4 .14. 2) ; in his
revised account of the inconstancy of the determination of
our wills by the law of reason or toward our greatest happiness (2.21.31-71) and in his related observations of the
necessary imperfection of our mundane happiness (2.7.5,
2.21.46); and somewhat more ambiguously, in his characterization of the great chain of animate being, from which,
whatever his other motives, one could reasonably infer at
minimum an agnostic openness to the possibility that human
life or human intelligence is not the highest form in the
order of animate being (3.6.12). Though his general emphasis on the significance for Lockean morality of the concept
of mediocrity or in-betweenness is thus defensible, Colman
attributes far too much credulity to Locke in asserting
that Locke "accepts unquestioningly" the doctrine of the
great chain of being (1983, 2; also 76-106).
88According to this argument, Locke's premise that
"Man made not himself nor any other man" and "made not the
world which he found made at his birth" implies a fundamental qualification of his assertions of human sovereignty
or self-ownership in the Second Treatise (27,44,123).
In
this view, Locke therein asserts not an absolute, but only
a relative property of individuals in themselves, i.e relative to other human beings; he intends not necessarily to
assert that the only genuine obligations are those selfimposed, but only to deny that any person is the natural
property of any other person.
Similarly, the argument
points to the limitations of Rapaczynski's observation that
Locke attempts "to synthesize praxis and poesis in a unified theory of human activity" (1987, 117).
A complete
synthesis of these two categories would mean, as Rapaczynski argues, that human action according to Locke is selfproduction, production of oneself, which would imply once
again a justification of a thoroughgoing arbitrariness or
willfulness.
True, Locke synthesizes the categories of
action and production, to the extent that he does, with a
view to establishing the ownership of or responsibility for
actions (see TT II.27; ECHU 2.27.9,17,18).
But as we have
seen, the principle of personal responsibility depends on
the governing presence of rationality, which is ultimately
incompatible with the principle of radical self-creation.
Cf. Windstrup 1981.
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guised as an expansion of our basic experience, for us to
attempt to assume or usurp such a status.
Locke's agnosticism can serve as the grounding for an
affirmation not only of the dignity of human reason,

but

also of the moral principle of human equality, as follows.
our rational capacity represents in its highest expression
a

capacity to transcend our particular historical condi-

tions and to confront the essential mysteriousness of our
human condition.

Somewhat paradoxically, we become free,

self-knowing, self-possessing beings to the extent that we
are able, by confronting our ignorance and our dependence
with respect to the ultimate source of our being.

Our

capacity for law consists then in a capacity to regulate
rationally our pursuit of happiness, in accordance with the
fundamental,

orienting

insight

into

the

middling,

between status of a rational, corporeal, mortal being.
is true that the natural

inIt

law according to this argument

could have no genuinely, categorically obligatory force, if
we conceive of genuine obligation as Locke sometimes does,
as depending upon a discoverable schedule of otherworldly
sanctions to enforce our conformity with that law.89

The

argument does, however, yield a conception of a natural law
that obliges hypothetically or with directive force,

re-

quiring us to respect the principle of equal natural rights

89see ECHU 1. 3. 6, 12, 13;
226.

STCE 61;

also Strauss 1953,
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inasmuch as reason informs us that it is appropriate for
beings of our station to do so. 90
would be appropriate

More specifically,

it

for us to respect the principle of

equal natural rights by virtue of the fact that whatever
the differences in our particular powers of reasoning,

in

the morally fundamental respect we share a common condition, a common experience of dependence upon a transcendent
dispensation.

In this way reason can serve as a source of

human community,

justifying a

sense of sympathy for our

fellows and a commitment to their preservation and wellbeing.

Tyranny can be attractive to us only insofar as we

misunderstand

our

own

nature,

insofar

as

we

fail

to

confront rationally or to recognize the challenge of what
transcends us,

and therefore mistake human beings as the

highest in the order of being, with no proper limits on the
projection of our own wills or powers.

By means of thus

paring away, in the spirit of the modest, moderate skepticism of the Essay, the more dogmatic and less sustainable
assertions with which Locke tends to clothe his workmanship principle,

Locke has, or would have, at his disposal

90Jaffa observes, without specific reference to Locke,
that the "imperatives of natural right have the character
of the 'then' clause in an 'if ... then' proposition.
'If
you would be happy, then you must be virtuous'" (1957, 64).
With less sympathy for his subject matter, Von Leyden assimilates Lockean natural law in this respect with that of
Grotius and Suarez, according to whom natural law "only
indicates whether or not an action is morally necessary,"
or has only "the nature of a directive rule rather than of
a law in the strict sense" (1956, 32).
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an essentially Socratic or Platonic conception of the dignity and sovereignty of reason, capable of supporting both
the distinction of human beings from lower orders of being
and the rejection of any assertion of fundamental moral or
jural divisions within the human species.91
Now, in view of the apparently "non-Lockean" coloring
of much of the foregoing, it is particularly necessary for
us to be clear about what, precisely, we are and are not

91Locke has available, in other words, an argument
very similar in outline to the argument whereby Jaffa
explicates the foundations of the natural rights principles
in the Declaration of Independence.
"We understand man,
and his rights, as much by understanding what he is not, as
by understanding what he is.
In fact, we understand the
latter only by understanding the former ... In short, as men
are neither beasts nor gods, they ought not to play God to
other men, nor ought they to treat other men as beasts"
(1975, 153).
Contrast Mansfield, who argues that Locke
attempts in a more modern manner to conceive of a faculty
of reason that distinguishes without dividing us.
For
Mansfield's Locke, the key to the moderation (or qualified
democratization) of the power of reason lies in its mixture
with the element of labor or industry (1979, 33-35).
Contrast further Pangle, who argues that Locke's utilitarian
argumentation proceeds from an "immoderate detestation of
his necessarily embattled situation as a philosopher," or
from a desire to free himself from "the troublesome need to
respond to attack from the defenders of traditional or unadulterated piety and reverence" ( 1988, 27 4) .
If the present argument is correct, there is no need to ascribe to
Locke such philosophic aloofness or even selfishness.
If
Locke maintains seriously his own principle of "mediocrity," then he has grounds for believing in the principle
of moral and political equality.
His utilitarianism would
then proceed from the virtue of care or the sentiment of
sympathy for the surrounding community.
It seems to me
that the relevant evidence that Pangle himself presents
with great insight indicates a much greater concern on
Locke's part for protecting the community against philosophy, or against the corruptions incident to any serious
public attempt at cultivating it, than the reverse.
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First, we do not suggest that Locke intends

arguing here.

to present with any significant emphasis this implicitly
Socratic dimension of his thinking as a publicly efficacious source of our moral-political orientation.
who

concedes

rationalist

that

the

core of

philosophic

Pangle,

the originally Socratic,

experience

remains

present

and

alive in Locke's thought, is perfectly correct in observing
that Locke fails to make that experience an explicit theme
of his reflections (1988,

265-275).

Second, though Locke

does seem to believe that such a presentation would be at
best of very limited public utility,92 we are not suggesting that his reluctance to elaborate this Socratic foundation proceeds only or primarily from his estimate of its
relative inaccessibility, or for that matter from a fear on
his part of the consequences of its relative heterodoxy.
We are suggesting more simply and cautiously, and for the
moment without
first that a

commenting on Locke's

intentions

at all,

Socratically inspired argument of the kind

adumbrated above is available to Locke, is at his disposal
within the boundaries of his epistemological and psychological principles, and second that such an argument contains
in the end the only possibility of making coherent sense
out of his philosophical-political

thought and

the life

92see Locke's account of the failure of the ancient
philosophers in this respect, in The Reasonableness of
Christianity (Works 7.135-151).
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that he devoted to it.93
From this perspective, the difficulty involved in any
attempt at more confidently attributing such an argument to
Locke's intention lies in ascertaining why he so steadfastly refuses to give it his clear endorsement.
ly,

More precise-

the di ff icul ty lies not only in the fact that Locke

characteristically presents the workmanship principle in a
form that virtually guarantees its dismissal by any serious
thinker, and refuses to elaborate the Socratic element of
his thought along with its potential moral significance.
After all,

given his observation that the difference

in

individuals' understandings renders it impossible that "the
same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the
same dress"

(ECHU "Epistle to the Reader," 8),

it is en-

tirely plausible that in setting forth a program of social
as well as intellectual reform,
principle

that

the

deepest,

Locke would act upon the

most

theoretically

adequate

93That Locke must recognize this appears evident in
the following remark, from an unpublished fragment entitled
"Ethica B":
"The original and foundation of all Law is
dependency.
A dependent intelligent being is under the
power and direction and dominion of him on whom he depends
and must be for the ends appointed him by that superior
being.
If man were independent he could have no law but
his own will no end but himself. He would be a god to himself and the satisfaction of his own will the sole measure
and end of all his actions" (MS Locke c.28, p.141; quoted
in Dunn 1969, 1; emphasis supplied). See also Colman 1983,
46.
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arguments may not be the most publically persuasive. 94

The

difficulty lies in the fact that Locke evidently does not
regard the argument in question as appropriate or persuasi ve for even the most rational,

free-thinking portion of

his readership; he flatly, publicly contradicts in the most
implicitly radical terms his own suggestion that our openness even to the possibility of an afterlife would, if well
considered, provide for us sufficient moral orientation.95
94In one of his replies to Stillingfleet, Locke admits
to acting on the related principle that it may be unwise to
discredit publically even relatively weak arguments that
are intended to support true and salutary propositions, in
view of the possibility that less discerning readers may
find in such arguments "enough to preserve in them true
sentiments of religion and morality" (Works 1823, 4.53-54).
I am unable to follow Strauss on this point, however, who
asserts that Locke hereby admits the weakness of the entire
argument developed in ECHU 4.10 (1953, 207).
It is clearly
implausible that Locke would under any circumstances make
such an admission to anyone, let alone Stillingfleet; and
in any event Locke clearly refers to an argument specifically mentioned and dropped at 4.10.7.
9 5contrast ECHU 2.21.70 with 2.21.55.
In the latter
paragraph, which so far as I am aware constitutes the most
extreme statement of moral relativism in the entire Lockean
corpus, Locke concludes an ostensible explanation of the
diversity of individuals' conceptions of happiness with the
following observations:
"For if there be no Prospect beyond the Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us
eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to morrow we shall die ... Men may chuse different things, and yet
all chuse right, supposing them only like a Company of poor
Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and
their sweetness; others, Beetles, delighted with other kind
of Viands; which having enjoyed for a season, they should
cease to be, and exist no more for ever."
One might upon
first reading believe that Locke intends here to reject the
supposition that "there be no Prospect beyond the Grave."
Yet he implies in context that he takes the proposition
that we have no prospect to be identical in meaning with
the proposition that "Men in this Life only have hope." We
have seen that Locke denies in principle that we can have
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The following questions arise.

If Locke holds in the

end an essentially Socratic conception of human reason, why
does he not more openly and emphatically say so?
he sprinkle his works,

however subtly,

Why would

with such morally

radical implications--why promote, even alongside his more
theologically orthodox professions, a hedonistic, utilitarian,

ultimately nihilistic line of reasoning whose promo-

tion is sure to endanger his reputation and may well endanger his career and even his life--if he did not mean them,
or intend his most radical readers to believe them? Why,
for that matter,

if he holds it the most edifying,

most

dignifying of human activities, does he apparently encourage the most rational portion of his audience to forego a
serious,

sustained rational confrontation of the ultimate

mysteries of the human condition, and to embrace instead a
more

pragmatically

nature?

Yet why,

or

technologically

on the other hand,

oriented

study

of

if Locke does not

seriously believe in the principle of common human dignity,
knowledge of an afterlife; he affirms that we can know the
afterlife only as a possibility, or in other words that we
"have only hope."
The inescapable implication is that in
this passage Locke denies that the possibility of an afterlife can provide us any moral orientation; he suggests that
we are "only like a Company of Poor Insects" who should
spend our lives in pursuance of transient delights, "for to
morrow we shall die." Cf. Burke's fear that under the influence of modern egoism, "Men would become little better
than the flies of a summer" (Reflections, in Mahoney ed.
1955, 108) .
See also Locke's similar denials that our
thoughts on the possibility of an afterlife can provide any
moral orientation, in The Reasonableness of Christianity
(Works 1823, 7 .149-150), and in the fragment "Morality"
{Sargentich 1974).
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if

he

status

really
than

2.21.55),

believes
that

of

"a

that

we

Company

occupy
of

no

poor

loftier

moral

Insects"

(ECHU

does he devote his adult life to advancing the

cause of natural human rights, a cause manifestly indefensible in the absence of a grounding in such a principle of
dignity?

Who is the real Locke?

THE CRITIQUE OF EROS
In attempting to decide which of the available alternatives represents Locke's deepest reflections--the rationalized, quasi-Socratic version of the workmanship principle
or the radically modern, ultimately nihilistic utilitarianism--we are dealing with a matter of judgment, an estimate
of relative plausibilities or probabilities.
support their case,
have provided a
public

foundations

those who endorse the latter reading

plausible

affirmations

In order to

of

explanation of

more

traditional,

Locke's common
less

for his political principles. 96

radical

In order to

defend the more Socratic alternative as at least an equally
plausible

reading,

it

is

therefore necessary

for

us

to

defend the perhaps initially surprising claim that Locke
could intend his more radically modern, utilitarian suggestions also to serve an essentially rhetorical, even to some
extent exoteric purpose.
The point of departure for this alternative reading
consists

in a

reflection on the significance of Locke's

emphasis on the great power of eros,

or of the various

objects of extra-personal devotion, to stimulate the human
inclinations toward willfulness and partisanship.

We have

96see Strauss 1953, 165-166, 202-230; cox 1960, 1-44;
Zuckert 1978.
391
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shown above how,
the contrary,

notwithstanding occasional assertions to

Locke regards as inadequate a narrowly ego-

istic conception of the motivations and concernments of the
human self.

To repeat, the most telling indication of the

self's capacity for self-transcendence lies in the relatively common human willingness to die in the service of
causes larger than self-defense or preservation.

Yet in

Locke's view that same willingness provides also a telling
indication of the power and danger of the human propensity
for partisanship,
Locke's work.97

a recurrent,

governing theme throughout

To be a partisan in Locke's sense is to be

resistant to rational

appeal. 98

In the end,

in Locke's

estimation, a danger equal to or greater than that posed by
egoism or narrow self-absorption lies in the fact that the
desire for self-preservation is so frequently overpowered
by other desires--that people too easily allow the expansion of their spheres of vital concernment, or that we are
so frequently all too willing to sacrifice ourselves

in

97on partisanship or sectarianism in general, see TT
II.42; ECHU 1.3.14, 2.33.18, 3.10.2ff., 4.3.6,20, 4.20.18;
CU 3,34,41; also Wood 1983, 101-109.
98"(W]hat one of a hundred," he asks rhetorically, "of
the zealous bigots in all parties ever examined the tenets
he is so stiff in, or ever thought it his business or duty
so to do?" (CU 34).
The effect of this characteristic obstinacy is to render real communication impossible, as "the
contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their
Arguings one with another ... speak different Languages"
(ECHU 3.10.22).
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acts of uncritical devotion to larger causes.99
Locke's concern over the human propensity for partisanship,
reflects,

or over the

fragility

of human reason that

it

is abundantly evident in his treatments of the

more common or prominent modes of our expansive affections.
Although,

as we have seen,

Locke occasionally appeals to

such affections as supports of our duties or sources of our
happiness, the more immediately noticeable characteristics
of those appeals are their infrequency and their considerable ambiguity.

Such is the case, for instance, with

respect to his treatment of the sentiment of patriotism,
which, notwithstanding his references to his readers' duty
to country and to the "generous Temper and Courage" of the
English nation,

is marked

least implicit hostility.

in general

by neglect and at

The relevant textual discussions

certainly contain no suggestion that Locke conceives of any
romantic absorption into a
appropriate

sentimental

individual obligations.

supposed national will

support

for

If anything,

the

as

an

performance

of

Locke's argument in

the Second Treatise serves to undercut the sentiment of
99nr easily grant, that there are great numbers of
Opinions, which, by Men of different Countries, Educations,
and Tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable Principles; many whereof, both for their Absurdity, as well as oppositions one to another, it is impossible should be true.
But yet all these Propositions, how
remote soever from Reason, are so sacred somewhere or
other, that Men even of good Understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their Lives, and whatever is
dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others
to question, the truth of them" (ECHU 1.3.21).
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patriotism.

Not only does he maintain therein the ultimate

arbitrariness

of

political

boundaries,

devoting

little

attention to the argument that such boundaries should correspond to national divisions,100 but he also explains the
enduring fact of political divisions among humankind only
by reference to "the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, " with out which there would be no need for any
society other than the community of "Mankind ... one Society
distinct

from

all

other Creatures"

(II .128;

cf.

II .14) .

Apparently in keeping with the same intention, Locke leaves
little ground for confusing his doctrine of political liberty with a doctrine of republican liberty in the classical
sense.

By carefully avoiding any reference to "citizens"

lOOI take this to be the implication of Locke's loose
stipulation, issued without further qualification, that
"Wherever ... any number of Men are so united into one Society" as to surrender their natural executive powers, "there
and there only is a Political, or Civil Society" (II.89),
also of his apparently approving observation of the historical frequency of "Men withdrawing themselves ... from the
Jurisdiction they were born under ..• and setting Y2 new
Governments in other places" (II .115) , and finally of his
observation that it "seldom happens, that ... Conquerors and
Conquered never incorporate into one People, under the same
Laws and Freedom," again with the implication that the free
consent of a conquered people to a benign conqueror suff ices to establish the legitimacy of the government of the
latter,
irrespective of considerations of nationality
(II.178).
I cannot agree with Seliger, therefore, in the
assertion that "Locke's political society presupposes the
coexistence of contractual with such natural ties as the
modern conception of a nation associates with it" (1969,
22).
Seliger seems thus to underappreciate the indissoluble link between liberty and preservation in Locke's
thought, such that the imperative of preservation for Locke
renders rational one's consent even to a government that
does not represent one's nationality.
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or any insistence on participatory freedom, he attempts to
maintain the assertiveness of free "subjects" or "members"
in an essentially defensive posture, intent on the protection

of

the

self's

sphere

of privacy but

resisting the

absorption of that sphere into a larger, collective, public
sphere.101

Locke's treatments of the issue of patriotism

and of the closely related issue of civic virtue in the
second Treatise appear thus to be governed by the opinion
that

national

and political

identities both

reflect and

exacerbate the human propensity for divisiveness or partisanship, and are therefore to be diluted or subordinated as
a precondition of the achievement of a truly liberal, stable, moderate, consensual politics.102
lOlTo his friend Edward Clarke, Locke expresses the
hope that "the zeale and forwardness of you your selves
[i.e. the House of Commons] makes it needlesse for us without dores soe much as to thinke of the publique which is
the happyest state a country can be in, when those whose
businesse it is, take such care of affairs that all others
quietly and with resignation acquiesce and thinke it superfluous and impertinent to medle or beat their heads about
them" (CJL #1326, 10/17/1690).
Cf. Jefferson's reflection
on the ultimate guarantor of happiness and prosperity in
his first inaugural address:
"a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another,
which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own
pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take
from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.
This is
the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close
the circle of our felicities" (in Koch and Peden eds. 1944,
323; also Jefferson to Madison, 6/9/1793, idem 523-524).
102rn an entry in his "Common-Place Book" entitled
"Amor Patriae," Locke appears to conceive of patriotism or
love of country as an instance of the association of ideas,
in particular as an association or outgrowth of private
affections.
"The remembrance of pleasures and conveniences
we have had there; the love of our friends, whose conversa-
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The same rhetorical design appears still more clearly
in

Locke's

analogous

throughout his work,
familial love.

reflections,

once

again

scattered

on the sentiments of friendship and

Again notwithstanding his published intima-

tions and his more expansive private testimony concerning
the power and sweetness of such sentiments, it is undeniable that the attitude toward them that predominates in his
published works,

and especially in those more immediately

concerned with politics, is much more narrowly utilitarian
and emotionally austere.

The Second Treatise contains but

three

to

direct

references

friendship,

none

of

which

emphasizes the power of friendship to bring meaning and
completion

to

individuals'

lives.

In

a

discussion

of

parental rights and obligations, Locke mentions as an aside
that a
(II. 70);

person may owe

"defence to his Child or Friend"

in his discussion of the beginning of political

tion and assistance may be pleasant and useful to us; and
the thoughts of recommending ourselves to our old acquaintance, by the improvements we shall bring home, either of
our fortunes or abilities, or the increase of esteem we
expect for having travelled and seen more than others of
this world ... all these preserve in us, in long absence, a
constant affection to our country." Cf. Tarcov 1983, 136.
Yet "the chief cause, that keeps us a longing after our
country," Locke suggests pregnantly, is the fact that
"Whilst we are abroad we look upon ourselves as strangers
there ... and the mind is not easily satisfied with anything
it can reach to the end of.
But when we are returned to
our country, where we think of a lasting abode, wherein to
set up our rest, an everlasting abode ... we do not propose
to ourselves another country whither we think to remove ... "
(in King 1830, 291-292). On the implications of the mind's
dissatisfaction with transience, see note 114 below.
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societies,

he supposes

(questionably, as it turns out103)

that the members of political societies in the beginning
must have "some Acquaintance and Friendship together," only
to draw the inference that "they could not but have greater
Apprehensions of others, than of one another ... "

(II.107).

He makes clear his view of the possible consequences for
domestic politics,

in raising the obvious difficulty with

the individual exercise of executive power:

"it is unrea-

sonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases," precisely
because "Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and
their Friends"

(II.13).

Friendship appears in the Second

Treatise as a power that divides just as it unites, that
moves us to feel the alienness of non-friends in proportion
as we experience friends as extensions of ourselves.

It

appears, in other words, as little more than an occasion of
partiality or partisanship.
ial love:

The same can be said of famil-

Locke's widely remarked utilitarian conception

of marital and familial

relations in the Second Treatise

can be understood as an attempt not only at correcting the
tendency

for

excessive

parental

tenderness

to

cultivate

habits of slavishness and dependence in their children,104
103cf. the passage under examination here with II.112,
115,175; see the discussion in chapter V, pp. 263-272.
104cf. Seliger 1968, 238-241; Pangle 1988, 230-243.
The cultivation of such slavishness can be seen as a consequence of an excessive sense of self-extension on the part
of parents; to identify oneself with one's child may facilitate a salutary sense of devotion, but it may also in more
extreme cases move parents to appropriate their childrens'
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but also at tempering the love of one's own,

which when

taken to an extreme can produce a spirit of clannishness
that corrupts and fractures the public sphere.105
Among all self-transcending or self-expanding human
devotions,

however,

unquestionably

the

deepest

dangerous,

the most productive of partisanship,

and

most

according

to Locke, are those associated with religion or theology-or

more

attempts,
gaining

fundamentally

still,

are

those

associated

with

whether ostensibly by reason or revelation,
knowledge

of

divinity

or eternity.

"The

at

three

great things that govern mankind," he observes in a 1681
journal entry, "are Reason, Passion, and Superstition; the
first governs a few,

the two last share the bulk of man-

kind ... but superstition is most powerful, and produces the
greatest mischiefs"

(in King 1830,

120) .

It is,

broadly

understood, the theological dimension of partisanship, its
faith in the divine authorization of its mission, that most
concerns Locke.

The theological partisanship that he judg-

sense of agency or responsibility, thus impairing their
development into free, self-disposing beings.
105Locke indicates his disagreement with Hooker on
this point, in diverging from Hooker's explanation of the
basis of equality.
In the latter's view, it is men's
"Duty, to Love others than themselves, for seeing those
things which are equal, must needs all have one measure."
It seems to be the weakness less of our capacity to love
others, according to Locke, than of our ordinary capacity
to love others equally that leads Locke to explain the
basis of equality in the "independent" status of individuals rather than in an obligation to mutual love (II.5,6).
See Zuckert 1978, 60.
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es dangerous is a form of "enthusiasm," of purely willful,
nonrational or irrational assent.

The paradigmatic example

of such assent is the pretension among such partisans that
they are the recipients of a divine revelation, "that they
are under the peculiar guidance of Heaven in their Actions
and Opinions ..• " (4.19.5).
Notwithstanding,

therefore,

his often-repeated dec-

laration that the true ground of morality can only be "the
Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his
Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to
account the Proudest Offender"

(ECHU 1. 3. 6), and notwith-

standing further his claim that any serious reflection on
the phenomena of causation confirms the proposition of the
existence of a supreme being (ECHU 1.4.9-10; 4.10 passim),
Locke expresses throughout his career a deep concern over
the

power

of

religious

or

quasi-religious

stimulate partisanship or sectarianism.

sentiment

to

In his early Two

Tracts on Government, he testifies in the preface that "I
no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself
in a storm,
ceeds

to

authority

which hath lasted almost hitherto," and pro-

argue
to

that

a

denial

"determine

relating to religion"
contention, censure,

the

of
use

the
of

would provide

civil

sovereign's

indifferent
"only a

things

liberty for

and persecution and turn us loose to

the tyranny of a religious rage" (ETG 119,125,120; also LTG
210-211).

Much later,

commenting on "those Absurdities,
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that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide
Mankind," Locke observes plaintively that "Religion which
should most
peculiarly
Brutes,
and

distinguish
to

elevate

us

from

us,

as

Beasts,

rational

and ought most
Creatures,

above

is that wherein Men often appear most irrational,
senseless

more

than

Beasts

themselves"

(ECHU

4.18.11) .106
Theological sectarianism or fanaticism as Locke diagnoses it proceeds from two general causes.

Its permissive

cause lies in the willingness and even eagerness of flocks
of people to embrace unreflectively the dogmatic teachings
of one theological

authority or another.

The

"greatest

part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World"
hold in the strict sense,

according to Locke,

no genuine

opinions of their own, and often become militant defenders
of

their

received

dogmas

because of that fact.

not

in

spite

of,

but

rather

"They are resolved to stick to a

Party, that Education or Interest has engaged them in; and
there,

like the common Soldiers of

an Army,

shew their

Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever
examining,

or so much as knowing the Cause they contend

106see also Locke's more private remark to a French
acquaintance:
" ... les bestes sont plus sages que nous
autres parceque comme di t une de nos poets burlesques ...
'But noe beast ever was so slight/For man, as for his god
to fight/They have more wit alas! and know/Themselves and
us better than soe'" (Correspondence #623, 2/9/1681 to
Toinard; the verse is from Butler, Hudibras I.i.775-778).
Cf. TT I.58.
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for"

(ECHU

In

4.20.18).

simply attests

to the

many

cases,

partisan

assent

great power of custom in forming

human minds and characters.

The power of custom in shaping

our opinions results in part from the laborious character
of serious inquiry.

As is the case with material property,

it is far easier to acquire one's opinions by inheritance
than by industry; and unlike that of inheriting property,
the opportunity of inheriting opinions extends to virtually
all members of society.

Moreover, the powerful desire for

esteem may discourage even the relatively industrious from
inquisitiveness, insofar as the challenging of orthodox or
fashionable
fellows

opinions

(CU 34;

may

invite

ECHU 1.3.25,

the

opprobrium of one's

2.28.12,

3.10.4) .107

Given thus both the lack of opportunity or inclination for most people to reflect seriously on their principl es, and the fact that "most Men cannot ... be at quiet in
their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest
their Thoughts on"

( 1. 3. 24),

the commonness of the human

propensity to render nonrational assent should come as little surprise.

But it does call attention to the extreme

importance of the formation of opinions among the "Leaders"
of parties, who do so much to form others' opinions, and

107or it may, as in Locke's own experience, invite
worse than opprobrium; surely not the least cause of nonrational assent is the fact that many people are "cooped in
close, by the Laws of their Countries, and the strict guard
of those, whose Interest it is to keep them ignorant" (ECHU
4.20.4), or if not wholly ignorant, orthodox.
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with such potentially grave consequences.

In reflecting

upon the character of the latter, Locke suggests with some
understatement
Motives,

that

"If

we

could

but

see

the

secret

that influenced the Men of Name and Learning in

the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always
find, that it was the embracing of Truth for its own sake,
that

made

them

maintained"

espouse

( 4. 2 O. 17) .

the

Doctrines,

they

To the contrary,

owned

and

Locke observes

throughout his career that the passion of ambition,

the

desire for dominion or self-aggrandizement, constitutes the
more active or efficient cause of theological partisanship.
In the

English Tract he argues

that a

proper religious

liberty does not include "a liberty for some men at pleasure to adopt themselves children of God, and from thence ...
proclaim themselves heirs of the world; not a liberty for
ambition

to

pull

down

well-framed

constitutions ... not

a

liberty to be Christians so as not to be subjects" (121).
Supporting
1667
the

the

opposite

constitutional

"Essay Concerning Toleration,"
propensity

assume

of

"depraved

principle

ambitious

human

nature"

to

in the attempt at

enforcing uniformity in religious worship

standing,

his

he similarly decries

"something of a godlike power"

1876, 1.178).

in

(in Fox Bourne

It is in the Essay Concerning Human Under-

however,

that Locke presents his most elaborate

and penetrating analysis of the enthusiastic propensity to
interpret one's strongest inclinations, however bizarre, as
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directives from heaven:
the love of something extraordinary, the Ease and Glory
it is to be inspired and be above the common and natural ways of Knowledge so flatters many Men's Laziness,
Ignorance, and Vanity, that when once they are got into
this way of immediate Revelation ... 'tis a hard matter
to get them out of it.
(4.19.8)
In

attempting to

appreciate

the

extent

of Locke's

respect for the depth and profundity of the human desire
for dominion at its extremes, it is important for us first
to notice that the doctrinal expressions of that desire are
not in Locke's view confined to the realm of theology narrowly conceived.

Throughout the Essay, Locke characteris-

tically uses the terms "party" and "sect 11108 in reference
not only to theological, but also to certain philosophical
schools;

whereas the

"Romanist[s]"

provide a

theological

example, the "Peripatetick[s]," Platonists, and Epicureans
are examples of "Sect[s]

in Philosophy"

(3.10.14).

More-

over, the philosophical or quasi-philosophical sects in the
schools that Locke observes firsthand tend paradoxically to
provide theoretical support for the irrationalism or enthusiasm
sects.

that

he

finds

so prevalent

among

the

theological

This points to the deeper significance of his sus-

tained and vigorous attack on the scholastic philosophers
whose dominance over the English universities lingers even
to his own day.

108He tends to use these terms interchangeably, as at
ECHU 4.20.18, where he refers to "the Partisans of most of
the Sects in the World ... "
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As we have seen, the "Schoolman and Metaphysicians"
as Locke presents them are abusers of speech,

wholly ab-

sorbed in abstract, purely formal, aridly logical disputations, arrogantly eschewing any real empirical inquiry.
effect,

according

in

the

realm of theory what the "Quarrelsom and Contentious"

(TT

II. 34)

for

are

displaying

to

Locke,

the

scholastics

in the realm of practice;
rhetorical

virtuosity

are

In

their fondness

serves

ultimately

to

precipitate an intellectual state of war, wherein words and
arguments

serve

as

weapons

and

the

purpose

for

their

exchange is not to enlighten, but only to prevail (3.10.7;
also 3.5.16; CU 42).
tation,

The scholastic conception of argumen-

as Locke presents it,

constitutes the theoretical

or ideological form of willful self-assertion.

The crucial

point here, however, is that the theoretical expressions of
willfulness do not merely parallel, but also support and
strengthen the more directly practical forms.

The scholas-

tic abusers of words have not confined their attentions to
mere

"logical

Niceties,

or

curious

empty

Speculations. "

They have "invaded the great Concernments of Humane Life
and Society"; they have "obscured and perplexed the material Truths of Law and Divinity ... and if not destroyed, yet
in great measure rendered useless, those two great Rules,
Religion and Justice" (3.10.12,8; also 13).
Locke repeatedly and emphatically contends that these
destructive effects proceed from no mere inadvertency, but
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rather from "wilful Faults and Neglects"

(3.10.1).

The

scholastics act as purveyors of "affected Obscurity, "filling their discourse

"with abundance of

gible noise and jargon"

(3.10.6,4),

empty unintelli-

often in a spirit of

sheer dishonesty, in order "to cover some Weakness of their
Hypothesis" or to "hinder their weak parts from being dis( 3 . 1 o . 2 , 6) .

covered"

By marshalling "Legions of obscure,

doubtful, and undefined Words" to guard their "strange and
absurd Doctrines" against rational scrutiny, making their
"Retreats,
Foxes,

more

like

the

Dens

of

Robbers,

or Holes

of

than the Fortresses of fair Warriours," they have

sought and in large measure acquired "Glory and Esteem"
along with "Authority and Dominion" (3.10.8,9; also 12,28).
In their motives and aspirations as Locke presents them,
the schoolmen are akin to liars, robbers, and conquerors;
they

are

subtly,

intellectual

insidiously

criminals

or

intellectualized

even

tyrants

whose

form of criminality

makes them no less and perhaps at bottom more practically
dangerous
designs.109

than

those

less

artful

in

concealing

their

Reflecting on the resistance to reason charac-

109zuckert comments that though this is not Locke's
last word on the subject, "Locke's suggestion as to the
character of the by-interests is certainly ungracious and
reflects perhaps worse on him than on those of whom he
speaks" (1974, 558 n.32).
Locke's incivility toward the
scholastics is obviously incongruous with the spirit of
modesty and toleration that generally animates the Essay,
as well as the emphasis on civility in his educational
writing (STCE 67,93,141-145).
The incongruity here seems
to proceed from Locke's more general attempt at attaching
our pride to our rationality.
The peculiar odiousness and
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teristic of the partisan enthusiast,

Locke wonders

"how

almost can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to
impose on others Belief,
own? "

( 4 . 19 . 2 ) .

might

draw

others'

the

Further,
corollary

who has already imposed on his
from this implicit warning one
that

whoever

tyrannizes

over

faculties can only be expected to tyrannize over

their bodies, their entire persons, as well.

It is after

all no "small power it gives one Man over another," Locke
warns, "to have the Authority to be the- Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unquestionable Truths" (1.4.24).
In objecting to scholastic philosophy and theology in
particular, Locke objects to a mode of thinking that lends
itself far too easily to the service of the human passion
for glory or dominion, if indeed it is not at bottom a mere
projection of that desire.

When we reflect on this partic-

ular critique, however, we come to question whether or to
what extent it applies in Locke's view not merely to latemedieval scholasticism, but in principle to the rest of the

dangerousness of Locke's scholastics lie in their implicit
treatment of arguments as weapons, and interlocutors and
audiences as potential subjects to be vanquished thereby,
or as irrational creatures incapable of judging and pursuing their own goods.
Scholastic ism then represents an
affront to our rationality, to our capacity for selfgovernment, to our very dignity as human beings.
Thus
according to this reading, in the Essay as well as in the
Two Treatises Locke seeks to fortify human rationality,
appealing to his readers' natural love of independence as
the psychological support of a proper respect for reason.
In seeking to arouse anger at the schoolmen, he seeks to
arouse anger at irrationality as such.
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"pre-modern consciousness,"110 the Biblical-Classical moral
and intellectual tradition.
Locke,
of

the

particularly to suit scholasticism for the service
passions

disputatious,

of

self-aggrandizement

is

polemical mode of reasoning,

perhaps more fundamentally,
its

For what seems, according to

reasonings.

At

not

only

its

but also,

and

the characteristic objects of

one point

Locke assimilates to the

schoolmen "the Philosophers of old," who like the former
would gain glory "for their great and universal Knowledge"
(3.10.8).

Inasmuch as he immediately qualifies this remark

by explaining that it is "the disputing and wrangling Philosophers I mean,

such as Lucian wittily,

and with reason

taxes, " it is doubtful that Locke intends thus to characterize the great classical Greek philosophers as mere lovers of glory.111

But it is far less doubtful that accor-

llOzuckert 1973, 69.
lllLocke appends to his remark a footnote directing his
readers to three of Lucian's comedies in particular:
Bis
Accusatus, Vitarum Auctio, and Convivium.
In Bis Accusatus, the voice of Justice distinguishes Socrates, whose sincere defense of the worthiness of justice proved ineff icacious, from the contemporary schools of philosophers who
"quarrel so among themselves," and who "make so free with
my name" yet "show no inclination at all to put my principles into practice" (Works 1905, III .14 7-148) .
In the
Essay Locke is notably more generous to Aristotle himself
than to Aristotle's professed followers among Locke's
contemporaries, taking pains in the midst of his critique
of the syllogistic form of reasoning to insist that he
intends thereby "not ... to lessen Aristotle, whom I look
upon as one of the greatest Men among the Antients; whose
large Views, acuteness and penetration of Thought, and
strength of Judgment, few have equalled" (4.17.4).
on the
other hand, this is by no means to deny the significance of
Locke's general failure, in his educational writings, to
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ding to Locke in the nature of the "old," premodern philosophers' publicly professed aspiration to "great and universal Knowledge" is the power to stimulate the vanity of
those perhaps least in need of such stimulation.
Just as Locke holds that the prevalence of scholastic
disputation bears most heavily on the great human concernments of religion and justice, so he seems more generally
to view the most important focus of the premodern phi losophic

aspiration

bonum"

(2. 21. 55).

as

the

search

for

the

human

"Summum

If the love of glory tends to corrupt

the love of truth or wisdom, then it would seem to follow
that the pursuit of the highest truths,
the

deepest

human

concernments

and

corresponding to

thus

promising

the

greatest glory to their discoverers,112 is most susceptible
to this form of corruption.113

In the Second Treatise and

still more clearly in Some Thoughts Concerning Education,
include the works of Aristotle (to say nothing of his complete neglect of Plato) among the front rank of works he
recommends for special study.
See STCE 185-186.
In a
draft letter to the Countess of Peterborough, Locke allows
that in the study of "True politics" as "a part of moral
philosophy ... Aristotle may be best to begin with," supplemented later by "more modern writers of government" (in
Axtell 1968, 395-396).
See also "Some Thoughts Concerning
Reading and Study for a Gentleman," in Axtell 1968, 400,
403.
112on the glory of religious founders, cf. Machiavelli,
The Prince 6; Discourses 1.10.
113cf. Pangle:
"Among civilized and educated men
influenced by priests, theologians, and philosophers,"
according to Locke, "the most insidiously powerful desire
is the one for the Summum Bonum" (1988, 184).
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Locke

identifies the most dangerous human desire or the

"Root of all Evil" as the desire of "having in our Possession,

and under our Dominion, more than we have need of"

(STCE 110; TT II.37).

The human desire of having more than

we need represents in its extremity a desire to transcend
once and for all our necessitous, incomplete natural condition, to achieve a final state of fullness or completion,
to be perfectly free and absolutely sovereign--to imitate
and even to identify ourselves with God, or with the highest,
the

freest,
Essay's

most powerful being we can conceive of.
discussion

of

the power of volition,

In

Locke

remarks on our good fortune to be determined in willing not
by the greater prospective good, but rather by the greatest
uneasiness present to our senses.

His immediate intention

is to explain how many people can maintain a sense of contentment with a "moderate portion of good" or a succession
of ordinary Enjoyments"; if it were otherwise,

"we should

be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which are not in our possession"
(2.21.44).

But the implication relevant for the present

argument is that for a person ruled by the expansive desires, a serious contemplation of the infinite, and therefore of the infinite degrees of happiness beyond what is
present to us and especially of "the infinite and eternal
Joys

of

Heaven"

(2. 21. 38),

constant and infinite misery.

may

very

well

make

For such people,

life

a

it would
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seem, mortal life could be made bearable only by embracing
the thought that it is within one's power--perhaps by withdrawing from the world, perhaps by attempting actively to
recreate it--to achieve the infinite, to obtain for oneself
the heavenly joy of final completeness or self-sufficiency,
of the infinite freedom and power whose absence brings such
misery. 114

114Locke's view of the moral significance of the fact
of mortality is complex and difficult.
As we have seen,
according to Locke the human condition of "mediocrity," involving especially the unavailability of any pure, unmixed
pleasure or happiness, makes some awareness of and reflection on the possibility of an afterlife unavoidable for
even a minimally rational person (ECHU 2.7.5, 2.21.46,
4.20.3,6; see pp. 376-383 above). The moral or legislative
implications of this fact,
however,
are problematic.
First, the natural or unreflective human propensity for
absorption in the present appears in many people to minimize the effect of this thought on their behavior (2.21.44,
60; 2.28.9, 12).
The suspicion of the greater likelihood
that death is a mere void or nothingness may do the same
(2.21.55; Works 1823, 7.6-7).
Second, among those over
whom the thought of an afterlife exercises some significant
power, it is by no means clear that that power will serve
the endowment of virtue (7.149-151), or that it will take
the form of an "expectation" that "carries a constant
pleasure with it" ("Thus I Think," in King 1830, 307).
It
may produce in the manner presently described an overpowering, expansive desire for the fullness of heaven, or it may
produce an immoderate, incapacitating fear (STCE 115,191).
As Strauss observes, Locke goes so far in his unpublished
work on the law of nature as to hint that "the creation of
man as a mortal being which knows of its own mortality
cannot be due to a being which loves man" (1959, 213-214;
see LN 5.161-163). On the human uneasiness or revulsion at
the experience of transience, see "Amor Patriae," in King
1830, 291-292.
Cf. the expansive uneasiness Locke fears
with that of Nietzsche's Zarathustra: "if there were gods,
how could I endure not to be a god!
Hence there are no
gods" (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2. 2 [Kaufmann ed. 1954,
198]).
Locke's attempt is to teach us to endure our condition of in-betweenness, to bear not to be God without
thereby inviting others to act as gods over us.
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In thus reflecting on the deeper significance of the
scholastics'

intellectual

tyranny

and

of

the

partisan

enthusiasts' tendency to proclaim their own opinions as the
directly revealed word of God,
dominion,
namely

in effect to usurp God's

we return ultimately to the fundamental

Locke's

respect

for

the

enormous

and

issue,

enormously

destructive power inherent in "the busy and boundless Fancy
of Man"

(ECHU 2.1.2; also 4.19.3,6,11).

"[Tis]

Phansye,"

the young Locke writes privately, that "is the great commander of the world" and that "rules us all under the title
of reason," acting as "the great guide both of the wise and
the fooleish"

(to [Thomas Westrowe], CJL #81, 10/20/1659).

Locke's emphasis on the moral primacy of the ego or self,
his insistent explanation of what may appear to be experiences of genuine sociality or self-transcendence as instead
experiences of mere self-extension or self-expansion,
reflects his urgently felt need to call attention to the
sobering

ease

and

frequency

with which

the

human

fancy

seduces its proper governor, or eclipses its "only Star and
compass," the guiding, directive power of reason (TT I.58).
The human experiences of love or devotion--for country, for
family and friends,

but especially for God and for reason

itself--serve in Locke's view as powerful stimuli for our
fanciful,

willful inclination to endow our particular af-

fections

with transcendent significance and thereupon to

demand that others embrace or bow to them.

It is only too
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human, according to Locke, for us to create gods or visions
of human completion and then to attempt to stride the earth
as their prophetic messengers,

in effect to create or re-

create the world so that we may rule it ourselves.
Herein lies, then, a plausible rationale for Locke's
firm refusal to appeal to any vision of human completion as
a source of moral and political orientation.
that

the

primary

business

of

political

It is clear

philosophy

in

Locke's view is not to raise the aspirations of political
societies

toward

ennobling

but

potentially

intoxicating

visions of the best, but rather to educate them to recognize the constraints imposed by natural necessity and thus
to prepare them to defend themselves against the worst, to
assist them in constructing the "best fence against Rebellion"

(TT II.226).115

Locke's great respect for the human

propensity for partisanship, for the corrupting, disordering power of the human

fancy,

implies that he may well

115Grant observes aptly that according to Locke the
"most important task" of political theory "is to let men
know what political evil is" (1987, 203).
Cf. Mansfield:
"To cool the ambition of religious fervor and replace it
with decent calculation of self-interest, Locke sketches
out a demonstrative morality according to which we are
wholly absorbed in meeting our necessities.
By this view
we shall find it in our interest always to consult necessity and live as we must without taking on the risks of enterprise" (1989, 208). See also Cox (1960, 165-195) on the
primacy of foreign policy in Locke's political thought.
More fundamental in this respect is Locke's emphasis on the
primacy of pain in human experience.
See especially ECHU
2.1.21, 2.20.6; STCE 126; Locke's journal entry of 7/16/76,
in Von Leyden 1954, 265-268; and the discussion in Strauss
1953, 249-251.
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maintain, in his most serious thinking, the propositions of
the sovereignty of reason and of the possibility of teleological

moral

reasoning,

and yet

feel

rhetorically com-

pelled to de-emphasize .or to render problematic his support
for such propositions in public, at least to certain portions of his public audience.

That the implications of the

utilitarian strain of Locke's presentation are incontestably radical
that this

and even dangerous does not in itself prove

strain represents

Locke's most

serious think-

ing; 116 he may well find the implications of the contrary
alternative more dangerous still.
We have argued at some length in this chapter and
those preceding it that Locke's highly self-conscious modesty and openness to empirical evidence, his insistence on

116contrast Seliger, who asserts that "according to
[Strauss') "esoteric method the inoffensive views must be
cancelled; they are intended to mislead the censor and
protect the writer" (1968, 34).
Though he clearly errs in
conceiving of this manner of interpretation as a preconceived method to be inflexibly applied to the reading of
any text, Seliger is not wrong in observing a tendency,
quite commonly justified, among Straussian readers to conclude that the most radical statements or implications of
an esoteric writer must reflect that writer's most serious
intention. Such conclusions normally rest upon the absence
of any plausible alternative for explaining the presence of
textually anomalous statements that it is clearly contrary
to an author's narrow interest to make.
As zuckert points
out in response to Seliger and others, however, the imperative of self-preservation, and by implication of avoiding
or concealing "offensive" views, is by no means the only or
the highest reason for esoteric writing (1978, 63).
I am
suggesting that even Locke's utilitarian or Hobbesian
strain may not represent his deepest understanding of the
human condition, but instead may be intended to serve for a
certain portion of his audience a pedagogical purpose.
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the possibility of a
against

the

enthusiasm,

rational pursuit of happiness

countervailing

forces

of

passion,

over

custom,

and the irrational association of ideas,

even

his acknowledgement of the occasional legitimacy of prerogative power, with its implicit allowance of the limitation
of the claim of consent by the claim of wisdom, 117

all

require the sovereignty of reason within the human mind or
self.

When

thought

in

plausible

we

consider

the

conjunction with
to

infer

that

defensiveness

these

Locke

of

Locke's

facts,

it

seems

maintains

in

his

most

deeper

reflections an awareness of the limits of the utilitarian
principle.

On the basis

of

the available evidence,

it

117wallin maintains that for Locke "Government becomes
based on consent in a more explicit manner than ever before
for the very reason that consent or agreement is thought to
be so arbitrary" (1984, 157). But with respect to the prerogative power of the "wisest and best Princes," Locke comments that "such God-like Princes indeed had some Title to
Arbitrary Power, by that Argument, that would prove Absolute Monarchy the best Government, as that by which God
himself governs the Universe by:
because such Kings partake of his Wisdom and Goodness" (II.165,166). It is true,
of course, that Locke decisively rejects "that Argument" to
which he refers; but the fact that he admits the legitimacy
of prerogative power at all, of executive action "without
the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it"
(160) in furtherance of the public good, implies an acknowledgement on his part of the claim of genuine wisdom to
supersede consent, or of the partial force of the classical
argument in support of a natural right of the wise to rule.
This means that for Locke wisdom must be distinct from or
nonreducible to consent, as reason must be distinct from
and nonreducible to will.
Locke's emphasis on consent implies that the sovereignty of reason is politically problematic; it does not imply the sovereignty of will over
reason. His difficult discussion of tacit consent seems to
carry a similar· implication (II.119-122), as does his
support for the principle of representation (especially
II.154-158; contrast Rousseau, Social Contract 2.1, 3.15).

415
seems most plausible to infer that Locke's abstraction from
~'

his appeal to a principle of egoistic utilitarianism

or of the moral primacy of the self and its pursuit of
happiness as the basis of natural human rights, and further
his

reluctance to present detailed treatments of founda-

tional questions,118 proceed in Locke's own mind less from
a

theoretical than from a merely practical or rhetorical

necessity.

It appears,

in other words, that his relative

narrowing of the political horizon proceeds from a judgment
less of the ultimate theoretical groundlessness of various
conceptions

of

human

completion

or

fulfillment

than

of

118Locke begins the concluding chapter of the First
Treatise by declaring, "The great Question which in all
Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on them the greatest part of those Mischiefs which have ruin'd cities, depopulated Countries, and disordered the Peace of the World,
has been, Not whether there be Power in the World, nor
whence it came, but who should have it" (I.106). This declaration seems somewhat disingenuous in implying that the
clarity with which it establishes the title to authority is
the primary criterion whereby a political theory should be
judged.
To say nothing of other difficulties, Locke's
awareness of the frequent dependence of disputes over title
on the question of the foundation of political authority is
beyond question.
As Grant observes, the "first task of
theory" for Locke "is a normative one ... to identify a standard of legitimate authority that does not dissolve into
'might makes right,'" while its second task is to meet the
criterion of clarity, to "teach us how to recognize who has
[authority]" (1987, 52-53).
In contenting himself explicitly to argue against Filmer that the principle of divine
right cannot meet the criterion of clarity, Locke implies
that the divine right principle (and by implication, that
of the natural right of the wise) resolves into an assertion of faith or will. A complete defense of the principle
of consent then requires a defense of reason against faith
or will as the proper foundation of politics, a defense
that Locke is characteristically reluctant to elaborate
clearly and completely.
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their public dangerousness.

If so, then Locke's break with

the premodern tradition of political philosophy would be
much less radical,

and the foundations of his liberalism

more secure, than his most powerful critics allow.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION:

THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL RIGHTS

Commenting on the problem of preserving the world's
most Lockean regime,

the young Lincoln insists that "All

the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined ... could not
by force,

take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on

the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years."

Whatever

danger may arise "must spring up amongst us.

It cannot

come

Political

from

abroad''

("The

Perpetuation

Institutions, 11 in Current ed.

1967,

12).

of

Our

Blessed on the

whole with the most favorable historical conditions,

the

United States in Lincoln's view can best secure itself as a
free society by securing itself against the dangers generally incident to free

societies,

against the dangers to

which such societies tend naturally to be susceptible.

He

suggests implicitly that the theoretical problem of preserving a free society, of preserving a societal attachment to
the idea of freedom under law,

reduces to the problem of

forming domestic public opinion.
Guided by the principle that at least in a free or
open

society,

opinion depends

the

soundness

of the

formation

of public

in large part upon the soundness of its

theoretical foundations,

we have attempted in the present
417
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work to uncover and elucidate the foundations of Lockean
natural

right.

In the course of that attempt,

we have

struggled,

as virtually all of Locke's commentators have

struggled,

to understand the significance of the extraor-

dinary complexity and difficulty of Locke's political philosophy in general and of his account of natural rights in
particular,

its peculiar apparent resistance to unitary,

coherent interpretation.

We have suggested that that ap-

parent resistance need not reflect a state of theoretical
confusion on Locke's part, but instead may itself function
as

an

integral

component

of

his

highly

self-conscious

response to the complexity and difficulty of the problem as
he understands it.

Having completed our investigation, we

are now in a position to state briefly our understanding
both of the manner in which Locke holds certain rights to
be natural and unalienable and of his insight into what is
essentially problematic about political

justice,

or into

the nature of the problem that requires for its solution
his peculiarly elusive treatment of the doctrine of natural
rights.

Finally, we will attempt to elaborate in somewhat

broader and more conjectural terms the intention behind and
the significance of his treatment of that problem.
Natural rights are natural to human beings, are naturally appropriate to human beings, according to Locke, in
three main respects.

First, it is natural for human beings

as individuals to assert, or at least to desire the secur-
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ity of,

their own rights of life,

second,

notwithstanding the fact of diversity among_ indi-

viduals,

liberty,

and property.

the constitution of our natural desires is such

that we are naturally capable of, though not instinctively
driven toward, achieving a general consensus on the rightfulness of respecting the claims of other persons to rights
equal to our own.

Third, natural rights are appropriate to

us in the most profound, comprehensive respect, by virtue
of the unity, dignity, and middling or in-between status of
humankind in the order of animate being.
This account of Locke's conception of the naturalness
of rights carries implications for two broad and related
scholarly controversies.

As

we have

seen,

particularly

though not exclusively in the past few decades,

scholars

have disagreed radically in their assessments of the fundamental coherence or incoherence as well as of the fundamental traditional ism or modernity of Locke's thought.

Our

own findings support the following general conclusions with
respect to these

issues.

However numerous his

apparent

confusions or self-contradictions, Locke can be most plausibly

understood

thinker.

as

a

fundamentally

coherent

political

The basis of his coherence consists, however, not

in the essential subordination or reduction of the traditional or premodern to the modern element of his thought,
nor even in the subordination of the latter to the former
as

it

is

commonly

conceived,

but

rather

in

a

peculiar
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attempt at combining or synthesizing modern and premodern
elements.

"There is no occasion,"

Locke maintains,

"to

oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another or to be
squeamish on either side.

He that wisely conducts his mind

in the pursuit of knowledge will gather what lights and get
what helps he can from either of them,

from whom they are

best to be had" (CU 24).
Perhaps the most uncommon aspect of this suggestion
concerns the character of the traditional or premodern, or
to borrow Tarcov's usage (1983), the "non-Lockean" Locke.
According to the present reading,
not a

the premodern Locke is

faithful expositor of any authoritative revelation,

nor even fundamentally a theologian, but rather in his most
serious
modern,

intention

a

quasi-Socratic

rationalist.

As

a

Locke rejects both in its corrupted and original

forms the classical teleological understanding of nature,
and proposes its replacement with a conception of nature as
an aggregation of diverse powers, explainable most precisely in terms of hypothetically formulated laws of material
and efficient causation.

The completeness of his assent to

modern principles is questionable, however, at least insofar as Locke does not draw from the ultimately hypothetical
character of any scientific or causal account of nature the
more radically modern inference that we are incapable of
any reliable knowledge of nature,

or that what we please

ourselves to call "knowledge" is at bottom a pure mental
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construction.
Locke insists that the inaccessibility of a genuine,
comprehensive science of nature need not and should not
dissuade us from the serious study of nature.
because

we

can

gain

reliable

It need not,

probabilistic

knowledge

through careful empirical study, through the gathering of
"natural

history,"

in many

cases under the guidance

hypotheses involving causality.

of

It should not, because the

advancement of the empirical study of nature lies very much
in our practical concernment.

Thus the validity of Locke's

defense of the study of nature rests in part upon conclusions drawn from his study of human nature.
in

turn

that

in

order

to

perform

a

But this means

natural-historical

investigation of the human condition and the concernments
proper to human beings as such,

the human understanding

must maintain an openness to the relevant evidence, must
operate

in

the

decisive

respect

in

independence

conditions of its own efficient causation.

of the

Locke cannot

then maintain dogmatically, but must instead maintain only
provisionally, the modern conception of nature.

He acknow-

ledges not only that we are inherently incapable of certainty

with

respect

to

propositions

involving

efficient

causation, but more importantly that there are natural phenomena--mental operations in particular--whose explanation
we cannot even conceive in such terms.
the

basis

of

the

Socratic element

of

In this consists
Locke's

thinking.
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Cognizant of its limitations, Locke adopts only partially
and

provisionally

the

modern

conception of

nature

as

a

realm ruled by the forces of material and efficient causation; at least his natural-historical account of the human
condition must rest on a somewhat more "naive," more genuinely empirical investigation.
For the same reason, Locke's rejection of the specifically classical teleology and its more dogmatic medieval
variants

need

not

proceed

from

or entail

rejection of the notion of teleology.
human nature

that

is

relevant to

a

categorical

In conceiving of the

the

foundation

of the

principles of natural human rights, Locke conceives of the
faculty of reason as engaged in a two-sided relationship
with the most powerful passions.
matic

or

instrumental

In its more common, prag-

manifestations,

reason

cooperates

with and even serves the passions; while in its manifestation as consciousness of our common ignorance or of the
mysteriousness of the human condition, reason struggles to
gain

independence

adopts

of the passions.

a kind of modernized,

In this way,

Locke

attenuated teleology,

which

takes its bearings not from instances of exceptional human
perfection, but rather from natural, empirical regularities
or from the "ordinary course of nature."
The suggestion that Locke's political philosophy proceeds from a

fundamentally Socratic inspiration carries a

surprising and at least initially problematic implication.
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It

implies

Lockes:

the

existence

of

not

one,

but

two

exoteric

not only the more prominent Locke who claims an

intellectual genealogy tracing through Hooker to the roots
of the Christian natural law tradition, therewith invoking
religious authority in support of his conception of human
dependence;
intention,

but

also,

with

a

somewhat more

specialized

the more radically modern Locke who seeks to

adapt to liberal ends the hedonist subjectivism of Hobbes
in particular.

We might say then that Locke diverges from

the premodern tradition, ultimately from the Socratic tradition, not radically, not theoretically, but only prudentially or instrumentally.

Yet we cannot simply leave the

matter as it stands; for the question arises whether this
apparently instrumental divergence in itself entails a deep
radicalism.

Stated in other words, the peculiar implica-

tion of our suggestion

is that the appropriate mode of

preserving or advancing in practice the Socratic principle
is not, according to Locke, the classical regime or political

science

descendants,
science,
natural

designed
but

by

Socrates

and

his

rather the modern regime

philosophic

and political

at the core of which is the modern principle of
rights.

What the Socratic premoderns affirm on

Socratic

grounds

as

a

guide

rejects,

also,

grounds.

The following is an attempt at elaborating some-

according

to

to
our

rational
argument,

action,
on

Locke

Socratic

what more conjecturally the grounds of Locke's surprising
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choice to advance his own foundational Socratism at least
to a significant extent by modern means.
The point

of departure

for

Locke's

deviation

from

premodern natural right teachings appears especially in the
problematic relation between the second and third propositions stated above,

describing the manner in which Locke

holds certain rights to be natural.

It appears, in other

words, in the fact that the "ordinary course of nature," as
manifested throughout human history, hardly provides unambiguous support for the principles of natural rights.
ural rights are most powerfully and persistently,
sense most naturally endangered,

in Locke's view,

the

nature

material

unprovidedness

rather by the natural
human,

mental desires.

of

expansiveness

of

in

Nat-

in this
not by

general,

but

the specifically

The implication seems to be that

the rhetorical advancement of the cause of natural rights
requires not only the affirmation of the fact of human dignity, but also and perhaps more urgently the de-emphasis of
and even abstraction from the grounds

of human dignity.

Insofar as arguments elaborating those grounds may tend to
excite in some readers fanciful dreams of dominion, in particular in the most clever, most ambitious, most rationally
adept readers,

their unambiguous public presentation may

serve in the end to harm the cause they are intended to
advance.
For this reason, the suspicion arises that the spirit
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of defensiveness that animates Locke's political thought
also governs Locke's presentation of his political thought.
According to this reading, the peculiar problem of natural
rights in Locke's view would then consist in the tendency
in practice of even or especially the deepest,
found

and complete accounts

of human

most pro-

nature and of the

naturalness of rights to invite the greatest abuses,

to

reinforce or exacerbate the greatest dangers to the securing of those rights.

Herein lies the broader significance

of Locke's emphasis in the Second Treatise and elsewhere on
the centrality of the property right and the justice and
social beneficence of the productive pursuit of material
This emphasis can be misleading in the respect

abundance.

that it tends to mask the essentially austere, necessitous
character of the Lockean political ethic.

Somewhat para-

doxically, the Lockean liberation of acquisitiveness represents in fact an attitude of deference to the powerfully
necessitous character of the human condition.
only acknowledges as

legitimate,

Locke not

but in fact urges as a

natural political imperative the creation of a condition of
material abundance; the right to acquire is to be protected
because nature compels us to labor productively, not only
to

relieve

or moderate

our natural

penury,

but also to

stimulate a more active desire for independence among the
sluggish

and

to

provide

benign

gratification

for

the

expansive desires of many of the more energetic members of
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the species.
necessity,

In its defensive respect for the power of

Locke's

political

thought

can

be

viewed

as

centering on an act of resistance to the transition that
Glaucon insists upon in Book 2 of The Republic, the transition from the necessitous to the luxurious or feverish city
(369b-373e).

The Second Treatise in this way presents a

liberalized, technologically fortified version of the Platonic "city of sows," and thus denies, despite its emphasis
on the creation of abundance,

any public significance to

the liberal arts, the leisured pursuits that might fulfill
the lives and redeem the labors of its inhabitants.
In

short,

Locke

seems

more

deeply

impressed

than

Plato himself by the Platonic insight of the kinship between eros
1964,

and tyranny

(Republic

571a-580a;

cf.

Strauss

110-111, 133), to the point that he seeks to defend

the commonwealth against tyranny by banishing at least the
most prominent forms of eros from public life.
mous

disordering

power

of

the human

fancy,

The enorwhich

Locke

seems implicitly to accuse the premoderns of underappreciating, greatly magnifies the enduring political problem of
authenticating

the

claims

of

wisdom

to

the

unwise

and

therewith intensifies the need to separate philosophy from
political life, to deny for practical purposes that wisdom
or philosophy as such has any superior legislative claim.
The dangers to public well-being posed by private fancies
are so persistent and so severe,

in Locke's estimation,
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that any vision of human happiness or completion that tends
to enflame such fancies,

including the life of reason as

the classics presented it, must be at least to a considerable extent relegated to private life along with the activities of the fancy proper.
As a rationale for his deviation from premodern natural

right,

necessitous

however,

Locke's appeal to the fundamentally

character of the

natural

human

condition as

thus described remains partial or one-dimensional.

It is

useful in this connection first to observe that the tradition of premodern natural right hardly manifests an obliviousness to the disorderly potential of the human mind.
The

Socrates

of

Plato's

Republic,

clearest example to the contrary,

to

cite

perhaps

the

remarks not only upon

the presence in virtually all human souls of "beastly and
wild, " tyrannical desires that emerge commonly in dreams,
unrestrained by "shame and prudence,"

but also upon the

power of a partial education in philosophy to liberate or
inflame those desires, producing the most degenerate forms
of human being

(571c-d, 491a-492c,

Politics 2. 7.11-13,19).

It clearly strains credulity to

charge the major figures
tradition,

originally

495a-b; cf. Aristotle,

of the premodern natural

inspired

by

a

reflection

right

on

the

meaning of the life and death of Socrates, with insensitivity to

the dangerousness

of philosophy or of any truly

ennobling vision of virtue or completion to the political
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community

(cf.

Republic 539c).

The disagreement between

Lockean and premodern natural right would appear then to
consist less in their divergent estimates of the power of
the fancy or of the human propensity for madness than in
their conceptions of the most appropriate or efficacious
remedy

for

the mind's

peculiar diseases.

At

issue,

in

other words, would be the most appropriate or efficacious
manner

of

communicating

and

therewith

cultivating

and

preserving respect for the human condition of "mediocrity"
or in-betweenness.
In Plato's Republic's implicit teaching of the enduring tension between love of one's own and love of the good
(419a-421c, 472a-473b, 499b-c, 501a, 519d-52lb, 541a), for
instance,

as well as in Aristotle's more straightforward

observation

in

the

Politics

of

the

naturalness

of

the

desire for private property and therefore of the need for
balancing the competing claims of virtue and consent
constituting a
cf.

7. 14. 12) ,

legitimate regime
appears

a

(2.5.8,

recognition on

3.10.4,

in

3.11.7;

the part of the

founders of classical natural right of the enduring power
of necessity over political life and human life.

The char-

acteristic classical emphasis on the priority of virtue or
wisdom to consent, of the liberal to the necessitarian pursuits,

most generally of the sphere of peace to that of

war, in no way reflects an opinion that the sway of necessity can be simply overcome at the political level, but to
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the contrary proceeds at least in part from a conviction
that a genuine respect for the limits of political life or
political

strivings

requires

in

the

end

an

affirmative

conception, a publically superintending and in some manner
authoritative conception of the good or the admirable for
the sake of which one willingly restrains the

fanciful,

antisocial desires.
Thus a certain confidence in the proposition that a
teleological conception of human virtue and the human good
can serve to limit as well as to elevate human strivings in
and out of the political arena underlies the general premodern

insistence

on

viewing

the

question

of

political

legitimacy in the light of the question of the best regime,
just as

it underlies the general premodern rejection of

"egalitarian natural right" in favor of a more meritocratic
or

aristocratic

conception

political community

of

the proper

ordering of

(Strauss 1953, 131-143).

cultivation of virtue,

in this view,

a

The serious

requires directly or

indirectly the political rule of virtue.

It requires that

the healthy community feature an ordering of rank among the
various classes that compose it,

that

it distribute of-

fices, honors, and influence among those classes not simply
equally,
their

but in accordance with the nature and extent of

respective

contributions

to

the

maintenance

especially the perfection of the regime (Aristotle,
tics 3. 7-3 .13) .

and
Poli-

In its highest or purest instantiation,
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this ordering of rank according to virtue would entail the
absolute rule of the wise,

while in its less pure, more

practically accommodating forms,

it would entail a mixed

regime, combining the more partial interests and principles
with whatever approximation of the aristocratic principle
prevailing
473d-e;

circumstances

Aristotle,

might

Politics

permit

(Plato,

3.13.24-25,

Republic

4.1.3-7,

4.7,

4.8.3-10; Cicero, Republic 1.26,29-30,35-41, 2.1-2,11,23).
The need to mix or dilute the aristocratic principle
with lower interests or principles, or in other words to
qualify pure merit or virtue as the requisite of rulership
by the

lower requisite

of the

consent of the governed,

derives from the practical impossibility or extreme unlikelihood of the direct

rule

of

reason

in political

life.

Even in the most favorable circumstances, the unphilosophic
character of the governed requires that their consent be
secured by means of an unphilosophic appeal or "noble lie"
(Plato,

Republic 377a-383c,

389b-c, 414c-415d,

459d).

In

more ordinary circumstances, such an appeal seems in some
form to influence governors as well as governed,

inasmuch

as, however refined their practical wisdom, the aristocratic gentlemen who occupy the highest or the most important
offices

in the classical

among

the

unphilosophic,

moral

commitment

mixed

regime

among

the bearers

(Aristotle,

belong ultimately
of

Nicomachean Ethics

1095a14, 1095b4-5; Politics 7.8.7, 7.9.4,5,9).

faith

or

1094b29-

The classi-
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cal mixed regime can therefore remain informed by a high
rational principle to the extent that its ruling aristocracy cultivates a respect if not an affinity for theoretical

as

well

as

moral

virtue

and possesses

the

leisure

required for the most gifted and independent of its members
or of their offspring to pursue the life of reason in the
fullest sense.

Under such conditions, the indirect legis-

lative influence of philosophy injects an element of openness into the general atmosphere of closure that pervades
the regime as a moral community, thus preventing the moral
bond of the community from degenerating into a species of
tribalism (Strauss 1964, 28).

At the same time, philosophy

itself in this view seems best to renew a sense of its own
limits, and thus to preserve the purity of its own rational
striving,

through a

serious and continuing confrontation

with the realm of moral commitment or of faithful devotion
to the sacred (Strauss 1979; Strauss 1983, 147-173; Pangle
1983, 18-26).
From the perspective of classic or premodern natural
right, the Lockean political science, elaborating a fundamentally egalitarian regime or according the principle of
consent a status of primacy relative to that of wisdom or
virtue,

runs the risk of neglecting and thus undermining

the communal or political supports required for the cultivation of reason as a truly independent, regulatory power.
Notwithstanding his suggestion that "if those of [the gen-
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tleman's] rank are by their Education once set right, they
will quickly bring all the rest into order" (STCE "Epistle
Dedicatory";

cf.

Horwitz

1979,

measures with respect to the

142),

Locke

formation of a

recommends
gentlemanly

class, as well as of a more distinctly intellectual class,
that may tend to diminish significantly the capacity of
such classes to function as genuine elites.

Apparently

moved by an acute sensitivity to the fragility of political
consensus, and thus by a heightened concern to formulate an
effective principle of political mixture,

Locke elevates

the principles of Cartesian subjectivity and of the virtually

all-encompassing

status

of

ethic,

with the result,

prominence

sway

or

even

of

natural

primacy

necessity

in

his

to

a

political

according to this view,

that he

renders somewhat obscure the grounds for the principle of
the sovereignty of reason within the human self or soul,
upon which his doctrine of justice ultimately depends.
In

speaking

intellectually

to

what

refined

would

audience,

appear
Locke

to

be

his

certainly

most

allows

greater visibility to his levelling conception of the pursuit of happiness than to his Socratic inspiration.

He

refuses to present in the more classically Socratic manner
a

comparative

analysis

of

or

dialectical

confrontation

between the various regimes or ways of living, and tends to
state

the

dogmatic

principles
or

of

doctrinaire

natural
manner,

right

in

apparently

a
in

relatively
order

to
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minimize the constitutional
the

distinctive virtue

209-210).
account

of

Above all,

or legislative
prudence

(cf.

importance of

Mansfield 1989,

he refuses to provide an explicit

of the specifically philosophical way of living,

instead placing his main emphasis on an account of science
as proceeding
tion.

from an essentially technological

inspira-

In providing for the formation of a more practically

oriented, more directly influential class, Locke relies for
a

primary principle of political mixture on an ethic of

rational,
lining

industrious,

his

emphasis

productive acquisitiveness,

on

the

power

necessity by his doctrine of the
striving

for

endless

increase

and

scope

of

undernatural

rationality of endless

and

its

corollary

in

his

replacement of the classical concept of leisure with the
more modern or utilitarian concept of "recreation"
108, 206) .
relies

Perhaps most tellingly,

heavily

on

the

cultivation

(STCE

the Lockean education
in

its

pupils

of

a

heightened desire for esteem or sensitivity to the opinions
of others, with the consequence that the Lockean gentry may
tend to value civility over

independence of spirit,

and

therefore may prove an insufficient check against the conformist tendencies of modern egalitarian societies (Strauss
1959, 38; Pangle 1988, 227-229,264-266,272).
The upshot seems to be that if Socrates is willing to
risk the emergence of an Alcibiades in order to preserve
the possibility of cultivating a Plato, Locke seems intent
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on suppressing the likes of Alcibiades, even at the cost of
malnourishing those natures out of which, properly tended,
the likes of Plato may develop.

The general failure of the

older political science to promote or to generate moderate
forms

of political practice may indeed lend considerable

force to Locke's critique.

Yet, to repeat, the danger is

that in his sensitivity to the susceptibility of the doctrines of classical natural right to capture and misuse by
the

willful,

Locke

proposes

a

remedy

oscillation to the opposite extreme,

that

involves

an

thus overlooking the

potential in the principle of subjectivity or in the denial
of a proper human orientation by the transcendent to support even more extreme and self-consciously arbitrary forms
of willfulness, to effect a fuller eclipse of reason than
had ever been accomplished in the corrupted practical forms
of classical or premodern natural right.
The core dilemma of Lockean liberalism,
for modern liberalism in general,

as perhaps

lies in the fact that

while, cognizant of the danger and practical likelihood of
enthroning malevolent impostors,

it declines to honor the

claim of superior reason to public sovereignty, it all the
more firmly requires the sovereignty of reason in private,
requiring of individuals that they rationally consent to
government

and

rationally pursue

private happiness.

An

overemphasis of the sovereignty of reason carries the danger

of

emboldening

the

ambitions

of

those

unreasonably

435

proud of their own rationality.

Yet an underemphasis of

the same carries the danger of teaching the complete privacy of reason and of therewith facilitating the overwhelming of the public by the private realm, led by those who
make no pretense of rationality,

but who proclaim merely

the most powerful faith or the strongest will.

In the lat-

ter dimension of the dilemma, then, if Locke abstracts too
completely from the ultimate aims of rational action, if he
too thoroughly ostracizes philosophy from public life, he
may

leave

reason

powerless

beyond the

dictates

of mere

instrumental calculation to regulate the forces of irrationalism

or

willfulness,

and

thus

sphere to be ruled by pure ideology.
one-sidedly

to

erect

a

defense

leave

the

political

If he attempts too

against

tyranny,

he may

unwittingly unsettle the theoretical grounds for objecting
to

tyranny.

It would seem then that Locke's diagnosis

leads him to confront the possibility that the major theoretical alternatives, the classical or premodern teleology
as

well

as

the

radically

modern

antiteleological

view,

carry unacceptable dangers as public teachings, insofar as
each tends in its way to excite or flatter the human fancy.
Absent a viable alternative or middle ground, it would seem
that Locke's estimate of the power of the fancy must yield
a

Hobbesian or even Nietzschean conception of the human

condition,

according to which a

willful politics of one

form or another is all but unavoidable,

a truly liberal,
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moderate, reasonable politics all but unattainable.
Given that he provides ample indication of an awareness of the dangers presented by both extremes,

it seems

reasonable for us to view Locke's foundational ambiguities,
his

peculiar

modern,

apparent

teleological

oscillation
and

between

nonteleological

premodern

and

arguments,

as

necessitated by the delicacy of his task in addressing this
dilemma.

The middling solution that Locke seeks seems to

require the

partial,

practical

or political,

not total,

radical or theoretical, privatization of the quest for the
human good or human completion.

It requires the deflation

of

of

the

legislative

aspirations

visionaries

of

human

salvation or perfection, while requiring also the preservation of a

notion of human dignity that seems to depend

ultimately on a conception of the human good.
In accordance with these requirements, Locke seems to
intend the ostracism from public life of philosophy in its
classic form,

with its implicit or explicit persuasion of

its own sovereign dignity, while yet intending the preservation or even enhancement of the public stature of reason.
Thus if it is unsafe for philosophy to appear fully exposed
in public, according to Locke (see e.g. ECRU 2.21.20), it
may be safer and even salutary for it to appear in public
as it were partially exposed, as the new "natural philosophy" or at least as "Under-Labourer" to the same.

By hon-

oring the new natural philosophy and its eminent "Master-
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Builders" as an exemplary employment of human reason, Locke
advances his public purposes in the following ways.

He

establishes by this means a prominent public model of devotion to reason and truth,

of openness to the persuasive

power of evidence and rational argumentation,

and at the

same time honors a form of reasoning or of the pursuit of
truth that promises to generate very substantial utilitarian benefits while carrying in itself no significant legislative aspirations.

He seems to calculate that the pur-

suance of this strategy will serve not only to facilitate
the production of at least that level of material abundance
required for the establishment of a general, societal consensus on the protection of property rights as a core principle of justice, but also to lay the public foundation for
the promotion of a societal respect for reason in the most
generally accessible manner.

It will tighten as it lends

greater visibility to the bond between truth and utility,
encouraging a conception of truth,

if as a means, then as

an indispensable means to public and private utility or
happiness.

Moreover,

to honor scientific explorations of

the infinite mysteries of material nature may provide some
publically

salutary direction

for

the

indulgence

of the

more expansive yearnings of the intellectually refined or
sophisticated class;

in minimizing his

ostracism of the

latter, Locke may well minimize the potential for cultivating enemies of the regime, and further reinforce his claim
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to have identified the grounds of rational consensus on a
principle of justice that, of the available alternatives,
would be both least dangerous and fairest to all concerned.
The question persists, however, concerning the extent
to which this casting of philosophy in the role of underlaborer

or

handmaiden

of

an

essentially mechanistic

or

nonteleological natural science can promote among the most
intellectually adept members of society the requisite devotion either to the principle of reason or to the Lockean
regime.

Granted, there can be little doubt that in obser-

ving that "most Men cannot ... be at quiet in their Minds,
without

some

Foundation

of

Principles

to

rest

their

Thoughts on," Locke refers to the educated as well as to
the

uneducated

classes

(ECHU

1. 3. 24) .

Insofar

as

the

desire for foundations frequently overpowers the desire for
rational

foundations,

Locke would have reason to believe

that many members even of his society's intellectual elite
will espouse some version of his rationalized Christianity
or of his workmanship argument, and therewith the equalitarian moral implications he adumbrates,

and that others

more secularly inclined but perhaps chastened by his insistent

illustrations

of

the

fragility

of

reason

and

the

grotesque extremes to which fanciful visions of dominion or
completion can carry us, will see in the utilitarian principle

an

morality.

adequate
Yet,

foundation

for

the

same

equalitarian

just as it strains credulity to suggest
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that Locke himself is unaware of the intrinsic weaknesses
of such arguments, so it is equally implausible to attribute to

Locke,

who

after all

contemporary critics
skepticism

and

to

is repeatedly compelled by

respond

nihilism,

the

to charges

opinion

that

of Hobbesian
none

readers would be cognizant of those weaknesses.
further implausible,

of

his

It seems

in view of Locke's great sensitivity

to the human mind's susceptibility to disorder, to suggest
that he could simply fail to consider the possibility that
a few of the most ambitious and intellectually radical of
his readers would find

in his utilitarian relativism in

particular an implicit invitation to reduce morality and
justice to sheer willfulness and thus to

formulate new,

modern sectarianisms, secular fancies of human completion.
It may well be a part of Locke's calculation that the
human desire for foundational principles is ordinarily of
such power as to engender a certain popular resistance to
the principle of subjectivity, thus enabling him to employ
the

latter as

a

monitory corrective

of the excesses to

which an embrace of the contrary principle of natural providedness may lead, confident that the principle of subjectivity will
undermine

all

principles.
innatism

not take
other,
His

root
more

critique

(ECHU 1. 3)

so deeply as

to

genuinely moral,
of the

supplant or
foundational

implications of moral

clearly indicates his opinion of the

enervating and corrupting effect of the presumption of a
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morally provided world, while his suggestion of the superiority of civil to philosophic discourse seems to indicate
a

calculation

teaching

of

cultivating
rational

of

the

potentially

pragmatism
a

genuine

conception

and

and

salutary

provisional

respect
pursuit

for
of

effect

of

subjectivism

reason

and

happiness

3.11.10 with 3.5.16, 3.6.24, 3.9.21, 3.10.8-13).

for
(cf.

a
in

the
ECHU

Carrying

this calculation further, Locke may reason that if by propagating the principle of subjectivity he weakens or removes
the moral constraints on willful thought and action on the
part

of

radical

those

relative

few capable

of

implications of that principle,

appreciating

the

then by the same

means he also prepares the majority of the Lockean regime's
subjects to recognize assertions of willfulness as such,
and consequently to resist them.
Yet

it is not quite sufficient to conclude simply

that if Locke finds it in the end impossible to formulate a
political theory that eliminates the potential for abuse,
he elects in accordance with this somewhat Machiavellian
calculation to risk the sorts of abuse attendant upon the
principle of subjectivity rather than those associated with
the premodern orientation toward a state of completion or
perfection.

Taking advantage of the hindsight afforded by

the experience of the past two centuries in particular, we
can hardly avoid questioning the soundness of any judgment
to the effect that the desire for moral foundations engen-
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ders an ordinary human resistance to demoralization,

and

therefore that the propagation of the principle of moral
subjectivism can serve reliably to immunize at least the
majority of human beings against assenting to the fanciful,
fanatical

dreams

of a

few.

That Locke himself already

questions the soundness of such a judgment or that he takes
seriously

the

possibility

of

popular

demoralization

is

evident in the attention that he devotes to constructing
the "best Fence against Rebellion" by cultivating in his
respectably acquisitive gentry and laboring class alike a
spirited,
dence.

defensive,

jealous love of privacy or indepen-

Implicit in this attempt appears to be a conception

of the proper or salutary role of the philosopher as that
of

an

underlaborer not

only

in

the realm of scientific

inquiry, but also in that of political morality.

Imitating

nature as he presents it or proceeding in the manner of a
judicious parent or educator, Locke insists upon the specific "Dignity and Excellency" of rational creatures and on
the estimable, dignifying character of the rational pursuit
of happiness, while permitting himself to provide only the
scattered materials or seeds of arguments pointing toward
the nature of human happiness or of the various goods proper to rational beings.

The political task of the philoso-

pher according to Locke appears to involve the cultivation
of reason in nonphilosophers, not by directly instructing
them in the content of their proper happiness, but by pro-
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rooting, and supplying the rationale for the political protection of, their own active, industrious reflection on the
nature of a life well-lived.
Thus

in his exhortations to his

readership and by

extension to all .members of society insofar as it lies in
their capacity to take care in reasoning about their own
proper happiness, we might find Locke's implicit response
to the charge that in promoting civility and a sensitivity
to esteem he prepares the undermining of the moral independence

and

courage

from which one draws the strength to

resist the recurring tides of

irrationalism.

While the

Lockean education clearly does involve an attempt at forming the class of gentry in particular as creatures of esteem, it appears nonetheless Locke's intention that they be
bred to consider themselves estimable insofar as they are
rational, self-disposing,
prietors.

self-providing,

independent pro-

It may then represent a dictate of pedagogical

prudence for Locke to leave his political philosophy in a
condition of incompleteness, such that it points beyond itself to its completion in the private thoughts of the subjects of the Lockean regime.

By thus limiting or obscuring

the legislative authority of philosophy, Locke facilitates
the

cul ti vat ion of a

nonphilosophic or aphilosophic yet

firmly rationalistic people,

of the sort that Tocqueville

finds exemplified in the Americans of the early nineteenth
century (Democracy in America 2.1.1,2).
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In this appears to consist the theoretical core of
Locke's
dilemma.

middling

or

moderating

approach

to

the

liberal

Philosophy is to serve in public as underlaborer

not only to the new science or sciences of nature, but also
to moral and political reasoning; and in the latter capacity, it is to serve not only a negative, critical function,
but also a pedagogical, even exhortative function in seeking

to

raise

in

nonphilosophers

their own rational dignity.

an

energizing sense

of

But this means that even the

Lockean regime seems to require the indirect rule of philosophy, if in a much more indirect way than the best regime
according to premodern or classical political philosophy
would require.

For to the extent to which we recognize the

nonphilosophic

character

of

the

various

appeals

whereby

Locke seeks to establish in the public mind the legitimacy
of the Lockean regime--in particular, of his appeals to the
workmanship principle or to a more secularized, more utilitarian doctrine of rights, along with his assertive insistence on the principle of common human dignity--it becomes
all the more necessary for the propagators of such appeals
to recognize their deeper,
justification.

more defensibly philosophical

In order for such appeals to serve effec-

tively as noble lies, lest they be contemptuously debunked
and replaced by more radical, allegedly more coherent ideological constructions, the merit or nobility of the principle they

serve must be evident

to those cognizant of
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their intrinsic weaknesses.

The implication, to repeat, is

that notwithstanding his visible ostracism of philosophy or
of any claim to wisdom concerning the comprehensive human
good, Locke is compelled by the logic of his own argument
to care about and if possible to take measures to provide
for the cultivation, if not of philosophy itself, at least
of a rational elite sufficiently philosophic in character
to reflect upon and thus preserve the ordering experience
of openness or in-betweenness that alone can serve as the
foundation for his teaching of rights.
Herein then lies the ultimate question for Lockean
politics.

If we are correct in viewing Locke as a Socratic

revisionist,

attempting

to

promote

essentially

ends by decidedly non-Socratic means,
reasonableness

of

Locke's

revision

Socratic

then the wisdom or

seems

to

depend most

fundamentally upon the capacity of the most apparently nonSocratic means to promote the highest Socratic ends.
contrast to Socrates or to Plato,

In

Locke does not present

philosophy as emerging from and struggling to achieve clarity in an endless dialogue with various representatives of
the realm of faith; he seems to intend,
bring that dialogue

to

a

final

if not simply to

resolution,

at least to

obscure the centrality of its role in sustaining the life
of reason (cf. Pangle 1988, 273-274).

Viewed in the light

of his apparent preference of the modern natural scientists
to the def enders of the faith as conversation partners,
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Locke's repeated emphasis of the inherent limitations of
the formers'

enterprise carries potentially great signif-

From this

icance.

insistence on the theoretical limita-

tions of the modern scientific perspective, one might draw
either

or

both of

two

implications.

On

the

one hand,

accepting without necessarily attempting to ascend from the
partiality of
perspective,

the truths

one might

produced within

the scientific

infer that the aim of scientific

endeavor is not truth or knowledge as such,
power.

but instead

On the other hand, one might find implicit in its

limitations the need to transcend the scientific perspective, to ascend from its partial truths to a fuller, more
specifically philosophic reflection on the openness of the
human understanding to the ultimate mysteriousness of the
order of nature.
In insisting both on the theoretical limitations of
the perspective of modern natural science and on his own
nonutilitarian devotion to the truth,

Locke clearly lays

the foundation for a more genuinely philosophic ascent from
that perspective.

Insofar as a clear recognition of the

limits of the scientific perspective represents for Locke a
prerequisite of sound moral reasoning,

we may take these

insistences as Locke's implicit suggestion that his or the
Lockean philosopher's function as moral underlaborer in the
end supersedes or comprehends his
underlaborer.

function as scientific

Yet, to state it once more, it is clear also
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that, apparently with a view toward promoting the creation
of

the

material

abundance

required both to broaden the

civility of the gentry and to facilitate the elevation of
the class of common laborers, Locke much more emphatically
directs the readers of the Essay toward technological or
power-oriented

than

toward

contemplative

pursuits.

As

moral underlaborer, the Lockean philosopher serves primarily, most visibly or vocally, the advancement of pragmatic
concerns,
itself.

not the advancement of the cause of philosophy
Insofar as we are justified in viewing it as the

product of rational deliberation or choice, Locke's politically narrowed or partialized presentation of philosophy
appears to proceed from his calculation that the pursuit of
power and the pursuit of truth can be linked with sufficient firmness that a recognition of the limits of our comprehension of the latter can serve to bring into view also
the proper limits of our desire or demand for the former.
His de-emphasis of philosophy as such appears to rest, in
other words,

on a

philosophy could

calculated,

emerge more

dialogue with modern natural

qualified
safely

confidence that

in the course of a

science than in a

dialogue

with revealed religion in one form or another, or that it
would confront less inherent resistance and thus require
less explicit cultivation in a society formed by the influence of modern science than in a

society formed predom-

inantly by the influence of religion.

If so, then for that
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very reason the characteristic danger for the Lockean or
modern liberal regime becomes the danger of succumbing to
"the charm of competence" (Strauss 1959, 40) or of lapsing
into a state of intoxication by its own unprecedented technological prowess.

The essential challenge for that regime

must then be to preserve or to reinvigorate a societal consciousness of the limits of human power, rooted in turn in
a

consciousness among the regime's rational elite of the

grounds of the principles of human freedom and dignity that
such power is to serve.

Locke seems to calculate that he

does as much as is necessary or prudentially advisable to
nurture such a consciousness, in preparing but only preparing the way for a continuing reflection on the limits of
human science

and power,

thus

leaving

it

for others to

reproduce in private the reflections that he himself seems
to engage in for the most part in private as well.
Let us return, in closing, to the question with which
we began.
itarianism

In arguing for the likelihood that Locke's utilin particular does

not

represent

his deepest

reflection concerning the foundation of the natural rights
principle,

but

instrumental

proceeds

calculation

instead

from

concerning

the

an
most

essentially
effective

rhetorical and constitutional strategy for advancing that
principle, we have been attempting to rethink the distinction between what is essential and what accidental, what is
the

core

and

what

the

exterior

in

Locke's

political
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If we are correct in suggesting that the core of

thought.

Lockean natural rights is not utilitarianism, not simply an
arbitrarily equalitarian expression of will-to-power,

but

rather a partially classical, moderately teleological, genuinely empirical conception of human nature, then the roots
of the contemporary opinion of the infirmity of the foundations of classical liberalism would require some similar
rethinking.

On the part of those sympathetic to attempts

at constructing more radically modern foundations for liberal theory,

this might involve a reconsideration of the
common

element

of

Locke's

critical

sense

that

epistemology,

defense of probabilistic

endures
and

judgments

in

the

midst

of

in particular of his
about

nature

and his

demonstration of the arbitrariness that follows from their
rejection.

Conversely, for those inclined to reject Locke

al together and

attempt the

recovery of purely classical

foundations for modern liberalism, it may be worthwhile to
reconsider not only the element of classical thinking that
endures

in Locke,

but also the reasoning behind Locke's

reluctance both to preserve more than this element of premodernism and to present unambiguously the element that he
does preserve.
In arguing in this manner for a reconsideration of
what is the core or the spirit of Locke's political philosophy,

we

are

suggesting

primarily

that

the

relative

resilience of the Lockean regime in practice may be less
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accidentally, more essentially related to Locke's theoretical provision than his most severe and powerful critics
maintain.

In making this suggestion,

we grant that the

long-term resilience of that regime remains at this point
an open question, and therefore by no means deny the reasonableness of wondering whether over the long term Locke
miscalculates

or

calculates

one-sidedly

the

serious public theological or teleological

dangers

of

reasoning,

or

whether Locke's partial or political modernism may be less
efficacious in defending the health of the Lockean regime
against the challenge posed by theoretical modernism than
against that posed by corrupted premodern principles.

The

effect of the present argument is to deny not the legitimacy of such doubts, but only their radical character and
implications.
intention

Our reconsideration of the core of Locke's

suggests

a

flexibility

in

Locke's

political

thought, such that should the need arise, it could accommodate as a matter more of rhetorical adjustment rather of
radical alteration the formulation of a more forceful and
straightforward defense of the sovereignty of reason and
the grounds of human dignity.

If we judge it necessary at

some point to ascend from the principles of utilitarianism
or relativism upon which Locke seems content at times to
rest his political thought, we may do so, according to this
argument, in the understanding that Locke's assent to such
principles is at best partial and serves a moderate inten-
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tion.

In appealing to such principles in a manner that

invites at least some of his readers to seek to ascend from
them,

Locke enables those readers to conceive of the req-

uisite ascent as an ascent within, not beyond the boundaries of his political thought.

Thus understood, the per-

plexities of Locke reflect not confusion or thoughtlessness
on Locke's part, but are made necessary by the difficulty
and delicacy of his task of at once explaining and advancing

the

cause

government.

of

legitimate,

civil,

rational,

liberal
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